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Why Geidar Aliev?

The elevation of Geidar Aliev, Azerbaijan's Communist Party boss, to the Deputy Premiership and full voting status in the Politburo offers some intriguing insights into and poses some equally intriguing questions about the direction of Soviet policy in some key areas under Andropov. There has been considerable speculation in the press and elsewhere concerning just what it is that Aliev's ascent means. In fact, there are some seemingly obvious explanations for his promotion, although, as I shall explain below, some become less obvious, even contradictory, upon closer scrutiny. Let us examine some of the explanations put forth by others, followed by a few of my own.

Aliev was chosen to underline the multinational character of the USSR. This is certainly one of the ancillary benefits of establishing a member of a national minority in such a prominent position. On the other hand, the USSR has never been without its token minority officeholders. Stalin, of course, was a Georgian. In more recent years, the President was Podgorny, a Ukrainian. Members of national minorities serve in embassies around the world and represent the Soviet state, especially in the Muslim world and among Soviet émigré groups abroad, wherever Soviet authorities deem their services to be of transcendent value. The Deputy Premiership, by itself, is not a conspicuously important post, but combined with its reward to a non-Slav who also receives full voting rights in the Politburo, it becomes more so. In this respect, one might conclude that Soviet authorities want to make a special point of it at this particular time.

If this is the case, the point to be made would seem to be of two parts. First, a message is being sent to the West that national minorities do matter and that no matter how hard "bourgeois falsifiers" in the West try to undermine the multinational structure of the Soviet state, there will always be sufficient equality - leading, one assumes, by way of torturous Soviet dogma to perfect multiethnic cohesion - to allow for the appearance and advancement of someone of Aliev's

calibre. Second, a message is being sent to Soviet minorities themselves, a message which is the logical counterpart of that being sent West: Minorities do make it in this system, despite what "some in the West" say about us; now that Brezhnev is gone, the new leadership will strive with some vigour to make this fact self-evident.

All well and good as theories go, but one wonders how the Russians, who under Brezhnev became used to the real and symbolic dominance of all things Russian over all things non-Russian in Soviet culture, will respond to Aliev's arrival. Are they likely to view his appointment as a change of state policy toward - not unlike the Khrushchev years - a strong emphasis on national equality and opportunity, perhaps even of "affirmative action"? It is probably too early to tell, but it should be borne in mind that Aliev's appointment, if it was made for symbolic reasons, will have very different, perhaps contradictory meanings in different parts of the Soviet multiethnic population. If they are casting around for symbols, one must assume that the Soviet leadership understands the important distinctions.

Soviet authorities are worried about the Soviet Muslim problem. This is a favourite explanation in the press, one which on its face would seem to contain a certain logic but which on closer examination fails. Again, it probably is the case that Aliev's appointment was viewed by the leadership as a way to make this implicit statement *en passant*, but it is doubtful that their fears for potential turmoil among Soviet Muslims prompted the action. (I am reminded that this same explanation was used to explain the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: Soviet fear of spillover from the Islamic revolution prompted the invasion. It appears that no one putting this argument took time to contemplate, as it is almost certain the Soviet leadership failed to do, the logical consequence of this action, namely that the invasion and its attendant events would speed the spillover of Islamic militancy into the USSR far more than Khomeini ever could.) For one reason, there already are two important Muslims as full or candidate members of the Politburo, Kunaev of Kazakhstan and Rashidov of Uzbekistan. Aliev was also there already as a non-voting member, bringing the total to three. For another, it would be strange for the Soviet leadership to choose Aliev, who is a Shiite Muslim and head of the largest Shiite group in the USSR, to represent a Soviet Muslim community that is overwhelmingly Sunnite. While the Shiite-Sunnite divisions probably are not as pronounced as they once were, they still exist. Moreover, there would appear to be only casual contact between Azerbaijani Muslims and the predominantly Sunnite Muslims of Central Asia, the Central Volga, and the North Caucasus, which makes the choice of Aliev as the latters' spokesman - if indeed that is how it is intended to portray him - even more peculiar. Certainly,

Uzbekistan's Party boss, Rashidov, would be a more logical candidate under these circumstances. Not only is Uzbekistan mostly Sunnite and, indeed, the largest Muslim group in the USSR by some considerable margin, but it is the Soviet vantage point on the Muslim world abroad (see below) and one of the most promising local economies in all of the USSR. If a symbolic gesture to Soviet Muslims was wanted, why not Rashidov?

As a representative of the Soviet Muslim community, Aliev will only attract attention outside the USSR among *Western* observers who are insufficiently well versed in Soviet or Islamic politics to recognize the nature or the scope of the Soviet Muslim problem. Aliev is urbane and cultured, which will increase his appeal among Westerners, many of whom will quickly conclude on the basis of his promotion that there is no Muslim problem in the USSR. If he succeeds in this, Aliev will have sown the seeds of a neat bit of confusion.

Aliev's promotion is aimed at attracting foreign Muslim interest. As noted above, Aliev will certainly become the focus of some discussion among Muslims in the Middle East, but it will not necessarily be flattering. The Shiite–Sunnite split may be less important *within* the USSR, in this regard, than it is beyond Soviet borders. Iranian militants, who caused such a stir in Mecca last year, have ensured that the division will be remembered vividly among non-Soviet Muslims. Iranians, of course, are Shiite Muslims, while the great majority of the remaining Muslims of the world are Sunnite. If anything, Aliev is likely to be viewed as the representative of a brand of Islam that has the entire Middle East in turmoil and which threatens to unsettle some of the more precariously enthroned Islamic governments.

Moreover, in the Muslim world abroad, most Muslim leaders are capable of distinguishing on more than a superficial level between what the Soviet government says and what the Soviet Islamic establishment says. Aliev is forever tarred by the anti-Islamic, atheistic brush of official Soviet policy. It is difficult to imagine that any true believer would treat Aliev as a true Muslim, a trustworthy brother. The young Shamsutdinkhan Babakhan(ov), the new Mufti of Tashkent and son of the recently retired head Mufti, Ziyautdinkhan Babakhan(ov), speaks to Muslims as a Muslim, even though he is understood to be the representative of the Soviet Muslim community *to* the Soviet state. Aliev is a representative *of* the state, an important difference which strips him of any immunity from suspicion he might otherwise claim. Regardless of having been born a "Muslim", Aliev carries with him the whole corpus of Soviet anti-Islamic ideological baggage, which he has helped to pack.

Aliev in the past, and perhaps currently, directed communications between Moscow and the communist parties of the Islamic states of the Middle East. This tie, which certainly is well known to the leaders of all of the conservative and revolutionary Islamic states of the region, could be a distinct liability, not an asset, for it is not through local communist party organizations that Moscow has been able to influence the politics of these countries, not even in the Soviet client states of Syria, Libya, and (at one time) Iraq. For all their opportunism - demonstrated by the alacrity with which many of them are willing to accept Soviet arms - even the most revolutionary Kadafi-types are not stupid; strong indigenous communist parties backed by Moscow would quickly move to end the foreign policy independence that has typified the behaviour of most of the Middle East states, often to Moscow's detriment or embarrassment. Aliev's long association with this part of the Soviet regional manoeuvring probably will win him few converts among the Middle East's current leaders.

Iran could be the exception to this rule.

Iran is Aliev's target. This explanation appeals to me for many reasons. First, almost alone among important Middle East states, Iran represents a real target of opportunity for the Soviets. Furthermore, Soviet designs on Iran, if they are ever realised, could reach fruition through the instrument of the Iranian communist party, the Tudeh, despite Khomeini's frantic attempts to wipe it out. Most media accounts find the Tudeh gathering strength, consolidating its gains at the grass roots and its stranglehold over critical ministries and services, and poised to spring when Khomeini topples, as will inevitably happen. Of course, media accounts are often inaccurate or exaggerated. Aliev certainly has had a hand in all of this, which was in keeping with his role as liaison to Middle East communist parties.

Second, Aliev, like the Iranians, is a Shiite Muslim; no doctrinal conflict threatens their relationship. Aliev, much like the Azeri National Communists of the early 1900s (Nariman Narimanov and Mehmed Emin Rasul Zade, among others) has, according to some rumours, visions of a synthesis of Islam and Soviet-style revolutionary Marxism. (The missing ingredient for true national communism, which Aliev conspicuously avoids in public - but not in private, as we shall see below - is *nationalism*, which is officially taboo for Soviet-schooled ideologues). Such a synthesis undoubtedly would appeal to the Tudeh-types in Iran, not so much because they are themselves good Muslims, but because they know that the Islamic component of Khomeini's revolution must somehow be captured in their own if they are to have any hope of carrying the masses with them.

Yet another possibility exists, again one for which Aliev is particularly well disposed. Iran's largest single minority (accurate figures

are lacking but probably somewhere around 6-8 million), located directly south of Aliev's headquarters in Baku, is the Azerbaijanis, who have had a long and troubled history since the 1920s in the Persian empire, although they have been culturally Persian since the 15th century. As Khomeini discovered almost too late, no leader in Tehran can hope to hold the state together without Azeri support or their subjugation. Aliev's new profile suggests a provocative, if currently implausible scenario: the Tudeh stages its coup while, simultaneously, Aliev appeals to Iranian Azeris on behalf of "Azeri unity", which, naturally enough, can be guaranteed only by the Soviets acting in concert with the Tudeh. This is not entirely wild speculation but it clearly is stretching the imagination a bit. It suggests that Aliev and the Tudeh are a lot more powerful than they appear to be, at least at this stage. Still, his promotion may be intended at least in part to send a signal to disaffected Iranian Azeris via the appearance of one of their own in a position of some import in Moscow.

Aliev's target is Turkey. Of all the Muslim countries of the Middle East, Turkey on the surface would appear to be the least likely focus of Soviet policy for which Aliev was specifically promoted. Closer examination suggests that there may be more here than meets the eye.

Soviet Azeri Turks, although culturally Persian, are ethnically and linguistically Turkic. Since the two Azerbaijans were separated by the Soviet-Iranian border, Soviet Azeris have looked more and more to Turkey as their spiritual and political centre and less and less to Iran. This tendency has gained momentum in the last ten years or so and has been particularly noticeable under Aliev's stewardship of the Azerbaijan SSR. Among Azeri intellectuals, Aliev is thought to be a "nationalist", in that he has quietly but steadily increased access of the entire Soviet Azeri population to its historical, mainly Turkic, past. His efforts have taken the form of sponsoring hundreds of new monuments to purely Azeri historical and cultural figures, new films some of which only thinly disguise a latent pan-Turkism, and the rehabilitation of many important political figures who were purged (and in most cases liquidated) by Stalin during the late 1920s and 1930s for "nationalist deviations", often a euphemism for national communist ideas. In addition, under Aliev Azerbaijan undertook to create probably the most extensive network of contacts between Azerbaijan and notably anti-communist Turkey in the entire Soviet period. These contacts include primarily cultural exchanges; their popular effect in Azerbaijan can be gauged by the Turkish music that one hears everywhere in Baku, both from imported records and from recorded radio broadcasts. Among intellectual elites, these contacts have focused their attention even more dramatically on Turkey as the logical centre of Turkic civilization today.

For her part, Turkey has only recently begun to show an interest in the larger Turkic world (as was demonstrated recently by the arrival and resettlement in Turkey of several thousand Kirghiz from Afghanistan). Could Aliev's new position assist him in opening this door even farther, thereby advancing the Soviet toe? It is simply too early to say, but the possibility remains, and Aliev is ideally placed to pursue it.

Aliev is a good and effective manager and an Andropov loyalist. We probably should restrain our instincts to look for something novel in Aliev's move upward. One can think of plenty of benign reasons for his promotion. For example, Aliev is known to be one of the few imaginative and innovative economic managers at the republic level. His achievements are considerable, especially when one considers how Soviet economics has hamstrung just about every other viable sector in the USSR too slow in developing a second economy. Moreover, he almost certainly can be labelled an "Andropov loyalist", a relationship dating from their days together as KGB administrators. Both share a penchant for rooting out corruption: certainly not a coincidence.

One might argue that Aliev's promotion was part and parcel of Andropov's consolidation: Aliev, regardless of his nationality, represents the replacement of Brezhnev's cadre by Andropov's. This replacement is in keeping with all Soviet successions, as it is with political transitions almost everywhere. As a powerful leader from the Soviet borderlands, Aliev comes to Moscow without a local Moscow constituency. He, thus, is at once more powerful, in the sense that he can step on more established toes in the course of putting Andropov's programme into place; less controversial, in the sense that he has not been chosen from one Moscow-Russian faction or another; and more loyal to his patron, Andropov, for getting him there in the first place.

One should resist, at least at first breath, the notion that Aliev is anything other than an ambitious, competent, and aggressive Party loyalist who saw his chance and took it. There could indeed be important symbolism attached to his landing this more visible position, but we should be careful about supplying it without a careful examination of the available evidence lest we catch ourselves in self-deception.

In conclusion, one should avoid becoming too carried away by the spectre of Aliev's new appointment and its potential applications to Soviet internal and foreign policy. Internally, the symbolic value of Aliev's visibility may be just as damaging, especially among Russians and other Slavs and among Sunnite Muslims. Moreover, one is always hard pressed to make a case for regional Party bosses being popular

representatives of their people; the notion that Moscow is "wooing" support is some quarter of the Caucasus or among Muslims is a thin one in the Soviet political context. For symbols to be effective they must resonate in a tuned milieu. It is hard to find much symbolic resonance for Aliev. In foreign policy, Aliev's promotion may have several potential applications of import, namely toward Iran and toward Turkey, but almost certainly not toward the larger Muslim world of the Middle East. Aliev's usefulness in scenarios encompassing future Soviet involvement in these two countries is based, moreover, not on Aliev's link to the world of Islam, but rather on his position as the leader of the Azeribaijani *national* community.

But these are, indeed, future concerns. Andropov needs loyal cadre now. Aliev, I believe, falls first and foremost into this category.

S. Enders Wimbush

Soviet Water Diversion Plans: Implications for Kazakhstan and Central Asia

PHILIP P. MICKLIN

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Abundant supplies of fresh water are essential for modern industrial nations. Especially large volumes are used in industrial production and for agriculture, the latter resulting from growing dependence on irrigation to improve yields and expand the harvested area in arid regions. The Soviet Union is the world's second largest water user, after the United States. In 1979, 309 cubic kilometres of fresh water were withdrawn for all uses with agriculture accounting for 203 cubic kilometres (66 percent).[1] Irrigation in 1978 accounted for 90 percent of water used for agriculture in the USSR.[2]

The Soviet Union faces a water distribution problem. Most of its population and industry and nearly all of its best agricultural lands are found in regions having semi-arid or arid climates and, consequently, limited freshwater resources. Thus, around 80 percent of the USSR's population, a large share of its industrial capacity, and some 82 percent of its cropland (*pashnia*) are situated in the steppes of southern European Russia and the steppes and deserts of Kazakhstan and Central Asia.[3] These zones lie in the drainage basins of the Black, Azov, Caspian, and Aral Seas which account for only 12 percent of average annual river flow from the Soviet land mass (Figure 1).[4] On the other hand, 88 percent of surface drainage is into the Arctic and Pacific oceans or into the Baltic Sea. These regions are viewed as having a "surplus" of water, particularly the Arctic, and the Soviet government since the 1930s has engaged in planning to redirect water southward to areas of the greatest need. Over the years a variety of concepts have been suggested and evaluated and a number rejected on economic and environmental grounds. Figure 2 shows concepts currently being studied.

The water problem (or at least the perception of one) has grown more severe in recent decades. Water use in industry is increasing. The chronic problem of inadequate and unstable agricultural production, which the Soviets believe can be greatly ameliorated by expanded

irrigation in dry regions, is growing worse. Grain harvests were well below plan in 1972, 1975, 1979, 1980, and 1981.[5] The range of annual grain production has grown from 25 percent of the average harvest for 1956-1960 to 45 percent for 1971-1975 as grain cultivation has shifted into drier regions of the trans-Volga and Kazakhstan.[6] These factors are powerful stimuli to the implementation of diversion schemes.[7]



A. Percentage of USSR's territory with river discharge into specified sea and ocean basins. B. Percentage of USSR's average annual river discharge accounted for by rivers flowing into specified sea and ocean basins. Numbers in boxes A and B indicate: 1-Arctic Ocean Basin; 2-Pacific Ocean Basin; 3-Black and Azov sea basins; 4-Baltic Sea Basin; 5-Caspian and Aral sea basins.

Source: Nikol'skiy, I. V., V. I. Tonyayev and V. G. Krasheninnikov, Geografiya vodnogo transporta SSSR (Geography of USSR water transport) (Moskva: Transport, 1975), p. 65.

Figure 1. Mean flow USSR rivers (km_3/year).

Additionally, the serious ecological and economic problems (primarily through effects on fisheries and transportation) posed by the declining levels and rising salinity of the Caspian and Aral seas and the growing salinity of the Azov Sea, which could be alleviated by increased inflow, are also leading the Soviets toward initiation of these projects. Indeed, first-stage diversions from rivers and lakes of the northern European USSR of nearly 10 and later 20 cubic



Figure 2. USSR water diversion prososals.

kilometres annually is stated to be under construction before 1990.[8] Work on the more grandiose Siberian or "Middle Region" diversions to bring water from the Ob' and its tributary, the Irtysh, to Kazakhstan and Central Asia (initial volume = 25 cubic kilometres) could be started before 2000.

Because of the immensity of these undertakings, their ecological, economic, and social effects would be felt over the whole of European Russia and in the Asiatic portion of the country eastward of the Yenisey River. Impacts would be numerous and complex. Whether project benefits outweigh costs on a national scale is a difficult

determination. Clearly, Soviet hydrotechnical planners and political leaders believe they will. Nevertheless, some regions would gain and others lose because of these projects. Northern regions of water export would on balance suffer harm and southern regions of water import benefit.

CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

The region which clearly stands to profit most from north-south water diversions is the arid zone extending eastward and southward from the Caspian Sea and southern terminus of the Ural Mountains to the Soviet borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and China (Figure 3). Politically this encompasses most of Kazakhstan, except for its extreme northern and northwestern portions, and all of the republics of Central Asia (Uzbek, Turkmen, Kirghiz, and Tajik). Soviet geographers consider this area a distinct physical unit and refer to it as "Central Asia and Central Kazakhstan".[9] In terms of water resources, which are of primary concern here, it is also a plausible unit, basically coinciding with the Aral Sea drainage basin. On the other hand, northern Kazakhstan relates to the West Siberian Lowland and its drainage to the Ob' whereas northwestern Kazakhstan is associated with the Volga and Ural rivers. In what follows, much of the data given will be for the republics of Central Asia and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Physical description, however, will apply to the natural region of Central Asia and Central Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan and Central Asia occupy nearly 4 million square kilometres with a 1981 population of 42 million, 18 and 16 percent of Soviet totals, respectively.[10] The region is experiencing the most rapid population growth in the USSR. Average annual increase over the period 1970–1981 was 2.2 percent compared to the national rate of 0.9 percent. The main cause of the "population explosion" here is very high fertility and low death rates among the indigenous Turkic and Iranian ethnic groups. This is illustrated by birth rates and death rates in Uzbekistan for 1980, where more than 75 percent of the population is of that ethnic group, of 33.8 and 7.4 per thousand, leading to a 2.6 percent growth rate.[11]

Although not a major industrial area, the region has significance in the production of some primary industrial and energy resources. Thus Kazakhstan is a major supplier of iron ore and iron and steel, coal (third in output after the Ukraine and the RSFSR), non-ferrous metals (leading producer of lead and second in zinc and copper), and more recently of oil.[12] The Turkmen and Uzbek republics of Central Asia are major producers of oil and gas, respectively, although they lag far behind the leading West Siberian fields.



Figure 3. The middle region. See text.

Kazakhstan and Central Asia have primary agricultural importance. Total agricultural land here (*sel'skokhozyaystvennyye ugod'ya*), consisting of crop land, haylands, and pastures equals 263 million hectares or 48 percent of the USSR total.[13] Cropland (*pashnia*) at 42 million hectares is 19 percent of the national total. This region in 1979 accounted for 20 percent of total grains and 28 percent of wheat production (mainly from the Virgin Lands in central and northern Kazakhstan) as well as 92 percent of the cotton crop (nearly all

grown in the Uzbek, Turkmen, and Tajik republics).[14] The latter is the leading Soviet export crop, valued at $1.2 billion (U.S.A.) in 1979. Animal husbandry is also significant in Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The zone accounted for 13 percent of cattle and 41 percent of sheep being raised in the USSR on January 1, 1980.[15] Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have the largest numbers of cattle and these republics, along with Kirghizia, the greatest number of sheep.

THE KEY ROLE OF WATER

An adequate supply of water is essential to support population, industrial, and agricultural growth. This is especially true of Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Although many industrial processes are large water withdrawers, they consume only a small amount and the balance is returned to streams and lakes as waste flow. Hence, the key issue is not so much ensuring greater quantities as cleaning up industrial effluents to prevent serious pollution and to allow repeated reuse of the same flow. To meet the requirements of a rapidly growing population, domestic and municipal supplies must be expanded. But relative to industrial and agricultural uses these are minor withdrawers. The chief task is the maintenence of very high standards of purity.

The critical water supply problem for Kazakhstan and Central Asia, therefore, relates to agriculture. This economic sector, as noted above, has national significance, and the Soviets would like to greatly expand this activity here. This requires irrigating and watering (i.e. supplying water to pastures and livestock) a greater area which in turn requires larger withdrawals or more efficient use of water for these purposes or, more likely, a combination of these measures. Agriculture is not only a large withdrawer of water but a heavy consumptive user, i.e., most of the flow withdrawn for use is not returned to its source but is "lost" via evaporation from the soil and transpiration through vegetation. Hence, expansion of agriculture will further strain an already tight water resource situation. It is little wonder that large-scale diversions from the Ob' drainage basin southward into Kazakhstan and Central Asia are viewed as a means of supplementing regional water resources and removing the primary constraint to expansion of agriculture.

The physical region of Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia is entirely within the arid zone of the USSR. In the north, and extending south to around 48 degrees latitude, are found steppe and semi-desert conditions whereas the central and southern parts of the zone are true deserts.[16] Thermal resources of the zone are great because of its southerly interior location (relative to the rest of the USSR) and lack of cloudiness during the warm part of the year (May to October).

The region has temperature sums for the growing season (period when average daily temperatures are 10 degrees centigrade or above) everywhere in excess of 2000 centigrade degree-days. This is sufficient for all major crops, excepting cotton and corn for grain.[17] The southern portion of the zone has more than 2600 degree-day totals and along with parts of Azerbaijan is the only part of the Soviet Union suitable for raising cotton, the nation's most important technical and export crop.

There are also sizeable areas of soils favourable for crop agriculture here.[18] In the steppes of the north, chestnut soils are widespread whereas in the semi-desert and deserts farther south, alluvial soils are found along the major rivers. These are fertile and have high agricultural productivity. Although less desirable, brown soils, found in the semi-desert, and *serozem* (gray) and *takyr* (clay pan) soils found in the desert, can produce good harvests if irrigated.[19]

The critical natural constraint on agriculture in Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia is moisture. With the exception of the mountains along the southeastern and eastern periphery of the zone, precipitation is meagre.[20] In the north, annual averages are 300-400 millimetres (12-16 inches) but are below 300 millimetres elsewhere. In the area immediately south and east of the Aral Sea (Kyzyl-Kum and Kara-Kum deserts), precipitation falls below 100 millimetres (4 inches). On the other hand, owing to high temperatures and low humidity during the warm part of the year, potential evapotranspiration (i.e. the amount of water that would be evaporated and transpired if it were available) is very high. In the north of Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia, it is around 700 millimetres (28 inches) or double precipitation; whereas in the deserts farther south it reaches 2400 millimetres (96 inches), 24 times greater than precipitation.[21] Not only is annual average precipitation here low, but the annual variability (i.e. the year-to-year departure from mean values) is high. This variability increases from north to south in the zone as the climate becomes drier.

Without supplementary water supplies, agriculture in Kazakhstan and Central Asia, excluding the Kirghiz and Tajik republics, is dependent on a meagre and highly variable natural moisture regime. In the steppes of the north, grains (chiefly wheat) are grown largely on unirrigated (*bogarnoye*) land. Thus, in the Kazakh Republic in 1980, less than 2 percent of the 25.3 million hectares devoted to grains were irrigated.[22] However, as is well known, the grain harvests from the Virgin Lands since their large-scale conversion to crop agriculture in the mid-1950s have been highly variable. The main cause has been drought, although unfavourable thermal conditions in the form of cool springs and early winters and even

excessive precipitation during the harvest season have also played a role.

In the semi-deserts and deserts to the south, agriculture without supplementary water is chiefly limited to grazing of sheep and goats. In the mountainous areas along the rim of the desert (above 500-1000 metres), moisture is sufficient for unirrigated crop agriculture and raising of animals on natural pastures and meadows. The importance of irrigation is illustrated by the fact that 33 percent of Central Asian cropland received supplementary water in 1978.[23]

Irrigation of crops and watering of haylands and pastures is considered essential to both current levels and any expansion of agricultural production in Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Stabilization of grain harvests in the northern part of the zone will require greatly increasing the irrigated area. Increasing crop yields in the dryer regions to the south will necessitate more irrigation and expanded animal production will require watering more pasture and hayland.

Unfortunately, local water resources upon which irrigation and watering are dependent are limited. The main sources of current and near-term supply are primarily rivers and secondarily ground water. Average annual river flow in Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia is not more than 150 cubic kilometres; most of this is related to the Aral Sea basin whose aggregate river flow is estimated to be around 127 cubic kilometres.[24] The two main rivers here are the Syrdar'ya and Amudar'ya, which flow into the Aral Sea. Their virgin flow (i.e. unaffected by man) is around 110 cubic kilometers on an average yearly basis with 73 and 37 cubic kilometres accruing to each, respectively.[25] Since they flow through deserts over much of their length, their discharge into the Aral Sea under natural conditions is reduced considerably by evaporation and transpiration, averaging only 56 cubic kilometres.

Groundwater resources in Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia are very large. The Kazakh republic alone possess some 2000 cubic kilometres of fresh subsurface water, with a large part found in its southern part.[26] However, the replenishment rate is slow and any heavy use would result in groundwater "mining" which would lower groundwater tables, reduce river flow, and adversely affect soil forming processes. Recent estimates by the Ministry of Geology indicate that groundwater use could rise to around 16 cubic kilometres annually in the plains areas of southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia without causing damage to surface flow.[27] In the mountainous regions on the desert margins (chiefly in Kirghizia and Tajikistan), use could reach around 39 cubic kilometres per year without problems.[28]

IRRIGATION

The water resources of Kazakhstan and Central Asia are heavily used for agriculture and this is scheduled to increase in the future. The irrigated area in 1980 was 1.961 million hectares in the former and 5.975 million hectares in the latter, for a total of nearly 8 million hectares.[29] This was 46 percent of the USSR total and up 28 percent over the 1970 level. The most important irrigated crop is cotton, followed by grains (wheat, corn, and rice), vegetables and fodder crops. The 11th five-year plan (1981-1985) envisages growth of the irrigated area in Central Asia and Kazakhstan by 1.081 million hectares and watered lands in the desert and semi-desert zone by 16.5 million hectares.[30] Some experts believe as much as 26 million hectares ultimately may be irrigable here - over three times the present level.[31]

Estimates of current water withdrawals for agriculture in the Aral Sea basin are hard to find. A recent authoritative article stated that in the very near future withdrawals for irrigation could reach 100 cubic kilometres annually.[32] Adding in another 20 cubic kilometres for other uses, total withdrawals would reach 120 cubic kilometres - 94 percent of average annual basin flow. Most withdrawals in the basin are from rivers (96 percent for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, 86 percent for Kazakhstan, 85 per cent for Kirghizia, and 89 per cent for Tajikistan); only 2.5 cubic kilometres came from groundwater in the mid-1970s and it is unlikely the figure has appreciably increased.[33]

A large part of the water withdrawn is not returned (at least not directly) to its source. This is due to the dominance of irrigation which has high losses owing to filtration, evaporation and transpiration, and the nonreturn of much drainage water. For the republics of Central Asia, losses for all water uses range from 83 to 92 percent of water withdrawn and in Kazakhstan equal 86 percent.[34] It has been estimated that unreturned flow losses could reach 72, 97, and 106 cubic kilometres annually in the Aral Sea Basin - 57, 76, and 88 percent, respectively, of total flow - by 1980, 1990 and 2000.[35]

From the above it is understandable why the Soviets believe water resources in the Aral Sea basin are strained and that the situation will worsen in the future. Already during low flow years irrigated agriculture experiences serious difficulties. Basin flow was well below normal in 1974, 1975, and 1977.[36] The problem was most severe on the Syrdar'ya where runoff in 1974 and 1975 was 36 percent below average and lagged withdrawals by 1.5 to 2-fold. The acute flow deficit was covered by using water from reservoirs and part of the drainage return flows (which totalled 17 cubic kilometres). Nonetheless to ensure adequate water for cotton, the sowing of other crops, including rice, had to be limited. The use of return drainage water

which is heavily salinized (average salinity = 5 grams/litre) and the lack of water for washing soils of salt, led to sharp worsening of the salinization problem. The latter is serious, leading to significant land abandonment and lowered crop yields.[37]

Crop losses from insufficient flow are believed to be considerable. For example, the President of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, N. Khudayberdyev, estimated that damages for his republic during each of the three low flow years exceeded 200 million rubles.[38] He also states that agricultural water deficits in the Uzbek Republic are now chronic. He foresees the full use of the water resources of the Amudar'ya by 1988-1990 and of the Syrdar'ya even earlier, in spite of the implementation of the most drastic water efficiency and economy measures. In light of these considerations, Khudayberdyev makes a strong plea for the implementation of Siberian diversions in the immediate future.

The question of better use of regional water resources in Kazakhstan and Central Asia is intimately related to water shortage problems and the timing and need for Siberian diversions. It is generally agreed that much can be done to economize and stretch current sources as well as develop new ones. Irrigation is inefficient (i.e. uses excessive amounts of water) throughout the USSR but is particularly so in the Aral Sea basin. Withdrawals commonly are several times the established norms. For example, withdrawals for cotton in Central Asia should be around 9-10,000 cubic metres/hectare.[39] In practice, however, they are much higher, reaching 26-28,000, 35-40,000, 16,500, and 15,000 cubic metres/hectare in Khorozem Oasis, Karakalpak ASSR, Fergana Oasis, and Bukhara Oasis, respectively.[40]

The basic problem is older irrigation systems with unlined canals, open field drainage systems, and lack of adequate control of water withdrawals at the head works on rivers and of applications at the fields. Recent calculations indicate that losses owing to filtration and evaporation from main and distributary canals and excessive water applications to crops account for 73 percent and 89 percent of head-work withdrawals for furrow and rice flooding systems, respectively.[41] This means water actually needed to raise crops was only 27 percent and 11 percent of initial withdrawals. A significant amount of the water withdrawn ends up as surface or subsurface drainage. Some of this replenishes streams or groundwater but much is lost to evaporation or accumulated in drainage lakes and subsequently evaporated. Since the mid-1960s, two very large drainage lakes formed in the Sarykamishsk Hollow, west of the lower Amudar'ya, and in the Arnasay Depression, southwest of Tashkent (see Figure 3). Annual evaporation from these plus several much smaller drainage lakes was nearly 15 cubic kilometres in 1975.[42]

A variety of measures could be (and to a degree are being) taken to improve the use of surface water resources in the Aral Sea basin. A recent decision to implement a national water pricing policy may be one of the most positive measures.[43] With few exceptions, prior to this action water use was "free" which, naturally, encouraged excessive use and waste. Water prices for the larger rivers of the Aral Sea basin have been set at 1.08 kopecks/cubic metre whereas higher rates (up to 1.61 kopecks) have been established for smaller streams.

Reconstruction of technically outdated irrigation systems, wider use of closed and sprinkler irrigation, more regulation of river flow, and measures to reuse or return to river flow a larger share of drainage water are also noteworthy.[44] Reconstruction fundamentally entails lining canals, installing more sophisticated systems to control water use, and improving field drainage systems. Closed irrigation systems use pipes rather than open channels to deliver water to the fields and eliminate evaporative and filtration losses. Sprinklers are considered a more efficient means of irrigation than furrows or flooding, and their use expanded in the Soviet Union from 1.7 million hectares in 1970 to 5.7 million in 1979.[45] Seasonal and multi-year regulation of river flow through creation of reservoirs allows storage of flood waters for use during low flow periods. Reservoirs completed or under construction in the Aral Sea basin have a useful storage capacity of nearly 50 cubic kilometres.[46] Full development of reservoir storage here could increase available water resources in low flow years by approximately 25 cubic kilometres.[47] The major problem has been inordinate delays in completion of these facilities.

Reuse or return to river flow of a larger share of drainage water (estimated at 30–35 and 35–38 percent of withdrawals for the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya, respectively) increases the water available for irrigation.[48] This can be accomplished by collecting drainage water, installing drainage tile or lining drainage channels, and taking measures to cut off the flow into the two large irrigation drainage lakes. The major problem with drainage flows is their salinity, reaching in some cases 47 grammes/litre - more than the ocean - and making them unfit for application to crops.[49] Drainage with salinities up to 5–6 grammes/litre can be used for irrigation of cotton, rice, and feed crops.

Complete reconstruction of older irrigation systems could improve the average water conveyance and delivery efficiency (percentage of water withdrawn that is actually used by crops) in the Aral Sea basin to 70 percent from a current level of around 50 percent.[50] This would allow expansion of irrigation without increased withdrawals by a factor of 1.3 to 1.4. However, the process would take about half of the irrigated area out of production for one to two years and cost,

perhaps, 25 billion rubles. A recent recommendation by a group of water resource and reclamation experts is to reconstruct the most inefficient irrigation facilities which are situated in the lower reaches of the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya.[51] This would be considerably cheaper and still yield water savings of 12 cubic kilometres annually.

Presently unutilized or underutilized water resources could also be developed. As mentioned earlier, groundwater, which now is little used, might provide on a sustained basis up to 16 cubic kilometres annually on the plains of Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia and 39 cubic kilometres in the mountainous regions. Although estimates are not available, to reach this level of development would take time and considerable investment. It has also been suggested to store, through artificial recharge, large quantities of surface flow in underground reservoirs.[52] The major advantages as far as irrigation is concerned would be storage of flood waters for use during dry periods and the elimination of water losses via evaporation.

There have also been suggestions of exploiting the water stored in glaciers in the Pamir and Tyan'-Shan mountains.[53] The glaciers are already a significant water resource since they feed the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya with meltwater. The idea, however, is to increase the melt rate artificially (via nuclear explosions, spreading of coal dust on the ice, etc.). Although some 2000 cubic kilometres of water are stored in the ice, rates of usage would be limited to around 1 percent of this (20 cubic kilometres) and only justified in exceptionally low flow years because of the very slow rate of natural replenishment.[54] Among other suggestions have been desalinization of saline or brackish groundwater and artificial stimulation of precipitation.[55] The problem with the former is cost whereas the latter is not only still an unproven technology but, owing to the low moisture content of the air passing over Central Kazakhstan and Central Asia, might not be able to provide large additional amounts of precipitation.

Greater water use efficiency and development of new sources could provide sizable amounts of water beyond what is currently available for continued agricultural development in the Aral Sea basin. However, implementation of these measures would be costly, complicated, and time consuming. Nevertheless, water resource experts believe such "local" programmes should have first priority and immediate implementation.[56] Most water planners and managers do not view local measures and Siberian diversions as alternatives. The former are seen as necessary to provide additional water over the medium term (to the year 2000), allowing time for more planning and evaluation of Siberian diversions and for the period of construction of them before flow could be sent southward. Also, it is recognized that efficient use of the expensive Siberian water requires

reconstruction of those irrigation systems in which it will be employed (mainly along the lower and middle course of the Syrda'rya and in the lower reaches of the Amudar'ya).

The argument is also being put forward that given the long construction period for Siberian diversions (at least 10–15 years and probably more to complete the first stage of 25 cubic kilometres), work needs to be started in the near future to guarantee adequate water for the Aral Sea basin in the early part of the next century.[57]

THE ARAL SEA PROBLEM

Another rationale for diverting Siberian water into Kazakhstan and Central Asia is to improve the water balance of the Aral Sea. Like any lake with close drainage (i.e. no outlet), the surface level of this waterbody fluctuates. For the period 1900 to 1960, changes were limited to a metre.[58] Since the latter year, however, sea level has dropped steadily and drastically. By 1979, the Aral had fallen 7 metres from an elevation of 53 metres to 46.[59] Its area had shrunk from 66,000 to 52,000 square kilometres and its volume diminished from 1077 to 697 cubic kilometres.[60] Salinity rose from 10.1 to 16.2 grammes/litre.

The sea's shrinkage owes to reduction of inflow from its only tributaries - the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya rivers. For the period 1911–1960, discharge to the sea averaged 56 cubic kilometres/year.[61] By 1978, flow was down to 31 cubic kilometres, a 43 percent diminution. This flow reduction owes primarily to human activities, fundamentally irrigation, although natural factors have played some role. For the period 1971–1977, estimates are that 77 percent of the diminution may be attributed to anthropogenic factors and 23 percent to natural.[62] A recent study by Ye. N. Minayeva, an expert on the Aral from the Institute of Geography of the Academy of Sciences, concluded that between 1961 and 1975 215 cubic kilometres of flow failed to reach the sea because of human actions.[63] This is equivalent to almost four years of virgin discharge. The specific losses were one-time occurrences such as reservoir filling, drainage of water from irrigated land into hollows (primarily Sarykamish and Arnasay), formation of water lenses below canals, and the filling of soil pore spaces on irrigated lands, and repetitive events involving evaporation from irrigated tracts, drainage water lakes, canals, and reservoirs and transpiration from phreatophytes (water loving plants) growing in canals and reservoirs. Evaporation and transpiration, of which losses from irrigated land are most important, accounted for 56 percent of the flow reduction and are the most serious problem because of their continuous nature.

If present trends of flow reduction continue, sea level will probably fall at least an additional 3 and 8 metres by 1990 and 2000, respectively.[64] Some scientists believe the sea would stabilize in the future at between 34 and 38 metres - 8 to 12 metres lower than currently. The sea under this scenario would be supplied only by 20-30 cubic kilometres of heavily saline return drainage water from irrigation. However, other experts believe future inflow could be as low as 19 and 11 cubic kilometres by 1990 and 2000, respectively.[65] These amounts of water (the smaller is 20 percent of average virgin discharge) would result in even lower levels and higher salinities.

The desiccation of the Aral Sea has caused considerable ecological and economic damage; future losses could be even more significant. Fishery resources have been severely degraded both by rising salinity and drying of critical spawning areas.[66] In the past, catches in good years reached 40 to 50,000 metric tons but have been much lower recently as the most valuable anadromous and semi-anadromous fishes have disappeared. Salinity at over 16 grammes/litre is now above the level of 15 grammes/litre considered the upper limit for their survival. Inevitable further rises of salinity could entirely destroy native fishes and necessitate the introduction of salinity-tolerant species, a strategem that has been seriously suggested.[67]

Adverse impacts are not restricted to the sea itself. Adjacent areas have also been affected. The strip of former bottom exposed by the shrinking sea has become a source of wind-blown salt.[68] This process along with intensified secondary soil salinization, also related to the Aral's drying, has degraded both pastures and irrigated areas at some distance from the sea. The most destructive landscape changes have occurred in the deltas of the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya and along their floodplains for as much as 500 kilometres upstream. These areas formerly were well supplied with water and were used as pastures and for irrigated crops. Because of the lowering of sea level and the reduction of river flow (particularly spring floods), their soils are deteriorating, erosion and salinization have intensified, flood water lakes have dried, and the process of vegetation succession is moving from meadow and swamp communities to desert associations.

Climatic consequences are also of concern. The Aral humidifies and lessens the temperature range some distance from its shores.[69] Additionally, evaporation from its surface makes a major contribution to the hydrologic cycle of the entire pre-Aral region. Reduction of the sea's area and volume has lessened this influence, leading to strengthened continentality with increased summer and decreased winter temperatures, later spring and earlier fall frosts, and reduced precipitation.[70] With a further drop of sea level to 33 metres, the growing season in the lower Amudar'ya probably would be shortened

to 170 to 180 days, insufficient for the maturing of cotton, which is now an important crop here.

Estimates of losses from the desiccation of the Aral Sea are substantial. A detailed study of the Uzbek Republic concluded that annual damages to agriculture, fisheries, and industry were 700 million rubles.[71] Inclusion of harm to other economic sectors and republics would boost this figure.

There is general agreement that the Aral Sea needs to be preserved, although at a much smaller than natural size. Measures to preserve it include diversions into it from Siberian rivers, separation of the sea into several waterbodies via dikes (allowing the drying of shallows to reduce evaporation but preserving deeper parts), and the intensification of efforts to see that more drainage from irrigated fields is returned to the rivers flowing into the sea rather than lost to evaporation and filtration.[72] Water from first stage diversions (25 cubic kilometres) would not be directly fed to the sea but used for irrigation and then supplied as return drainage flow. Some of the second phase diversions, raising transfers to 60 cubic kilometres, would be fed directly to the Aral. It should be noted that the measures to preserve the Aral are not viewed as alternatives but as complimentary parts of a comprehensive plan to permit continued expansion of irrigation and yet prevent the total drying or complete ecological destruction of this waterbody.

SIBERIAN DIVERSIONS

The concept of diverting part of the flow of Siberian rivers southward into Kazakhstan and Central Asia was proposed as early as 1871 by N. Demchenko.[73] Other schemes were put forward by Soviet engineers during both the pre-war and post-war period. The most famous of these was the so-called "Davydov Plan" formulated by the engineer of the same name in the late 1940s.[74] It envisioned diverting 315 cubic kilometres annually from the Ob' and Yenisey through the Turgay depression. The goal was radical improvement of the climate of the entire Aral-Caspian lowland and the conversion of steppe and desert regions into productive pastures and croplands. This scheme, promoted as part of the "Stalin Plan for the Transformation of Nature," would have flooded 250,000 square kilometres of the Western Siberian Plain, drowning valuable forests, huge swampy tracts, agricultural land, railroads, settlements, and, as it was later discovered, the largest oil and gas fields in the USSR. The plan was not seriously considered and little was heard of it after Stalin's death. Besides the adverse environmental effects, it would have taken decades to complete and cost (in today's currency) at least 100 to 200 billion rubles.

However, the perception of growing water shortages in Kazakhstan and Central Asia has maintained high interest in schemes for transferring Siberian water southward. A number of proposals, all smaller in scale than the Davydov Plan, have been suggested. The variants of greatest interest currently were originally devised by "Soyuzvodproyekt" (All-Union Design-Survey and Scientific Research Association) part of Minvodkhoz (Ministry of Reclamation and Water Management), in the early 1970s.[75] The agency has headed design work on Siberian diversions since 1971.[76] More recently, a specialized institute within Minvodkhoz known as "Soyuzgiprovodkhoz" (All-Union State Head Design-Survey and Scientific Research Institute for the Diversion and Redistribution of the Waters of Northern and Siberian Rivers) has been heavily involved in refining these projects.[77]

Since the early 1970s, 20 variants of Siberian diversion have been evaluated.[78] After detailed technical, environmental, and economic study, these have now been narrowed to two basic alternatives: the Turgay and Kazakhstan concepts (Figure 3). The former has received the most attention and is favoured by the design agencies. The main reason for this, apparently, is that the design and engineering for this scheme is furthest along. The latter has been promoted by some of the physical and biological scientists who have conducted the environmental evaluations of the projects and believe it would cause less environmental harm to Western Siberia.[79]

The Turgay scheme would draw water from both the Ob' and its major left-bank tributary, the Irtysh. The initial diversion would be 25 cubic kilometres annually which would be raised to 60 in a second stage.[80] Four dams would be erected on the Irtysh between Tobol'sk and the river's confluence with the Ob'. A single dam would be placed on the Ob' slightly below the entrance of the Irtysh near the village of Belogor'ye. All dams would be equipped with navigation locks. To minimize land loss, the dams would be low, limiting flooding chiefly to the existing river bed.[81] Inundation beyond the lowest floodplain would be restricted to short stretches immediately upstream from the barriers.

Water would be taken only from the Tobol'sk reservoir during the higher flow months of May through August. During the rest of the year, it would be pumped from the Ob' in steps up the reservoirs on the Irtush and into the Tobol'sk reservoir. This is to avoid diminishing the flow below Tobol'sk to damaging levels during low flow months. However, it would turn the Irtush into an "anti-river" (i.e., with its direction of flow reversed from normal) for a good part of the year. Above Tobol'sk a canal, following the right (east) bank of the Tobol River, and five pumping stations would lift water 101 metres to the Turgay divide between the Western Siberian Lowland

and the Aral-Caspian basin. The pumping stations would require 1300 megawatts of generating capacity - the size of a large nuclear or thermal facility.[82] Flow would then be carried by gravity along a canal into the Tegiz reservoir, to be located about 160 kilometres northeast of the Aral Sea in what is now the bed of the ephemeral salt lake Chalkar-Tengiz. This reservoir would store 14 cubic kilometres and is necessary to mesh the year around diversions to the warm season irrigation regime of southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia. The diversion regime into this reservoir would have a summer and winter phase. During the summer (warm season of May through October) when the flow of the Irtysh and Ob' are heaviest, 1000 and 2400 cubic metres/second (15.8 and 37.9 cubic kilometres) would be transferred in the first and second stages, respectively. Over the cool season of low flow, 600 and 1400 cubic metres/second (9.3 and 22.1 cubic kilometres) would be supplied in the first and second stages.

From the Tegiz reservoir, the canal would lead south and then southwest around the Aral Sea, crossing the Syrdar'ya near Dzhusaly, and ultimately entering the Amudar'ya near Urgench. The canal would stretch 1700 and 2300 kilometres from the Tobol'sk reservoir to the Syrdar'ya and Amudar'ya, respectively. Main distributary canals to provide irrigation water would lead from it eastward into northern Kazakhstan and Turgay and Kyzyl-Orda oblasts and westward into Kurgan, Chelyabinsk, and Orenburg oblasts of the RSFSR and into Kustanay and Mangyshlak oblasts of Kazakhstan. The largest distributary canal would supply the Kyzyl-Orda and Yany Kurgan water distribution systems on the Syrdar'ya as well as the Chardar'ya reservoir from where it could be pumped into Bukhara oblast and the lower reaches of the Zeravshan River. The main canal could later be extended southwest to link up with the planned extension of the existing Kara-Kum Canal and, ultimately, the Caspian Sea. Although 25 cubic kilometres would be diverted in the first stage from the Ob' the Irtysh, eight would be used or lost along the 1400 kilometre route from Tobol'sk to the Tegiz Reservoir or evaporated from its extensive surface. Hence, only 17 cubic kilometres would be available for use south of this waterbody.[83]

The main canal (designated the Ob-Caspian Canal or Main Canal of Diversion) would have a cross section approximating a convex lens. First stage dimensions would be 120 to 170 metres width at the water surface with an average depth of 12 metres, sufficient for navigation. In the second stage, the width would be enlarged to 200-280 metres. The canal would, where possible, follow temporary and relic river channels. Nevertheless, its construction would entail excavation and filling totalling 5 billion cubic metres for first stage

diversions and 9.5 billion for second. Excavation, which at some points along the route could reach 34 metres, would be conducted both by traditional construction techniques utilizing power shovels, draglines, scrapers and bulldozers and by newer approaches employing directed linear explosives and dredges.[84] There was talk during the early and mid-1970s of using nuclear devices to facilitate earth removal but the idea has evidently been abandoned.[85]

The canal would require a protective strip 1.5–2.0 kilometres wide.[86] Here roads, maintenance settlements, and electric transmission lines would be located. Where the canal passes through semi-desert and desert (from kilometre 990-2273), a double row of forest shelterbelts would be planted on both sides.

Although there is no doubt the canal is technically feasible, concern exists over several of its characteristics and consequences, particularly hydraulic stability, water losses, and ice and wave conditions.[87] The canal over most of its length will be unlined and, considering its size and the volume of water carried, may act like a river. Thus, channel dimensions could alter via erosion and sedimentation and even course changes are possible. Such modifications would lower its conveyance capacity and hinder navigation to say nothing of effects on facilities and settlements on its banks. Much of the route will be through arid regions where the water table lies below the canal's surface. Consequently, evaporation and seepage losses could be substantial as is characteristic for other large canals in similar environments. For example, conveyance losses before distribution of water into lateral canals are 20 percent of headworks withdrawals for the Kara-Kum Canal in Turkmenistan. The designers state aggregate losses along the canal will initially be 2.5 cubic kilometres, 10 percent of first stage withdrawals, dropping to 1.5 after 20 years.[88] Furthermore, they claim that seepage will be collected and used for irrigation along the route or returned to the main canal.[89]

Because the canal will run parallel to the prevailing northeast winds, there are fears of high wave conditions, up to 2 metres, during the frequent windy periods. These occurrences would not only erode the banks but could complicate navigation. High winds could also blow large amounts of sand into the canal; mitigation of this problem is one reason for the placing of shelterbelts along the route. The canal would freeze during the winter and spring ice breakup could delay delivery of water for irrigation, lead to ice jams, and cause local flooding. The stability and filtration problems could be greatly lessened by lining the canal with concrete and using other reinforcing and anti-seepage measures (e.g. coatings and films) along critical stretches.[90] However, this would substantially raise the cost of construction.

Overall costs of the first stage of Siberian diversions are not clear. Gosplan (the State Planning Agency) has estimated 14 billion rubles.[91] However, this figure appears to cover only the canal proper from the Tobol'sk reservoir to the Amudar'ya and not the facilities on the Irtysh and Ob' nor adjacent to the canal. One expert from the Institute of Geography of Siberia and the Far East contends the capital investment for the whole project will be at least 30 billion rubles.[92] The period for completing the project has been estimated at 25 to 50 years.[93] The former figure probably relates to the first stage of 25 cubic kilometres and the latter to second stage transfers of 60. Some amount of water transfer would be initiated prior to completion of the first stage.

The Kazakhstan variant would involve the same features as the Turgay south of the water divide between Western Siberia and the Aral-Caspian basin but a different arrangement to the north. Rather than taking water from the Irtysh and Lower Ob', diversions would be made from the middle and upper Ob'.[94] For the first stage, 25 cubic kilometres would be taken from the existing Novosibirsk reservoir on the Ob' and diverted via a canal across the Kulunda Steppe into a reservoir to be created on the Irtysh near Pavlodar. An irrigation canal that could be enlarged and extended for this purpose is reportedly near the construction phase.[95] A second canal would stretch from Pavlodar to the Tobol River near Kurgan, from whence the water would be sent southward via the same facilities as the Turgay variant. The length of the canal from the Novosibirsk Reservoir to Kurgan would be 1500 kilometres. A second stage increasing diversions to 60 cubic kilometres could be implemented by erecting dams on two Ob' tributaries downstream from Novosibirsk, the Tom' and Chulym, and pumping 35 cubic kilometres via a 400 kilometre canal into the Novosibirsk Reservoir.

The Kazakhstan variant would require a number of large reservoirs on the upper Ob' and its middle course tributaries, with an aggregate volume and area of over 50 cubic kilometres and 2500–3500 square kilometres, respectively, after implementation of the second stage. It would have fewer adverse environmental effects on the Irtysh than the Turgay plan but would do harm to the Ob' below Novosibirsk by its significant reduction of flow. It would also allow irrigation in extreme northern Kazakhstan adjacent to the canal from the Novosibirsk reservoir to Kurgan.

A CONTROVERSY OVER SIBERIAN DIVERSIONS

Plans to transfer water from the Irtysh and Ob' into Kazakhstan and Central Asia are embroiled in internal debate within the Soviet Union.

The project has been enthusiastically endorsed and forcefully promoted over the past decade by the design agencies Soyuzvodproyekt and Soyuzgiprovodkhoz along with party and government officials as well as reclamationists and other water management scientists in Kazakhstan and the Central Asian republics. This support is natural. The hydrotechnical agencies' reputation and future are tied to these projects whereas little of the harm but most of the benefits from them would accrue to Kazakhstan and Central Asia. For some years, however, concern about the implementation of these schemes, at least in their present form and in the near future has been articulated. Worries have been expressed, mainly by environmental scientists and economists assigned the task of evaluating the effects of these undertakings. Recently, what might be construed as outright opposition to Siberian diversions has surfaced in the Soviet press.

The debate was most clearly and dramatically revealed in two articles, occupying a full page, published in the influential and widely read paper *Literaturnaya gazeta* on March 10, 1982. One piece was an interview with Igor' A. Gerardi, deputy chief engineer for the design agencies Soyuzgiprovodkhoz and Soyuzvodproyekt and chief engineer for the Siberian diversion projects.[96] Gerardi, who spent his early professional career building irrigation facilities in Central Asia, has been deeply involved with the formulation of these schemes since the late 1960s.[97] He has been an articulate, forceful proponent of the rapid implementation of these undertakings. The opposing view was written about by V. Perevedentsev, identified as a candidate (*kandidat*) of economic science.[98] Although not known for his work on the analysis of the diversion projects, Perevedentsev is obviously familiar with them and has been present at many of the major conferences convened about them.

Gerardi, in this piece and elsewhere, argues that the Siberian diversion projects have been carefully studied and designed over many years. He feels that the environmental consequences for the Middle Region (Western Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia) of first stage diversions of 25 cubic kilometres have been adequately investigated by over 30 research organizations of the national and republican academies of sciences, universities, Goskomgidromet (State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Control of the Natural Environment), and other state agencies.[98] Among the matters looked at were effects on the Arctic Ocean as well as changes in climatic, hydrologic, permafrost, vegetation, soil, wildlife, epidemeological, and general landscape conditions. According to Gerardi, no adverse effects so serious as to consider foregoing the rapid implementation of the Turgay variant of first stage diversions were discovered.

On the other hand, he sees great economic benefits from the water

transfers, primarily to agriculture. Thus, he predicts that grain production in Central Asia and southern Kazakhstan, mainly of wheat and corn, would rise by 25-30 times initially and ultimately by 50-60 million tons (probably after second stage diversions raise the transfers to 60 cubic kilometres). This would make a major contribution to Soviet grain output which averaged 205 million metric tons for 1976-1980. Cotton, the USSR's key technical crop, which is raised only in Central Asia and in Azerbaijan, would also benefit greatly from water diversions as would vegetable output and animal husbandry. Transportation also would be improved since the Main Canal of Diversion would provide a navigable waterway from Belogor'ye on the Ob' to the Amudar'ya and subsequently, after extension, to the Caspian Sea. Other major benefits of the project have been cited by others: the economic development of regions adjacent to the canal and the raising of the drainage capacity and reduction of high-water periods on the lower Irtysh and Ob', which would improve the agricultural potential of adjacent lands.[99]

Gerardi claims that delaying construction of the Siberian schemes will result in losses of 20 billion rubles annually to agriculture and industry. Each cubic kilometre of water provided, according to the Uzbek Council for the Study of Productive Forces (SOPS), would add 500 million rubles annually to agricultural and industrial production in this republic alone. The payoff period for the canal (time necessary to recoup the "official" estimate of the capital investment of 14 billion rubles) Gerardi places at 10 years. He stresses that construction of the project could begin at the end of the current (11th) five-year plan (1981-1986) since Minvodhoz has a strong construction base in Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

Arguments similar to Gerardi's have been made by others. At the 25th Party Congress in 1976, Uzbek, Kazakh and Turkmen Party officials came out strongly in favour of Siberian diversions.[100] These pleadings were repeated at the 26th Congress held in February 1981 by the same people, M. G. Gapurov, Sh. R. Rashidov, and D. A. Kunayev, First Secretaries of the Turkmen, Uzbek, and Kazakh central committees, respectively.[101]

N. Khudayberdyev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Uzbek Republic, is also a staunch supporter of Siberian diversions. He presented his views in the lead article of the March 1981 issue of *Gidrotekhnika i melioratsiya* (Hydrotechnology and Reclamation), the Journal of Minvoodkhoz.[102] Khudayberdyev foresees, in spite of institution of efficiency and other measures to better utilize local water resources, a water shortage crisis facing the republic by 1990. The only means for further expansion of irrigated agriculture would be transfer of water from Siberian rivers. Diversions (both first and

second stage, equalling 60 cubic kilometres) would increase water resources in the Aral Sea Basin by 50 percent allowing a doubling of the present irrigated area and an increase in cotton production to 11-12 million tons from present levels of around 9 million tons. Khudayberdyev also sees major benefits deriving from the growth of settlements and the development of mineral resources and land along the route of the Main Canal. He states the construction of the project will require hundreds of thousands of workers and will promote the rational use of the rapidly growing labour resources of Central Asia. The argument that water diversions would help to resolve problems caused by rapid population growth in Central Asia has been mentioned by others also.[103]

Khudayberdyev believes previous large hydrotechnical construction projects in the USSR have provided the technical experience to proceed with implementation of the Siberian scheme. He states that the equipment and technicians necessary for the project are already available and that the workers of Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics stand ready to actively participate in the implementation of the plans.

Perevedentsev takes a dim view of Siberian diversions.[104] He emphatically states that the investigation of their economic and ecological effects is inadequate and that they are not economically justified. Perevedentsev alleges that, based on his participation in many conferences on diversion projects, designers and scientists are on opposite sides of this question, the former pushing for rapid implementation and the latter urging caution and more research. In his view, designing of the diversion schemes preceded the gathering of critical scientific data; consequently, some key questions are unanswered or resolved in an approximate fashion.

Among the basic questions that Perevedentsev sees as unresolved are the magnitude of water loss and mineralization between points of withdrawal in Western Siberia and use in the Aral Sea basin, consequences of withdrawals for Western Siberia, ramifications of migration of cold-water flora and fauna of Siberia into areas with much warmer environments, and the cost and payoff period of the project. Owing to his expertise in economics, he deals at length with the economic justification (or lack of it) for the project. The Expert Commission of Gosplan in 1980 estimated the Main Canal would require 14 billion rubles capital investment. Of the 17 cubic kilometres of water drawn annually from the Tegiz Reservoir, only 14 would reach the fields in the most modern irrigation systems of Central Asia with efficiencies of 80 percent. Consequently, to pay off the capital cost (not including interest charges) in ten years, as the designers claim will be done, would require a net return of 100 rubles/1000 cubic

metres.[105] However, according to Perevedentsev, cotton, the most profitable crop grown here, returns only 8 to 50 rubles/1000 cubic meters. Thus, even assuming the maximum rate, the payoff period would be at least 20 years. Furthermore, there would be additional expenses associated with constructing new irrigation facilities to use the Siberian water, a lengthy period of "dead" investment before construction would be far enough along for any water to be used productively, and substantial costs to operate the diversion facilities. Considering all factors, he doubts that the diversion project will have a payoff period of less than 30 years.

Perevedentsev concludes that there are more economical means of increasing food production in the USSR and dealing with the water shortage problems of the Aral Sea basin. He recommends, for example, concentrating on the irrigation of grain in Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan where yields could be raised and stabilized with considerably less water than is required farther south. The same argument has been put forward by geographers from the Institute of Geography in Moscow.[106] Their calculations show that 50-60 cubic kilometres are required to irrigate 10 million hectares in the Aral Sea Basin but half this amount to irrigate the same hectarage in Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan. Furthermore, since the length of transfer would be much shorter, losses from evaporation and infiltration would be lower. As others have, Perevedentsev argues for reconstruction of older inefficient irrigation systems, more use of groundwater, and further regulation of the flow of the Amudar'ya and Syrdar'ya. The first measure alone, he claims, could provide sufficient water to double the current irrigated area here. He sees no basis for rushing ahead with Siberian diversions but recommends continued research and planning work as directed by the 26th Party Congress.

Perevedentsev's critique was subsequently violently attacked in the Uzbek paper *Pravda Vostoka* by S. Ziyadullayev, an academician of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, and A. Bostanzhoglo and A. Pugachev, honored irrigators of the Uzbek Republic (Bostanzhoglo is also the deputy director of the Institute of Water Problems of the USSR Academy of Sciences, which is heavily involved in research on diversions).[107] These writers contend that Perevedentsev does not know what he is talking about and his absurd arguments hardly deserve a rejoinder. They go on, however, and provide rebuttal to many of his key allegations. His claim of a basic conflict between diversion planning agencies and scientists doing research on these projects is rejected. Many scientific institutes have been involved in research on the consequences of the project and their views and recommendations have been taken seriously, as evidenced by the 10 volumes of appendices based on their work which is part

of the Technical and Economic Justification (TEO - *tekhniko-ekonomicheskoye obosnovaniye*) for the project. He also greatly overstates the seriousness of such problems as water losses and mineralization associated with the Main Canal. These have been carefully determined and do not present serious problems. They state the project will have a payoff period of 10 years but provide no details of the calculations upon which this conclusion is based.

They also fault Perevedentsev on his knowledge of the state of irrigation in Central Asia. Older irrigation facilities are being rebuilt and the efficiency of these averaged 60 percent in 1980. Complete reconstruction will save only 3 to 4 cubic kilometres and hardly allow a doubling of the irrigated area as is claimed. Furthermore, total rebuilding would cost 10 billion rubles and take 30 years to complete for the Uzbek Republic alone. In any case, local water resources will be exhausted in the near future (late 1980s and early 1990s) and diversions will be needed to supply water for further agricultural expansion. The writers conclude by saying precious time shouldn't be wasted on superfluous and unfounded arguments and express the hope that the problem of the diversion of water into Central Asia and Kazakhstan will soon be decided positively.

Although Perevedentsev's criticisms are the most dramatic and public so far, other caustic analyses have been published within the past few years. For example, a resource analyst, Yu. P. Mikhaylov, at the Institute of Geography of Siberia and the Far East has levelled essentially the same criticisms against these schemes.[108] Several other additional points he makes are of interest. Rather than expanding grain production and livestock production in the arid parts of the country, consideration should be given to doing this in the *non-chernozem* soil zone (located in central European Russia) where only one-third as much supplementary water is required per unit of production. The construction of irrigation facilities is notoriously slow and it is doubtful that those necessary to effectively use Siberian water would be finished rapidly enough to allow payoff of the project in the assumed ten-year period. Consequently, excess flow might simply be wastefully applied and worsen the already serious problem of secondary soil salinization.

Mikhaylov feels the benefits of diversions have been exaggerated and the adverse consequences underestimated. He recommends far more research be done and other alternative means of water transfer be investigated, noting that this same process led to the identification of many unforeseen problems with the original (early 1960s) proposal for diversions in the northern European USSR (the so-called Kama-Vychegda-Pechora scheme) and its replacement by

several different and more sensible projects. He warns against starting too soon since mistakes will be difficult to correct.

Somewhere between the avid proponents on the one hand and severe detractors such as Perevedentsev and Mikhaylov on the other, we find the major scientific research groups engaged in forecasting and evaluating the consequences of Siberian diversions. More than 30 organizations worked on this topic in the 10th five-year plan (1976–1980) and are continuing in these endeavours.[109] Among the most important have been two institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Institute of Water Problems, the leading agency for environmental research, and the Institute of Geography in Moscow, designated to head research on forecasting the influence of diversions on natural conditions); a variety of institutes associated with the Siberian Affiliate of the Academy of Sciences (e.g. Institute of Geography of Siberia and the Far East); subagencies of the State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Control of the Natural Environment, particularly the State Hydrologic and Arctic and Antarctic institutes in Leningrad, responsible for evaluating the effects of diversions on downstream and estuarial and marginal sea conditions of the Arctic, respectively; and the Department of Geography at Moscow State University, which has worked on a contract basis for the design agency Soyuzvodproyekt to develop a physical-geographic forecast of the effects of first stage Siberian diversions.

These and other agencies have conducted voluminous research on Siberian diversion schemes and convened 13 major conferences devoted to this topic (as well as European projects) between 1976 and 1981. The position of the key research organizations as evinced by these conferences and published research is that Siberian diversions will be necessary in the future. However, they stress that these undertakings should only be implemented after careful research has been completed to determine and substantiate their critical ramifications so that optimal variants (in terms of volumes, sequences, and routes of diversion) can be selected. And there is a feeling that planning work on diversions is ahead of the necessary research work.[110] As G. Voropayev, the director of the Institute of Water Problems, has stated, "To accept a decision (about diversions) without adequate scientific justification would be rash."[111]

As has been reported in the Soviet press, the results of research on first stage Siberian diversions (25 cubic kilometres), indicate they would not cause adverse consequences over large areas such as the Arctic or Central Asia.[112] The design agencies and other proponents of Siberian diversions are citing these conclusions as an "environmental clearance" to go ahead with these projects. Although widespread, large-scale adverse consequences are unlikely, there would

be significant local effects. Most of these would be concentrated in Western Siberia where, among other things, transportation could be hindered by reduced navigational depths and later spring breakup of ice on the Ob' and in the southern part of Ob' Gulf; water quality would be degraded (owing to reduced dilution); and fisheries would be harmed by blocked migration routes, reduced floodplain inundation, and worsened winter anoxia (oxygen deficit) conditions.[113] Some improvement of conditions here would be expected, for example, slight reduction of waterlogging, but would not outweigh harm. This is the reason scientists and scientific organizations attached to the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences have been particularly concerned about these projects.[114]

Second stage diversions would raise withdrawals to 60 cubic kilometres and, along with expected internal basin consumptive uses, could reduce the flow of the Ob' by 85 cubic kilometres or 27 percent below the point of withdrawal at Belogor'ye.[115] This is considered beyond the safe limit and could lead to severe negative effects.[116] Larger withdrawals (raising total transfers perhaps as high as 200–300 cubic kilometres) from both Ob' and Yenisey contemplated for the next century would not only worsen local impacts but probably cause sizeable changes in the ice cover of the Kara Sea and possibly even the Arctic and through the latter effect influence Northern Hemisphere climate.[117]

CONCLUSIONS

The status of Siberian diversion projects is difficult to evaluate. During the 10th five-year plan (1976–1980), according to directives given at the 25th Party Congress and in the plan for land reclamation, considerable design and research work was to be conducted on both European and Siberian schemes.[118] In December 1978, a resolution of the Party Central Committee and Council of Ministers, signed by Brezhnev and Kosygin, gave specific and detailed directions for speeding up this work.[119] A technical and economic justification (TEO) was to be completed on the first-stage Siberian schemes by 1980. In addition, various construction ministries were delegated to design and produce experimental models of specialized construction equipment for the Siberian project before 1985. The TEO was completed by Soyuzgiprovodkhoz in 1980 and has been submitted to the State Expert Commission of Gosplan for its approval.[120]

Because of the publicity the Siberian projects have received in recent years and the calls for their implementation by representatives of the design agencies and Central Asian and Kazakh political figures, there has been some thought in the West that they might be im-

plemented in the 1980s before the European schemes.[121] This now appears unlikely. The Basic Directions of the Economy and Social Development of the USSR for 1981 . . . 1985 and for the period to 1990, approved at the 26th Party Congress, calls for, "initiating preparatory work on the diversion of part of the flow of northern rivers into the Volga Basin and continuing scientific and design work on the diversion of Siberian rivers into Central Asia and Kazakhstan."[122] Furthermore, the TEO for first stage European diversions of around 20 cubic kilometres, has now been approved by Gosplan with the initial phase (5-10 cubic kilometres) to be implemented (it is not clear whether this means under construction or completed) by 1990.[123]

The major focus through the present decade undoubtedly will be on the less costly, grandiose, and controversial European schemes. Considerable capital will be tied up in their construction and it is unlikely the Soviet government would be willing to commit to an even larger and longer term investment in the first-turn Siberian project. On the other hand, implementation of the European diversions will launch the Soviets on a particular course for solving southern water shortage problems and may, in the long run, facilitate fruition of Siberian transfers.

The dispute over Siberian diversions should be kept in perspective. So far only a few scientists have spoken out forcefully against the projects, although there appears to be a base of support for this position among research institutes of the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences, concerned over potential harm to Western Siberia.

A number of criticisms raised have merit, particularly those related to the project's economic justification. Perevedentsev's contention that the payoff period will almost certainly be much longer than 10 years is difficult to dispute. Indeed, it appears the proponents of Siberian diversions have exaggerated their economic benefits. Thus Gerardi's claim that grain harvests in southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia will be increased by 25-30 million tons after first stage transfers of 25 cubic kilometres and by 55-60 million tons after second stage diversions raise the total to 60 cubic kilometres is improbable. Even if all 17 cubic kilometres of flow available from the Tegiz reservoir after first stage diversions were available for grains (which won't be the case owing to losses and use on other crops) and assuming application rates (5000 cubic metres/hectare) and yields (3.55 tons/hectare) typical for irrigated grains in southern Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the increase of the grain harvests would amount to no more than 12 million tons. Adding all 35 cubic kilometres of additional water from second stage diversions would raise production to only 37 million tons.

The airing of the arguments in *Literaturnaya gazeta* is significant. This is a prestigious newspaper and has long served as a forum for major environmental debates such as erupted over the construction of pulp mills on the shores of Lake Baykal in the middle 1960s.[124] The construction of these plants was not halted. But measures to mitigate their impacts were taken, although the efficacy of these has been questioned.[125] Most experts and research organs continue, at least publicly, to support the concept of Siberian diversions, although cautioning that more environmental, economic, and design analysis is necessary before implementation. It is true that in the 1960s, strong opposition from environmental scientists was a factor in rejection of three proposed massive water management plans with severe environmental impacts: the lower Ob' and lower Volga dams and the Kama-Vychgda-Pechora scheme for European diversions.[126] If this sort of opposition can be marshalled against the Siberian project, it could make a difference.

On the other hand, powerful Kazakh and Central Asian political forces are pushing very hard for rapid initiation of construction with the support of many reclamationists, Minvodkhoz, and the hydrotechnical design agencies. It is noteworthy that although the Institute of Water Problems has generally taken a middle of the road position on Siberian diversions, Bostanzhoglo, deputy director of IVP, who has a Central Asian background, was one of the authors of the letter in *Pravda Vostoka* attacking Perevedentsev.

It is evident means exist to make greater use of local water resources in the Aral Sea basin. Reconstruction of older irrigation systems, more regulation of river flow, reuse of drainage water, and more use of groundwater would allow considerable expansion of irrigation for the next 5-10 years. Indeed, near-term water shortage problems here must be solved on this basis since even immediate construction of Siberian diversions would not deliver any water for a decade.[127] Beyond the 1990s, in spite of these measures, agricultural expansion may be hindered by water shortages. Furthermore, as local surface water resources are employed to the limit for irrigation, the Aral Sea will continue to dry. A persuasive case can be made that to forestall these problems and to deal with population growth and the need for further industrial expansion, water from Siberia will be needed by the early part of the next century.

An alternative would be to limit the expansion of irrigated agriculture here to that level which can be sustained by local water supplies. Perevedentsev and others have suggested this course, claiming that grain production in moister regions of the USSR is more economical. This would probably free sufficient water to support a considerably larger population and industrial base but would not

resolve the Aral Sea problem. Also, if increased cotton production remains a major goal, there are no areas outside the Central Asian republics and southern Kazakhstan, excepting Azerbaijan, where climatic conditions are suitable for the growth of this crop.

Predictions are fraught with uncertainty. But, assuming the Soviets intend to continue agricultural expansion in Kazakhstan and Central Asia and are committed to preserving the Aral Sea, it is likely that they will start construction of first-turn Siberian diversions before the end of the century. Initially, this may involve a canal into southern Western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan to provide water for improving harvests of grain and forage crops as has been suggested by a geographer.[128] The revenue gained could be used to subsequently extend the diversion into the Aral Sea Basin. If implementation of the first phase doesn't meet unexpected technical problems or cause severe environmental damage (although this might take years to show up), much larger diversions could well follow during the next century.

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The Religion of the Central Caucasus: An Analysis from 19th Century Travellers' Accounts

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During the 19th century religion was as forceful an element in the lives of the people of the Caucasus as the rugged mountains which surrounded them, an element which showed a remarkable similarity of spirit from one end of the mountain range to the other. Probably more than any other aspect of life in the Caucasus, religion had the strongest claim to defining a sense of unity between and within the various tribes. Religious gatherings played a large role in bringing people, from over the mountain or from the next household, in contact with one another. And it is within the doctrines of religion that we find the foundations of the family-oriented mentality so characteristic of these people.

In the 19th century the tribes to the west and east were officially Muslim (the Ciracassians, Abkhaz, Chechen-Ingush, Lesgian, etc.) and those in the central sections (Ossetes, Svans, Khevsurs, Pshavs, Tush, etc.), Christian.[1] It was the indigenous religious beliefs, however, which held the strongest place in the spirituality of all the mountaineers. These beliefs are ultimately the most crucial for this discussion but a brief summary of the history of religion in the mountain areas will provide an understanding of the religious atmosphere of the Caucasus.

In order to get some sense of the religious diversity, consider the experience of a 19th century traveller to the area. On arriving in a village the Westerner naturally sought out the priest, assuming to find in him a leader of the community. After some inquiry, he found the member of the clergy who cordially offered him hospitality. However, the poor fellow's establishment was so painfully meagre that even our traveller hesitated to accept what so obviously could not be spared. The priest then offered to show the traveller the village on his way to the church for evening services. Included in the tour was the local shrine where the priest carefully pointed out the sword used for sacrificing animals. At the church the priest presided over a service

for a congregation of three people - all members of his family.[2] "What puzzling paradoxes!", our traveller exclaims. "A church and a shrine? A Christian priest and a sacrificial sword?"

A blending of Christian and pagan customs is not an uncommon attribute of peasant religions. In most cases the pagan rituals and beliefs are remnants of a past way of life which is struggling for survival against the increasingly powerful influence of Christianity. In the Caucasus of the 19th century, however, the situation seems to have been exactly the opposite. One confronts mere remnants of Christianity alongside a thriving pagan ritualism.[3] While the old church was virtually deserted, and the poor priest ignored, the sacrificial sword bore the sheen of frequent use. This religious situation can be explained both by the peculiarities of a mountain culture and by the history of the political situation in that part of the Kingdom of Georgia which lay south of the mountain range.

The major cultural routes crossing the isthmus in early times passed from east to west below the main range of the mountains. The Christianity which developed in Georgia in the 3rd century A.D. was, therefore, strongly influenced by Byzantine thought. While this lively interaction with distant neighbours took place in the south, the tribes inhabiting the higher, northern regions of the mountains remained isolated from Christian development.[4] After the establishment of an independent Georgian Church in the 5th century A.D., the missionary urge deviated from the traditional east-west cultural flow and pushed northwards into the mountains. This movement to Christianize their pagan countrymen and neighbours reached its peak in the Middle Ages when the Georgian Monarchy was at the height of its power. Missions and monasteries were established all along the rugged mountain slopes and churches were built in every village.[5] These early efforts seem to have had a wide-ranging and enduring influence, for in the 19th century even the most remote and isolated tribes exhibited remnants of Christian thought. (Indeed, the number of old, deserted churches reported by travellers is substantial.)

In the 15th century the Georgian monarchy began to suffer under the strain of incessant pressure from Persians and Turks. Political strife was reflected in the once very powerful church which now struggled to retain its former influence. By the 17th century the clergy in the lowlands were in an appalling state of poverty and corruption. The monasteries and missions in the mountain areas, however, continued to function into the 18th century.[6] The same isolation which delayed their founding postponed their decline. As soon as the organized church receded from its mountain outposts the tenuous grip of Christianity began to slip. By the 19th century, when outside travellers observed them, the mountaineers were again solidly entren-

ched in their natural religious customs.

The Georgian Church experienced a resurgence in the lowlands in the early part of the 19th century, no doubt a reflection of anti-Russian nationalistic sentiment.[7] The repression of the Church by the Russians, however, prevented this surge from affecting the mountain areas. Neither the fettered Georgian Church nor the clumsy attempts of the Russian government and Christian Societies had much influence on the native mountain tribes. Though the government and the Societies cooperated to build new churches, employ priests and enforce Christian ways they had only a superficial effect. As one observer noted "These Christian rites (marriage, christening, etc.) were being adopted to some extent in obedience to the new laws, but the heathen hierarchy went their way unmoved and with the people it was they who counted."[8] An experience of the same Englishman gives a clue to understanding a reason for this limited success. He recounts an evening during his travels:

> At supper the Orthodox priest . . . sat with us; a good sort of fellow, as seen at table mostly hair and beard. I inquired whether he did anything to discourage pagan customs. 'No! indeed, not I. Why interfere? They are quite harmless, . . .' (later) He, the priest, and all of us drank reverently to Afsati, the patron saint or god of wild beasts and of hunters . . .[9]

Such tolerance in the field negated any of the missionary zeal which might have inspired the organizers of rechristianizing efforts. Even well meaning priests suffered so from lack of funds and communication that their struggle for respect was hopeless.[10]

In the far eastern and western sections the resurgence of the indigenous religion was checked by the successful inroads of Islam. In the 17th and 18th centuries, as Christianity was losing its hold in the mountains, Moslems moved into these sections and successfully converted them to Islam. The indigenous religion remained an undercurrent for a long period but the Murid wars in the mid-19th century inspired a religious nationalism which established Islam in the minds and lives of these people more firmly than Christianity ever had been.[11]

The result of the advance and retreat of Christianity was astutely noted by one traveller and scholar of the Caucasus. "Conversions . . . only added new and half understood superstitions, never truly becoming a part of the 'mental fabric' of the tribe."[12] The Church, as an organization, was no longer revered in the 19th century, but odd elements of Christian worship were incorporated into the indigenous religious rituals with no real understanding of their meaning. Prayers were offered to saints by name with no sense of their Christian character. Icons and vestments from the deserted churches were

sometimes kept in the shrine and though they were highly valued they were never displayed, never read, and played no role in any of the rites.[13] One traveller was able to observe this tendency:

> There was one small modern church in the valley, never opened – no priest ever came there – and, when certain rather gorgeous looking vestments and other ecclesiastical appurtenances intended to further revival of Christianity amongst them were displayed, they seized upon them greedily, but had not the faintest idea what they were meant for.[14]

Many tribes retained recognition of the Holy Trinity which they conceptualized, however, in the form of angels, or assistants to their god. The Lenten Fast and Easter were the only Christian ceremonies observed with any semblance of their original character. Since most tribes retained no real belief in the death and resurrection, however, their explanation for this celebration must have been garbled. The Khevsurs even prayed to a Virgin Mary, though they considered her a saint rather than the mother of God.[15]

The indigenous religion which survived the "conversions" of the Christian period was firmly based on ancestor worship and the cult of the dead.[16] Formal worship focused on a single God of the Dead and his servants. Each of these servants, or *khati*, controlled a particular earthly realm. For example, one spoke of the *khati* of a mountain, a *khati* of property, a *khati* of a place. Each of these *khati* received orders from God and had a band of messengers, or spirits, of his own to relay God's word to earth. The *khati* controlled what happened on earth, the harvest, the weather, the hunt and so forth. These were the things that affected the mountaineer most directly, hence his frequent worship of *khati* and travellers' possible misuse of the word "god" to describe them. Most travellers described the indigenous religion as polytheistic, assuming that the *khati* were gods, not just servants.[17] Technically, however, the Caucasians were monotheistic.

The existence of a belief in good and evil spirits was noted by travellers. If God wished to cause a man grief a *khati* sent an evil spirit to trouble him; if the man deserved pleasure, a good spirit was dispatched.[18] Sickness was believed to be caused by the presence of an evil spirit, and the only way to cure the sickness was to humour the spirit so that it would leave. This might be accomplished by performing a sacrifice or entertaining the spirit with song and dance while politely asking it to leave. Sometimes the sick room would be festively decorated and the "party" held there.[19]

Because the *khati*, as servants of God, were believed to control the lives of men on earth, communication with them was necessary before or after any undertaking. Hunters always prayed to the *khati*

of the hunter before setting out. If the hunter was successful, he had to present an offering to the shrine to thank the *khati* and the good spirit who had helped him. The large number of bones, horns, and arrowheads found piled in shrines suggest that hunters were frequent visitors. Indeed, hunting was regarded as an almost religious undertaking. Men could not hunt, for example, if their wives were menstruating, for the women's uncleanliness affected the men.[20]

Acts of devotion were performed at a sacred site, also known as the *khati*. The compound was often placed within or adjoining a grove of trees. This grove was regarded as highly sacred. No trees could ever be cut or animals hunted within it.[21] It is not clear whether each village had its own shrine. It is certain that some served the needs of several villages.[22] Within the walled compound of the site there were anywhere from one to several small, stone huts. The most important one was the actual shrine, which looked like any number of simple stone huts except that its exterior was decorated with the horns and bones of animals. Simple benches lined the walls of the interior, but the focal point was the crude stone altar where offerings were placed. Only very rarely did some old icon or cross adorn the otherwise bare walls.[23] In front of the shrine itself was a stone slab used for sacrificing animals. In some areas the other buildings in the compound were devoted to the brewing of beer, which formed an integral part of religious observances. An anthropologist claims that only the attendants of the *khati* were allowed to make the semi-sacred drink. A photograph of beer brewing in Ossetia, however, shows women involved in the process. Since women were not even allowed within the walls of the *khati* it seems that not all beer, or at least not this batch, was actually sacred.[24] Though the actual significance of the beverage remains unclear, it was consumed in large quantities at religious feasts.[25]

The sacred compound was attended by a group of male priests, or Chuzessi. These Chuzessi were supposedly chosen by the *khati* himself, though the choice was made public through the local diviner or soothsayer. Each village had its own group of Chuzessi, but the hierarchy and nature of their respective duties varied from community to community.[26] It seems that there was no supracommunal organization which was responsible for seeing to uniformity of belief and practice. Yet while every Chuzessi performed the basic duties in his own way, the carrying out of these duties evidently varied only slightly or insignificantly since there is no sign of factionalism. The general duties of a Chuzessi were to say prayers, perform marriages, conduct portions of the funeral and, above all, to kill the sacrificial animals. The position was considered sacred and holders of it were expected to be of the highest moral and spiritual character. Although

they were allowed to marry, they were expected to abstain from sexual intercourse for weeks before important holidays so they would be pure. And since they were supposed to have been elected by the *khati* himself, no human could remove the Chuzessi from office. Besides holding a respected position in the community, a Chuzessi also enjoyed the material support of its members through donations of animals and food stuffs.[27]

The sacrificing of animals was an important part of many rituals. During the equivalent of thanksgiving, "smaller children . . . carry home on wooden platters portions of the ox that has just been slaughtered in the church yard, pursued by large, wolflike dogs, disposed to claim prematurely their share in the harvest-feast."[28] The sacrificial animal was usually an ox or a sheep, or a number of them, depending upon the importance of the occasion. Sacrifices took place in front of the shrine, except in certain circumstances. A sheep, for example, would be sacrificed on the roof of a sick person's house in order to appease the evil spirit in residence. In either case, the blood of the animal was collected and used to "cleanse" the person or structure in need of purification. The meat of the animal was then eaten at the banquet following the official rites, or distributed among members of the community.[29] All these offerings were meant to keep one on good terms with the *khati*. Not only did the keeping of good relations increase one's chances of a good life on earth, but more importantly, they were crucial to one's existence in the life after death.

When a person died his or her soul departed the body for the next life. Nineteenth-century observers were able to ascertain that the conception of this next life included not only a heaven but a "good, hot material hell."[30] A 20th century anthropologist provides a more detailed description of the next world as seen by one tribe. According to him, the Khevsurs believed that souls of all people initially travelled the same path towards the next world, but before reaching the entrance into Paradise, they had to pass over what was known as a "bridge of hair," spanning a river or sea of boiling pitch. Souls of sinners could not manage the difficult crossing and fell into the seething liquid below to become victims of Satan's tortures. The souls of the pure, however, passed over the bridge effortlessly and entered paradise. Each pure soul was alloted a living space in the fortress of God which stood amongst shady gardens irrigated by crystal clear springs.[31] The funeral customs strongly support this sense of journeying into the next world. While one cannot assume that all tribes conceptualized the transition exactly as the Khevsurs did in the early 20th century it seems an excellent and valid example of the beliefs of these people.

Although invisible, the soul was thought to possess distinctive

features even when separated from its body. In many ways a departed soul had more personality and freedom to express it than a living person. While interactions between living humans were based on traditional codes of honour and etiquette those of the dead were not. A younger brother who had always shown respect for his elder siblings during his lifetime might finally show his mettle as a spirit by causing minor accidents and misfortunes within his old household. If a spirit was offended it did not need to repress its feelings, but could let everyone know how it felt right away. Not only did a soul reveal its personality on earth through the nature of its deeds, but it also retained physical features which allowed it to be recognized by other inhabitants of the next world. It was believed that souls of children continued to grow to adulthood and that all souls had many of the same needs as a living person. They required regular nourishment as well as warmth and comfort.[32]

The belief that the soul retained many human characteristics is reflected in some peculiarities of the marriage custom. A marriage was not considered ended if the husband died, rather his wife continued to be regarded as being wedded to the deceased even after she married another man. Furthermore, all the children she might bear by her second husband were regarded as children of the first husband because she was still his wife. In this way, the deceased's heirs continued to increase even after his death. An even more striking example was the practice of marrying two deceased persons. The father of a dead girl would approach the father of a boy who had recently died and suggest that since the boy did not have a wife in the next world he should be married to his daughter. Not only would the boy's father rarely refuse such an offer, but he would also agree to pay the girl's father a bride price - albeit one much lower than usual. When such a marriage was concluded, both fathers were comfortable knowing their children were fully provided with the essentials of "life".[33] Not only does a case of this kind illustrate how much substance and character souls were believed to have in the next world, but it also shows how the mountaineers believed they had an effect on the souls of their relatives in the next world. An investigation of the funeral customs illustrates how this belief was central to the religion of the Caucasus.

As death appeared imminent the dying were carefully carried out of the house and into the yard, regardless of the weather.[34] More than one sick mountaineer was probably hurried onto the crucial bridge of hair by being carried into the yard in inclement weather! Two explanations are given for this: first, that a body without the soul was considered unclean and would contaminate the house, and second, that the escaping soul would be trapped in the house if the person were allowed to die there.[35] The notion of the escaping soul is mentioned in the account of an Englishman travelling in the 1870's.

Recounting the apprehension with which his party approached a seemingly deserted village, he recalls:

> We were glad when we saw a ragged little urchin run out of a dwelling to have a look at us, for we learnt from him that everybody was gone to bury the *starshyna* (mayor), and he pointed in the direction they had taken; we drove towards it, and in a little while came upon the party returning from the burial. The Ingoush dispersed at our approach, and hurried past as fast as they could, seeking to avoid any conversation with the interpreter, who however found out from the mistrustful people that all the doors of the habitations had been left open, that the spirit of the departed might not conceal itself in any of them.[36]

Unfortunately, no 19th century traveller was able to witness the entire funeral process. Many of them did, however, inquire about local customs and recounted the information in their works. The nature of their information affects any discussion of the funeral process, forcing it to be less interpretive. However, anthropological observations combined with information gleaned from natives in the 19th century enable us to develop a sound description of the Caucasian funeral.

Immediately after death the body was washed and shaved of all hair by special attendants. These attendants were always young people, girls for dead women and boys for dead men.[37] The body was then dressed in fine clothes and laid out on a bed in front of the house, weather permitting. No expense was spared in outfitting the body in the best attire possible. Altogether, the financial strain of a funeral was severe. It was considered very important that the person should not be embarrassed (and therefore be an embarrassment to his family) in front of the other souls in heaven by arriving in plain clothes.

The arms were not crossed over the chest but were laid out beside the body, in order, it was believed, to give the soul better use of his hands should he have to struggle to get into heaven. It is interesting to note that among some tribes who were more influenced by Christianity the arms were crossed over the chest but were symbolically "freed" by a ceremony before the burial. All the worldly belongings of the dead person were placed around the death bed. At the head of the bed was a pitcher of water or spirits and food to provide refreshment for the deceased. At night a fire was kept burning to provide both warmth and light.[38]

The death of any village member affected the entire population of the village. Everyone stopped working or playing to mourn the deceased. Neighbours and relatives gathered at the house of the bereft family immediately after the death to express their sympathy. Village

women brought provisions to feed the gathered mourners. The funeral itself was usually held a few days after the death. Again, all members of the village and friends and relatives from other villages were expected to attend.[39] A great deal of effort was devoted to eulogizing the deceased, for it was believed that the soul lingered near the body during these days and was able to hear everything that was said about it. In order to avoid being tormented by an angry, offended soul only the most flattering things were said.[40] A hired professional mourner, always a woman, or the nearest female relative led the others in general mourning. She sat next to the body chanting the brave and good deeds of the departed. The other participants, male and female, gathered around her and reinforced her lamentations. Women were notorious for their excessive displays of grief, tearing their hair, scratching their faces and weeping incessantly. Men, however, were expected to bear their grief in dignified silence.[41]

If the deceased was an active young male, it was believed that he would need his horse in the next world. In such cases, before the body was removed to the burial site the young man's horse was consecrated so that it could accompany him to the next world. The ceremony simply involved leading the animal, which was fully saddled and outfitted with provisions for a journey, up to the corpse and placing the reins in its hand. In some areas the horse was anointed by the Chuzessi before it accompanied the body to the grave, where it was led around the gravesite three times. This horse could never become the steed of another man, for like a wife, it belonged to the man in heaven.[42] In some areas a similar ceremony was performed with an ox, which as the plough animal was considered the working partner of the man.[43]

In many areas a horse race was held to honour the deceased. The participants, usually relatives, raced cross country between villages on barebacked horses, competing for prizes provided by the family of the deceased. The Chuzessi oversaw the running of the race. If the death occurred in the winter the race was sometimes postponed until spring or a footrace was run instead. Footraces were run for women as well. According to one traveller, poorer people had a shooting match, instead of a race. The only explanation offered for this almost universal custom of holding a funeral competition was that it was yet another attempt to amuse the departed soul.[44] There is no doubt it provided a pleasant diversion for the living as well.

When the time came for the burial, the body, wrapped in a thin rug, was carried to the cemetery at the edge of the town accompanied by a procession which included the spouse, a few close relatives, the horse (if the deceased were male) and sometimes one of the Chuzessi.[45] At the interment numerous articles for the journey to, and life in, the next world were placed with the body, a container of water, a

flask of liquor, bread, butter, cheese, personal articles and so forth.[46] A simple stone slab inscribed with the name of the departed or a pile of rocks served to mark the grave.[47]

It is unclear exactly what religious ceremony accompanied the actual burial. There is no indication that the Chuzessi played a major role in the funeral proceedings, though it is mentioned as one of his duties. It seems that it was the behaviour of the whole family which influenced the deceased's acceptance into heaven rather than the prayers of a single religious figure. After the deceased was safely and comfortably sent on his journey, everyone gathered at the house of the bereft family for several days of feasting.[48]

For three days after the funeral the grave was watched over, especially during the night when a fire was kept burning by the grave in order to ward off evil spirits and to provide the deceased with warmth and light.[49] This is only the beginning of the responsibility a family took for the support and welfare of its deceased members. This support took various forms though the emphasis was definitely on providing nourishment for the souls in the next world. The worst insult that could be offered was to imply that one's ancestors were hungry. One traveller witnessed this continued attention to the grave:

> On leaving the church, cries of loud wailing reached our ears. Going in the direction of the sounds, we came upon three women seated over a grave mourning the death of a relative, but the lamentation ceased the instant we were observed. This wailing for the dead becomes the weekly duty of the nearest female relative during the first year after their loss, when they repair to the burying grounds with bread, eggs, and a bottle of *arak*, 'spirits', and they daily place aside for the deceased a meal which remains untouched; the men never join in these demonstrations.[50]

This passage underscores the leading role played by women, an important characteristic of the funeral customs of the Caucasians. First as mourners and then as caretakers of the dead, it was upon the women that the welfare of the deceased depended. The whole family became involved in taking care of its ancestors - men defended their honour, children prayed - but women, as the producers and preparers of food, seem to have been of central importance.

Besides the daily meal put aside by every family for its ancestors, each village had at least one annual feast for the dead while some tribes held as many as ten per year. Feasts following a harvest, for example, shared the bounty with ancestors. On such occasions the food eaten as well as that laid aside benefited the family's souls. As a result, gluttony could be a sign of filial piety.[51]

Once a year the souls returned to earth to take part physically in

the feasting in their honour. The first night of the celebration a table was laid with food and the living members of the household hid out of view of the dining area. During the period of seclusion the souls were believd to enter the home and partake of the feast prepared for them. After they had "finished", the family ate the food and spent the night in dancing and singing. The week of feasting was closed by a special prayer said by the children who roamed through the village asking God to give peace to the souls of their ancestors.[52] The sentiment behind these customs is summed up in the words of a New Year's prayer recorded by a traveller:

> May he (the dead soul) be at peace and may his grave be undisturbed; may he be famous among the dead, so that none may have the power over his sustenance, and that it may reach him untouched and be his forever, that increasing it may multiply as long as the rocks fall down over mountains and the rivers roll over the plains, neither growing mouldy in summer nor being frozen in winter; and may he divide it according to his good will among such of the dead as have no food.[53]

A soul without a conscientious family became poor and hungry, unhappy and restless. It was in the interest of the family members to keep their ancestors happy for not only could they make life difficult but they could guide and assist a family into prosperity. Well cared for ancestors increased a family's honour in both worlds. Their continued status and happiness in the next world was the focal point of religious activity in the Caucasus and in a sense defined an essential purpose for the existence of the family on earth. Religion, therefore, was a major concern of the Caucasian family.

Although by the latter part of the 19th century the customs of the mountaineers were beginning to show the effects of Russian attempts to rid their territory of what the Russians regarded as barbarism, the indigenous customs did not disappear. A recent research paper attests to the strength and endurance of the religious and social customs described above. "Religious Survivals and Popular Tradition in Georgia", a Radio Liberty research paper by *Elizabeth Fuller* dated August 6, 1982, discusses the highlights of a letter written by the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party assessing its success in implementing the 1975 decree "On Measures to Intensify the Struggle against Harmful Traditions and Customs". It is apparent, from the concerns voiced in this letter, that the traditions and customs are holding out against Committee pressure to substitute moderate, modern holidays. The letter expresses continued disapproval of the "theatrical excesses" and extravagant waste of food and drink that accompany most weddings, funerals and holiday feasts. Not only has

the fundamental tradition of hospitality endured but the horse races that formed a part of every funeral celebration continue in the form of automobile races, which, according to the Committee, frequently result in serious accidents.

The social behaviour patterns which characterized 19th century religious customs have obviously survived both time and the Soviet regime. Whether the religious beliefs which were the basis for the customs remain intact is harder to ascertain. As late as 1975, however, a pitcher of water and a pack of cigarettes were placed beside the grave of an old woman "for her use".[54]

NOTES

1. Bernard Geiger, *et al.*, *Peoples and Languages of the Caucasus: A Synopsis* ('S-Gravenhage, The Netherlands: Mouton & Company, 1959), pp. 12, 17, 19, 21, 38, 47.
2. John F. Baddeley, *The Rugged Flanks of the Caucasus* (New York: Arno Press, 1973), Vol. 1, pp. 235-8, 245; Stephan Graham, *A Vagabond in the Caucasus* (London: John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1911), p. 149.
3. Baddeley, Vol. I, p. 75.
4. D. Ghambashidze, *The Caucasus: Its People, History, Economy and Present Position* (London: The Anglo-Georgian Society, 1918), p. 3; Cyril Toumanoff, *Studies in Christian Caucasian History* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1963), pp. 11-12.
5. Ghambashidze, p. 3; W.E.D. Allen, *The History of the Georgian People - from the Beginning Down to the Russian Conquest in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1932), pp. 95-108, 267-271; Rusudan Mepisashvili and Vakhtang Tsintsadze, *The Arts of Ancient Georgia* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1979), p. 59.
6. Allen, pp. 273-4; Mepisashvili, p. 180.
7. David M. Lang, *A Modern History of Soviet Georgia* (New York: Grove Press, 1962), p. 56.
8. Baddeley, p. 245.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
10. Baddeley, p. 235; Graham, p. 149.
11. Carl H. Hahn, *Aus dem Kaukasus, Reisen und Studien, Beiträge zur Kenntnis des Landes* (Leipzig: Verlag von Ducker und Humblot, 1892), p. 241; L.J. Luzbetak, *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia* (Vienna-Mödling: St. Gabriel's Mission Press, 1951), pp. 22, 39.
12. Douglas W. Freshfield, *The Exploration of the Caucasus* (New York: Edward Arnold, 1896), Vol. I, p. 88.
13. Alexander Grigolia, *Custom and Justice in the Caucasus: The Georgian Highlanders* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1939), p. 27; August von Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1854), p. 160.
14. Baddeley, Vol. I, p. 183.
15. Baddeley, Vol. 1, p. 75; Freshfield, Vol. 1, p. 88; Georg Nioradze, *Begräbnis und Totenkultus bei den Chewsuren* (Stuttgart: Strecker und Schröder Verlag, 1931), p. 10; Jacob Reineggs and F.M.A. von Bieberstein, *A General Historical Description of Mount Caucasus*, translated by Charles Wilkinson

(London: C. Taylor, W. Miller, A. Collins and Darton & Harvey, 1807), p. 245.

16. Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 88; Grigolia, p. 43; Haxthausen, p. 399; Luzbetak, p. 44; Nioradze, p. 10.
17. Freshfield, Vol. I, pp. 95, 216; Reineggs, p. 215; Hon. John Abercromby, *A Trip Through the Eastern Caucasus* (London: Edward Stanford, 1889), p. 189. Pages 188-198 of Abercromby's work are a translation of one of the earliest and most detailed articles on the Tush, Pshav and Khevsurs by Prince Raphael Eristov published in *Zapiski Kavkazskavo Otdiela*, Vol. II, 1855.
18. Grigolia, p. 21; Nioradze, p. 10.
19. Grigolia, pp. 51, 109; Reineggs, p. 245; Louis Moser, *The Caucasus and Its People* (London: David Nutt, 1856), p. 35.
20. Baddeley, pp. 133-4, 170, 172, 216.
21. Hahn, p. 256. This tree worship was often manifested in a village tree, as well. Many villages throughout the Caucasus had a large, old tree as their physical and spiritual centre.
22. Abercromby, p. 190; Baddeley, pp. 131, 154, 219.
23. Abercromby, pp. 189-90; Baddeley, pp. 169, 232; Grigolia, p. 28; Hahn, p. 257; J. Buchan Telfer, *The Crimea and Transcaucasia* (London: Henry S. King & Company, 1876), Vol. II, p. 72.
24. Baddeley, "Beer-Brewing at Tmenikau", plate facing p. 100, Vol. II; Grigolia, p. 29.
25. Baddeley, pp. 75, 183, 240; Eugene Melchior de Vogue, "Through the Caucasus", *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, Vol. LXXXI, No. CCCCLCCCI, June, 1890, p. 41.
26. Abercromby, p. 189; Grigolia, pp. 29-30; Hahn, p. 256; Nioradze, p. 12; Telfer, Vol. II, pp. 113-14.
27. Abercromby, pp. 190-91; Baddeley, p. 245; Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 216; Haxthausen, p. 162; Nioradze, p. 12; Telfer, Vol. II, pp. 113-14.
28. Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 118.
29. de Vogue, p. 40; Freshfield, Vol. I, pp. 118, 122, 216; Grigolia, pp. 16, 52; Nioradze, p. 14.
30. Baddeley, p. 270; Graham, p. 186; Telfer, Vol, II, p. 21.
31. Nioradze, p. 11.
32. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
33. Luzbetak, pp. 72-4, 85; Haxthausen, p. 162.
34. Abercromby, p. 196 - only one traveller witnessed this.
35. Abercromby, p. 196; Grigolia, p. 50; Nioradze, p. 13.
36. Telfer, Vol. II, p. 8. This excerpt does not only document the existence of this belief in the nineteenth century. The reluctance with which the natives confessed their primitive custom perhaps suggests that they feared being discovered still practicing such old, non-Russian traditions. This hints at a period of more stringent anti-pagan regulations.
37. Grigolia, p. 50; Nioradze, p. 15.
38. Abercromby, p. 196; Baddeley, p. 270; Nioradze, pp. 14-15; Telfer, Vol. II, p. 8.
39. Baddeley, p. 270; de Vogue, p. 41; Grigolia, p. 47; Nioradze, p. 18; Telfer, Vol. II, p. 8.
40. de Vogue, p. 41; Nioradze, pp. 20-1.
41. Abercromby, p. 196; Baddeley, p. 270; Moser, p. 35; Nioradze, p. 20; Reineggs, p. 243; Telfer, Vol. II, pp. 22, 81; Frederika Freygang, *Letters from Caucasia and Georgia* (London: John Murray, 1873), p. 55.

42. Baddeley, p. 270; Haxthausen, p. 400; Nioradze, p. 24; Telfer, Vol. II, p.21.
43. Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 216.
44. Abercromby, p. 197; Baddeley, p. 271n; Nioradze, p. 27.
45. Baddeley, p. 270; Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 216; Haxthausen, p. 400; Nioradze, p. 27.
46. Baddeley, p. 270; Nioradze, p. 29; Telfer, Vol. II, p. 81.
47. Nioradze, p. 27. In some areas the coffin or body was placed in a kind of above-ground tomb or mausoleum (Hahn, pp. 57, 275).
48. Abercromby, p. 197; Baddeley, p. 183; de Vogue, p. 41; Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 102; Freygang, p. 55; Moser, p. 36; Reineggs, p. 244.
49. Baddeley, p. 270; Nioradze, p. 29; Reineggs, p. 244.
50. Telfer, Vol. II, p. 81.
51. Baddeley, p. 183; Freshfield, Vol. I, pp. 102, 216; Hahn, p. 258; Moser, p. 36.
52. Grigolia, p. 47.
53. Freshfield, Vol. I, p. 102.
54. Sula Benet, *How to Live to be 100, the Life-Style of the People of the Caucasus* (New York: Dial Press, 1976), p. 6.

Shake-up in the Uzbek Literary Elite

JOHN SOPER

Since September 1980, a number of personnel changes have taken place in the literary elite of Uzbekistan that have altered the composition and perhaps the complexion of the elite. The first noticeable change, however, seemed rather insignificant at the time: at an organizational plenum of the Board of the Karakalpak ASSR Writers' Union on 10 September, 1980, a day after the 8th Congress of the union, writer Tulepbergen Qäipbergenov replaced poet Ibrayim Yusupov as chairman of the Karakalpakistan Writers' Union Board, a post the latter had held since 1965.[1] Of much greater consequence was the election of Särvär Alimjanovich Äzimov as first secretary of the Board of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union at a plenum of the Board on 1 November, 1980, the day after the 8th Congress of the union. He replaced Kamil Yäshin (real name: Kamil No"manovich No"manov), who had served in this capacity since 1958.[2] Since that time, changes have taken place fairly regularly in the editorial staffs of publications associated with the Uzbekistan Writers' Union and in the secretariat of the union's Board.

The first series of changes seems to have occurred in the spring of 1981. The cultural, literary newspaper that was characterized as the organ of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Culture and the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti* ("Culture of Uzbekistan"), underwent changes in format, title, and chief editorship at the time. With the inaugural issue of 8 April, 1981, it became a weekly of eight full pages, instead of a semi-weekly of four pages - a format which is comparable to the now-standard weekly format of the Central Asian cultural newspapers. The title became *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti* ("Literature and Art of Uzbekistan"), and it witnessed a nominal shift in affiliation priorities, becoming the "organ of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union and the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Culture". Finally, the writer Äsqäd Mukhtar replaced Professor and Doctor of the Philological Sciences Läziz Qäyumov as the chief editor.[3] Spring 1981

also witnessed a change in the chief editorship of the major Uzbek-language literary journal of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, *Shärq yulduzi* ("Star of the East"). Häfiz Äbdusämätov, a doctor of the philological sciences, replaced poet and writer Mirmuhsin (real name: Mirmuhsin Mirsäidov) as chief editor, beginning with the June (No. 6) issue of the journal, after a month (May, No. 5) in which the assistant chief editor, Häydäräli Niyazov, was in charge. In the process, Mirmuhsin became the chief editor of a less prestigious publication, the popular monthly magazine of the Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee, *Gulistan*. Its former chief editor had been Äsqäd Mukhtar, the new chief editor of *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän'äti*. In addition, poet Turab Tolä (real name: Turab Toläkhojäev) and writer Häkim Näzir were elected to membership of the secretariat of the Writers' Union Board.[4]

Then, there appeared to be no indications of any major changes in personnel until a second series of shifts took place at the very end of 1981. At a plenum of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union Board on 16 December, 1981, writer Aleksandr Udalov was confirmed as the new chief editor of the major Russian-language literary journal in Uzbekistan, *Zvezda Vostoka*. The former chief editor of that journal, Doctor of the Philological Sciences Georgiy Vladimirov, was released from his post, according to the published account of the plenum, "in connection with his transfer to other work and at his request".[5] Also at the plenum, poet Erkin Vahidov was appointed the chief editor of a new Uzbek-language literary journal intended to provide a forum for young writers, *Yashlik* ("Youth"), which appeared for the first time in early 1982. Finally at the plenum, writer Oktäm Usmanov, an instructor in the Culture Department of the Uzbekistan party Central Committee,[6] was elected as a secretary of the union's Board, and the poet Narmurad Närzulläev was released from his position as secretary "in connection with his transfer to other work". Also, the Director of the Ghäfur Ghulam Literature and Art Publishing House, the poet Jumäniyaz Jäbbarov, became a member of the secretariat.[7]

But what was recorded as having taken place at the 16 December, 1981 plenum of the Writers' Union Board was not all that transpired in late 1981. An examination of the editorial boards of certain journals as published at the beginning of 1982 reveals other changes. Most significantly, Kamil Yäshin, who had been replaced as head of the Writers' Union in 1980, was also replaced as the chief editor of the journal of linguistics and literary studies associated with the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati* ("Uzbek Language and Literature"). As of the first issue of 1982, Doctor of the Philological Sciences Äbduqadir Häyitmetov took over as the chief editor, with Yäshin

having been dropped completely from the editorial staff. As a consequence, Yäshin now retains only his position as a regular staff member of the editorial board of the magazine *Gulistan*, among the major Uzbek publications. In addition, some less prominent changes took place in the composition of the *Shärq yulduzi* editorial staff. Nasir Fazilov, a writer, translator, and senior editor at the Ghäfur Ghulam Literature and Art Publishing House, was dropped from the staff after having served on it for only one year (1981) in the capacity of responsible secretary, a post he had assumed after it had remained vacant for more than a year and a half.[8] Tahir Mälik, a not especially well-known writer who was recently described as a pioneer of Soviet Uzbek science fiction,[9] joined the staff in January 1982 as the responsible secretary. Also added to the staff at this time were the young writer (born in 1950)[10] and chief editor of the relatively new journal of the arts associated with the Uzbekistan CP Central Committee, *Sovet Ozbekistani sän"äti*, Nuräli Qabul (real name: Nuräli Khalbotäev), and the philologist Ninel' V. Vladimirova, whose doctoral dissertation for the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute on the story genre in Uzbek literature was recently accepted.[11] The addition of these three to the *Shärq yulduzi* editorial staff may perhaps be connected with an apparently concerted effort to promote younger talents on the Uzbek literary and cultural scene. The fourth new member of the editorial staff, a new member of the Writers' Union secretariat as well, Jumäniyaz Jäbbarov, is, however, an older generation poet and writer who earlier worked in a "responsible position" with the Uzbekistan party Central Committee.[12]

During 1982 there have been a few personnel changes among the Uzbek literary elite, although not quite on the same scale as the changes made in 1981. In between issues Nos. 2 and 3 (February and March) 1982, the editorial staff of the popular magazine *Gulistan* was expanded to include Writers' Union head Azimov, a responsible secretary Änvär Säidumärov, an assistant chief editor Aqiljan Husänov, and some others. At the fourth plenum of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union Board April 29, 1982, a highly visible Uzbek writer Rämz Babajan was released from his position as secretary on the union's Board, and Sä"dullä Käramätov was elected as a secretary.[13] Then, the first issue in August 1982 of the newspaper *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän'äti* revealed a few changes in the editorial staff, chief of which was the replacement of Äsqäd Mukhtar as chief editor by writer Adil Yaqubov and the replacement of Häbib Kärimov as assistant chief editor by Ibrahim Ghäfurov.[14] Mukhtar had, therefore, served in the capacity of chief editor for only a year and four months.

In summary, since the election of Äzimov as head of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, three of the publications associated directly

with the union - the newspaper *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti* and the literary journals *Shärq yulduzi* and *Zvezda Vostoka* - have undergone a change in the chief editorship. A third journal, *Yashlik*, was introduced with Erkin Vahidov as its chief editor. The fourth literary journal associated with the Writers' Union, the Crimean Tatar-language journal, *Yïldïz*, has not undergone a change in chief editorship; Shamil' Alyadin has remained its chief editor since it was converted from a periodic anthology (*al'manakh*) to a journal in 1980.[15] The fifth literary journal published in Uzbekistan, the Karakalpak-language *Ämudär'ya*, is associated with the Karakalpakistan Writers' Union. Its current chief editor, Tajitdin Seytjanov, has been at this position since at least before the September 1980 Congress of the Karakalpak Writers' Union.[16] The changes in chief editorship of two journals not associated directly with the Writers' Union, *Gulistan* and *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, seem to be connected with the other personnel changes within the Writers' Union.

The shifts in the composition of the secretariat of the Board of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union are significant in the sense that members of the secretariat seem to include the chairmen of the councils (*sovet*), committees, and commissions within the union that control various aspects of literary life in Uzbekistan, as well as the chief editors of certain major publications and a few institute or department heads. The secretariat does not seem to include any members who occupy secondary positions such as assistant chief editor or responsible secretary on a publication editorial staff (see the Table of the Secretariat). The composition of the secretariat is not quite identical to that of the elected literary leadership. For instance, the chairmen of the Folklore Council, Yusuf Sultanov, and the Uigur Literature Council, Rozi Qadiriy, within the Writers' Union are not members of the secretariat, perhaps because the councils they head are not considered important enough.[17] There is, for instance, no substantial publication in the Uigur language in Uzbekistan, although there are radio broadcasts. But by and large, the secretariat does represent the literary elite of Uzbekistan. Recent confirmation of this can be found in the list of signatories to a letter denouncing Israeli military activity in Lebanon which was published in the major newspapers of Uzbekistan *Pravda Vostoka, Sovet Ozbekistani*, and *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti* on July 23, 1982. The list of illustrious literary figures is in large measure the same as that of the secretariat published in late 1980, although the letter also includes the five members known to have been elected to the secretariat since that time (see the Table of the Secretariat). The other discrepancies between the two lists, particularly the members of the secretariat in 1980 who are not among the signatories, are interesting, but it is not known if they reflect changes in the secretariat or not.

It might be supposed that all these changes in personnel are not especially noteworthy, since they may simply represent efforts to swap leadership opportunities among the literary elite. For instance, the change in the chief editorship of *Shärq yulduzi* seems to conform to this view: since 1951 the position has been shared by writers who are all presently members of the secretariat - Mirmuhsin (1951–1960), Äsqäd Mukhtar (1961–1965), Hämid Ghulam (1965–1971), and again Mirmuhsin (1972–1981).[18] However, in other respects, the last two decades have been marked by a certain stability in the Uzbek literary leadership. For instance, as was noted above, Kamil Yäshin had been the head of the Writers' Union since 1958. Läziz Qäyumov had been the chief editor of *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti* since 1962,[19] and Yäshin the chief editor of *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati* since 1969, after the death in 1968 of its only other chief editor Aybek.[20] In the light of the longevity of these literary figures in their posts, it hardly seems coincidental that so many changes have taken place in such a short period of time after the election of Äzimov to head of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union.

A Western observer, because of a persistent conservatism in the leadership of various Soviet institutions during the Brezhnev era, is inclined to look for political motivations behind any such set of changes, but at first, in this case, there appeared to be no evidence of a "purge". The new head of the Writers' Union, Äzimov, had been in this position before,[21] and the man he replaced in November 1980, Yäshin, has not been disgraced or ignored. Although he remained merely a regular staff member of the *Gulistan* editorial board and the chairman of the "Hamza Days" Committee within the Writers' Union, Yäshin continued to be a member of the Central Committee and the last Congress Presidium of the Uzbekistan Communist Party and a secretary of the Board of the USSR Writers' Union (he and Äzimov are apparently the only Uzbeks in that latter position).[22] It is conceivable that simply because Yäshin has turned seventy years old recently (on 25 December, 1979), it was considered appropriate for him to hand over his leadership responsibilities to others. In addition, it seems that other replaced literary figures have not been relegated to obscurity or exposed to direct, open criticism.

A Western observer may be tempted to speculate whether Uzbek literary figures had become increasingly "nationalistic" in some of their works, and whether the changes represent an effort to check such a trend. While it is true that some Uzbek works published in the late 1970s could be regarded as approaching the limits of the permissible, at first it did not seem that the election of Äzimov had signalled a return to more orthodox positions. In fact, in one of his first speeches as first secretary, Äzimov articulated a position firmly in the

Uzbek national interest; he came out strongly in support of the project to divert some Siberian river water to Central Asia, even advocating that the draft of the 1981–1985 plan period then being discussed be amended substantially to advance the project.[23] This project has been a favourite of fellow-writer and Uzbek party chief Shäraf Räshidov's, but Äzimov's remarks at that time seemed particularly forceful. Hence, it appeared that the changes in the Uzbek literary elite amounted to little more than a reshuffling of individuals and positions. The chief editorships could simply have been distributed among people whom Äzimov felt he could work better with. A more negative representation of the same phenomena would be that Äzimov was installing his own cronies in prestigious posts, in effect creating his own faction within the Uzbek elite.

CAMPAIGN TO RESTORE LITERARY ORTHODOXY A FACTOR?

However, the appearance of two articles in the Uzbek-language press in 1982 has considerably complicated such an interpretation of the changes. On 10 February, 1982, the major Uzbek-language newspaper in the republic, *Sovet Ozbekistani*, whose chief editor Mäqsud Qariev, incidentally, is a member of the secretariat of the Writers' Union, published an approximately 1800-word lead article critical of certain ideological lapses in current literary work. This article was subsequently published in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti* on 12 February, 1982. The second article to cast doubt on the prosaic interpretation of the events was written by the secretary of the party organization bureau of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, Turab Tolä, and was published in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, May 1982, pp. 161–165. Apparently, it represents the remarks made by Tolä at an open party meeting of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union party organization in March.[24] Both of these articles took certain individuals and the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences to task for ideological errors concerning the interpretation of events and personages in Uzbekistan's past.

But these two articles did not appear without something of a forewarning. During 1981 there had been some high-level but general criticism of the interpretation given to historical events and individuals in certain literary works. For instance, at an open party meeting of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, 12 March, 1981, First Secretary Äzimov reported on his participation at the 26th Congress of the CPSU and made a special point of touching upon matters of ideology and literature: ". . . appearances of a lack of true ideological content (*i.e., bezydeinost'*), inattention in defining the world view, and devia-

tion from a clear-cut class position in evaluating some historical events and individuals can harm the talent of even talented people".[25] At the recent Congress of the USSR Writers' Union in late June 1981, First Secretary Georgiy Markov used similar terminology in contending that at a time of great interest in historical literature, errors in evaluating events and personages as well as deviation from a clear class position in taking account of the forces acting upon history could not be tolerated.[26] Then several months later a work was published in *Shärq yulduzi* that provided a concrete case of such errors; the October and November issues (Nos. 10 and 11, 1981) contained a novel by a young writer, Mämädäli Mähmudov, entitled "Immortal Cliffs" (*Olmäs qayälär*). The novel and the writer were then subjected to sharp criticism at an 18 January, 1982 meeting of the secretariat of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union Board. For instance, an account of the meeting states that according to various speakers, "Mähmudov permitted some confusions to arise in the realm of a realistic description of the conditions of the historical past and in the realm of an approach to past events on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology".[27] Mähmudov reportedly also spoke at the meeting, expressing appreciation for the criticism and promising to do a principled reworking of his novel.[28]

While this episode is of some intrinsic interest, it is perhaps of greater interest that the matter was not allowed to recede quietly after the secretariat meeting. The publication of the lead article in *Sovet Ozbekistani* and *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän'äti*, as well as Tolä's reference to it in a wider context in *Shärq yulduzi*, rendered it an issue of much wider public concern. The apparent reason for the escalation of the issue is that it was not just Mähmudov's novel that was objectionable. The lead article in *Sovet Ozbekistani*, immediately after criticizing "Immortal Cliffs" for an unrealistic depiction of the past and confusions in approach which make it "difficult to know even which level or which social groups its heroes were representatives of", goes on to state, "it is also possible to encounter the very same shortcomings in the prose and poetic works of some of our writers".[29]

In fact, the three other Uzbek novels published in *Shärq yulduzi* in 1981 were also deemed rather weak. At the annual meeting held to assess the previous year's production of prose works and led by the chairman of the Prose Council of the Writers' Union Adil Yaqubov, the four novels - Mähmudov's "Immortal Cliffs", Hämid Ghulam's "Mäshräb", Mirmuhsin's "Roots and Leaves", and Ibrahim Rähim's "The Consequence" - were rather strongly criticized.[30] Of possible significance here is the criticism aimed at Hämid Ghulam's "Mäshräb", a historical novel whose central character is the traditional Central Asian poet Mäshräb, a writer considered in current Soviet Uzbek

literary studies a "typical representative of the Leftist Sufis-Pantheists".[31] (That is, Soviet Uzbek literary scholars try to link some traditional Central Asian writers who were heavily influenced by the Islamic mystic movement Sufism with certain "progressive" views). The speakers at the meeting seemed to have come to a consensus that Ghulam did not sufficiently explore the philosophical views of the poet, but instead merely reproduced too many of Mäshräb's poems, which "were not integrated into the true essence of the work".[32] Another article in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän'äti* later in the year pursues this line of criticism further.[33] In it Äkräm Kättäbekov maintains that the historical Mäshräb was a pantheist sufi who waged a fierce rebellion against the inhuman ideas of orthodox Muslim clerics, not some sort of "Mäjnun-Mäshräb", who falls madly in love. According to Kättäbekov, Ghulam seems to glorify a man with second-rate qualities. His rebellious spirit should be depicted as arising from his social-philosophical thought, not, as in the novel, from some sort of romantic madness. In this article Kättäbekov also criticizes a story published in *Shärq yulduzi* in 1981 by Qoldash Mirza, which, according to him, ends up "grossly vulgarizing" a great human being like the traditional Central Asian poet Navaiy.[34] While neither Ghulam in his novel nor Mirza in his story are accused of "ideological" mistakes in their interpretation of the past, it is clear that their traditional, perhaps more popular treatments of personages of the past (particularly where Islam is involved) are not the orthodox approaches now being required.

In the context of the criticism of Ghulam's "Mäshräb" and especially of Mähmudov's "Immortal Cliffs", one wonders how these works could have "slipped through" the strict supervision maintained over all material published in the Soviet Union. Ghulam is an established writer and member of the secretariat of the Writers' Union, who could have perhaps commanded enough respect to have his work passed without serious review, but Mähmudov is a young writer without the advantages afforded by prestige. As a young writer who has had no personal acquaintance with Stalinesque criticism, he may have been more willing to test the limits of the permissible than more established writers, but certainly someone in a responsible position would have had to approve his efforts in order for his work to have been published. He must have had support from some quarter, but whether it will be possible to identify some literary figure as his supporter - such as the former chief editor of *Shärq yulduzi*, Mirmuhsin - remains uncertain at the present. Mirmuhsin was in charge of the journal when it was announced that the three novels mentioned above would be published in 1981, even though one of the three, Ibrahim Rähim's "The Consequence", as well as "Immortal Cliffs", was actually published after

he had been replaced by Äbdusämätov as chief editor.[35] But as yet there is no evidence linking Mirmuhsin with Mähmudov's novel and its ideological errors. Nevertheless, it is clear that the criticism in this matter is directed at others besides Mähmudov. The denunciation of the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences in the *Sovet Ozbekistani* editorial of February 10, 1982 is ample evidence of this. The lead article states that "some scholars have been permitting a deviation from class positions in evaluating the prerevolutionary literary process". That this criticism may in fact be an even more serious issue than Mähmudov's novel can be seen from the fact that the work of the Institute's party organization merited a special decree by the Tashkent city party committee.[36]

Turab Tolä's article is more revealing than the *Sovet Ozbekistani* editorial about the shortcomings in the work of the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute. In this remarkable article, Tolä seems to suggest that the scholars of the Institute are too preoccupied with folklore and the literary past:

> At the Institute great attention is given to studying oral folk literature and the history of literature from the most ancient of times. This is very good. But this must not be at the expense of our current literature. Sufficient consideration has not been given to its burning issues.[37]

In this preoccupation, mistakes have been made, apparently. The specific case Tolä discusses concerns an attempt to improve the status of the early 20th century indigenous reformist movement called Jadidism, represented by such talented Uzbek writers (and purge victims) as Fiträt and Cholpan. Tolä retrieves the authoritative pronouncement on Jadidism made by Uzbek party chief Shäraf Räshidov at a June 1963 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee:

> In recent years there have even appeared attempts to vindicate Jadidism, a reactionary bourgeois nationalistic trend in the past, and to rehabilitate its representatives under the guise of struggling against the consequences of the cult of personality. The party organization has dealt a crippling blow to such harmful attempts.[38]

But despite the "crippling blow", not everyone, according to Tolä, understands this position. In critic Erik Kärimov's "The Development of Realism in Uzbek Literature", for example, Jadidism is given an "almost democratic hue". Tolä also objects to the fact that Kärimov equates Fiträt and Cholpan with the "true" founders of Soviet Uzbek literature Hämzä and Äyniy, and calls them all "democrats-advocates of enlightenment". Five other works are cited as having made similar

errors, including one still in manuscript form. Tolä emphasizes that publishing material and making it available to the public is not the same sort of thing as engaging in "scholastic, scholarly" discussions in some cozy office which will never go beyond the thick walls of the Institute or the Writers' Union. That is to say, Tolä is not that concerned with the personal opinions of scholars, but writings that become public property must meet the required standards. He asks, do such public efforts

> . . . have benefit for our general work, or do they do harm? Why wasn't this important, politically decisive question brought forth in the kollektiv or in the Institute's party organization, in whose own ranks there are also members of the republic Writers' Union, or why has this question been so little talked about?[39]

In a convoluted way Tolä suggests that some sort of nationalistic sentiment has been at work in the efforts of the Institute; he mentions a party document which warns about nationalism being a means used by imperialism against real socialism. Although the document refers to bourgeois tactics, nonetheless, according to Tolä, it is necessary never to relax political vigilance and never forget what kind of influence the printed word has on people, especially young people. He also maintains that it is not possible to say that in some works the matter of the mutual relationship of the national and the international is illuminated very correctly.

Tolä criticizes three individuals by name - Erik Kärimov, Bäkhtiyar Näzärov, and Batir Narbayev, all relatively young specialists in the study of literatire.[40] He also mentions that similar ideological errors occur in the two-volume "Theory of Literature" and the five-volume "History of Uzbek Literature" compiled by kollektivs within the Institute in the 1970s. Yet he leaves no doubt that the real targets of his criticism are the senior, established scholars who have encouraged the ideologically erroneous ideas of the young scholars he names. For instance, he writes,

> Another important question gives one cause to ponder: what kind of influence can the mistakes and shortcomings permitted by critics and literary scholars belonging to the older generation have upon young people who are only now stepping across the threshold of literature studies?[41]

He answers his own question by citing the example of the talented young literary scholar Batir Narbayev. Tolä states that his first book on poetry elicited "strong, fair critical opinions" in the press,[42] but when a new book of his came out later, it seems he compounded his errors; that is, "he looked upon public opinion with indifference".[43]

Tolä then disdains the "childish" attempts by some to be "original" in their analyses and asks from what quarter this "literary nihilism" arose.

> It is necessary to admit, if bitterly, that all of this depends upon the scholarly work of some of our respected literary scholars, those who have been called upon to serve tirelessly and indefatigably on the path of our literature's development. The Writers' Union, the headquarters of our literature, summons these its own members, its respected members once again to responsibility.[44]

Unfortunately, Tolä does not name the "respected" members of the Uzbek literary elite who have ventured into ideological error.

One interesting feature of Tolä's article is that he alludes to a history of expressed disagreement with the direction taken by some scholars at the Pushkin Institute; that is, his is not the first criticism to be voiced against their views.[45] He specifically refers to a plenum of the Writers' Union in January 1980 at which Häfiz Äbdusämätov (the new chief editor of *Shärq yulduzi*) spoke of the ideological shortcomings in Erik Kärimov's book, particularly concerning the role of Jadidism. According to Tolä, there was time for Kärimov to understand his "mistaken opinions" and revise them accordingly, but he did not listen to the "correct and friendly criticism" of others. Interestingly, in the abbreviated account of this plenum published in former chief editor Läziz Qäyumov's *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti* at the time, there was no indication of Äbdusämätov's criticism of the shortcomings in Kärimov's book. Äbdusämätov is quoted as criticizing the two-volume "Theory of Literature" because some chapters were written "on a shallow, poor level" and then adding a cryptic remark to the effect that early 20th century Uzbek literature must be analysed correctly in scholarly works in firm adherence to a Marxist-Leninist position.[46]

That brief criticism of "The Theory of Literature" by Häfiz Äbdusämätov was certainly not the first. The two-volume work was a product of the collective efforts of members of the Department of Literary Theory and Criticism in the Pushkin Language and Literary Institute under the supervision of Department head Izzät Sultan and was published by the publishing house associated with the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, "Fan", in 1978-1979.[47] On 27 December, 1979, a meeting organized by the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences, the Pushkin Institute, and the UzSSR Ministry of Education was convened to discuss the matter of preparing the work for *re*publication.[48] Although some sharp criticisms of the work were expressed at the

meeting, the accounts of it published at the time do not indicate that one of the problematic features of the work was the attempt to enhance the status of Jadidism and its representatives. There was only one published reference to Fiträt or Cholpan, and that consisted of a denial that Fiträt's "Qiyamät" (a 1923 story regarded as a contribution to the struggle against religion and outdated customs)[49] was an *epos* (epic).[50] Yet, whatever the errors consisted of they were of sufficient magnitude to require a meeting devoted to the republication of the work. Only in Tolä's article of May 1982 is it revealed that mistakes in the evaluation of Jadidism were to be found in "The Theory of Literature". The other collective work mentioned by Tolä as containing these errors as well was the five-volume "History of Uzbek Literature" published in 1977, 1978 and 1980. It treated prerevolutionary literature since ancient times and was produced by the members of the Prerevolutionary Uzbek Literature Department of the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute headed by Äbduqadir Häyitmetov (now chief editor of *Ozbek tili va ädäbiyati*), as well as by other experts.[51] Despite that fact that Tolä finds fault with this work and the fact that the *Sovet Ozbekistani* editorial specifically criticizes interpretations of prerevolutionary Uzbek literature, the main subject of the work, it does not seem to have generated as much critical discussion as "The Theory of Literature". In fact, one fairly recent review in *Shärq yulduzi* was rather favourable towards the work, even laudatory about the "objective" but novel approach of Introduction writer Äbduqadir Häyitmetov towards the influence of Islamic mysticism upon traditional Uzbek literature, although it was critical of the tendency to identify certain classical works as the fruit of "Uzbeks" rather than the heritage of all Turkic peoples.[52]

CONCLUSION

In the changes that have occurred in the literary establishment of Uzbekistan since September 1980 and in the criticisms that have been directed at supposedly erroneous attitudes towards the past since, apparently, the end of December 1979, there are many details that remain unclear, particularly concerning the connections between these two developments. But it is clear that some members of the literary elite of Uzbekistan have been promoted - *viz.*, Särvär Äzimov as the new head of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, the new chief editors of publications, and the new members and secretaries of the Writers' Union secretariat. It is less clear that others - Kamil Yäshin as the former head of the union, the former chief editors, and those members of the secretariat who are missing from the list of signatories to the anti-Israeli letter - have been intentionally demoted, rather than

simply replaced. One possible motivation for the changes in the chief editorships and the secretariat, the establishment of a faction with which new Writers' Union chief Äzimov could work effectively, would not entail that those replaced have been systematically discredited. But such an explanation for the changes provides no insight into the promotion of Äzimov himself. The conjecture that at 70 years old and after more than 20 years of service as head of the Writers' Union, Kamil Yäshin had reached a point in his career at which he should have handed over his responsibilities to others seems feeble in the light of the conservatism in the leadership of Soviet institutions during the Brezhnev era and in light of the fact that there is no indication Yäshin is in poor health.

But the orchestrated campaign of early 1982, represented by the *Sovet Ozbekistani* editorial, the decree of the Tashkent city party committee on the work of the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute party organization, and especially Turab Tolä's article in *Shärq yulduzi*, provides another possible motivation for the changes. This explanation does seem to involve the discrediting of some members of the Uzbek literary elite. According to Tolä, some young literary scholars, in particular Erik Kärimov and Batir Narbayev, had been warned about their "mistaken opinions" as long ago as January 1980. Izzät Sultan's "The Theory of Literature" was subjected to severe criticism in an organized fashion as long ago as late December 1979. Yet, as Tolä makes clear, erroneous ideological views have persisted in the work of some young scholars, presumably under the protection of senior, established literary figures.[53] From this point of view, the changes in the Uzbek literary elite reflect sterner measures adopted to restore orthodoxy in the interpretations of the past. That is, the changes were intended to remove some of the established figures who had more or less permitted the errors in the first place and to ensure that they would not be repeated. But unfortunately, the situation is not quite so simple. The major targets of the *gorkom* decree and Tolä's article were the scholars at the Pushkin Institute who fostered erroneous notions, but it may be that the decree, while limited in focus, was actually intended to serve as a warning to all literary figures who espouse unconventional ideas about the past, regardless of institutional affiliation.

It is possible to make a link between the Pushkin Institute and a couple of individuals who have been replaced or whose work has been criticized. The head of the kollektiv that produced "The Theory of Literature", Izzät Sultan, is definitely an esteemed member of the Pushkin Institute, and interestingly, is not among the signers of the anti-Israeli letter. Kamil Yäshin himself was a corresponding member of the Uzbekistan Academy of Sciences from 1960 to 1968 and has

been a full academician there since 1968.[54] But such identification may be misleading. The new chief editor of *Shärq yulduzi*, and therefore presumably a member of the "Äzimov faction", Häfiz Äbdusämätov, is nonetheless associated with the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute.[55] Tolä in his article, however, singles out Äbdusämätov as one literary figure who had warned others about ideological errors in 1980. Yet, Äbdusämätov was the chief editor of *Shärq yulduzi* when Mähmudov's novel "Immortal Cliffs" was published.[56] The point is that thus far the published record is unclear about the connection between the leadership changes in the Uzbek literary community and the current attempt to restore literary orthodoxy. Nonetheless, it is very curious that these two developments have been taking place roughly simultaneously. Of course, one cannot dismiss the possibility that some individuals have been demoted because of the campaign to check nationalistic trends, while others have been promoted because of an affiliation with Äzimov.

Perhaps because writers held a prominent position in traditional Uzbek society and because they were very important in the post-revolutionary development of Uzbekistan, the links between literature and politics continue to be very strong in Soviet Uzbekistan today. Both Äzimov and Yäshin, as well as the poetess Zulfiyä (real name: Zulfiyä Israilova), are full members of the Central Committee of the Uzbekistan Communist Party and were members of the presidium at the last party Congress in February 1981.[57] One of the new secretaries, Öktäm Usmanov, and a new member, Jumäniyaz Jäbbarov, added to the Writers' Union secretariat after the autumn 1980 union Congress had been working within the UzCP Central Committee.[58] Most importantly, Shäraf Räshidov, the first secretary of the Uzbekistan Communist Party since March 1959, is a well-known writer who had formerly been the head of the Writers' Union and is still a member of its Central Commitee.[59] It is therefore highly unlikely that party chief Räshidov would be unaware of major developments within the Uzbek literary community, but of course, the extent of his personal involvement in the recent events is unknown. One wonders how he could have been unaware of the fact that some literary figures had been encouraging a liberalization of the official attitude towards Jadidism and its representatives or unaware of the fact that the Jadid movement has retained a certain appeal among Uzbek literary figures. This issue is an extremely sensitive topic in Uzbekistan even today because of the nationalistic and potentially anti-Russian overtones of the movement. But at present it must remain a matter of pure speculation as to who decided that the interest in Jadidism and other elements of the past (e.g., Sufism) had got out of hand and who initiated the crackdown on manifestations of this interest. It must also remain

speculative at the moment whether the shake-up in the Uzbek literary elite of the last two years is connected directly with the crackdown.

POST-SCRIPTUM

Since this article was originally submitted for publication, the Uzbek press has continued publishing material revealing that the developments described above have yet to run their course. There has been at least one significant personnel change: at the annual report-and-election meeting of the Writers' Union party organization, writer Rähmät Fäyziy was elected as the party organization secretary, replacing Turab Tolä (*Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, November 12, 1982, p.7). In the published account of this meeting, there was no mention of whether Tolä assumed any further duties, but in light of his other activities within the Writers' Union (see the Table of the Secretariat), he may not be in line for another position. Mämädäli Mähmudov, whose "Immortal Cliffs" aroused considerable public criticism, wrote an interesting article for *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän ''äti* (November 26, 1982, p. 8) affirming his loyalty to the Soviet homeland. In this article he attributes his mistakes to his inexperience:

> "Immortal Cliffs" is my first major work. Rating my creative potentials more than they should have been, I took up my pen to write about a very complicated historical period. As a result I permitted some shortcomings. What is the reason for this? Because I could not present the spirit of that age correctly.

He also wants to emphasize his commitment to good relations among the Soviet peoples. He states that having lived in Russia for five years, he has come to know and love the Russian people, and he tried to convey that affection in his novel. He maintains that he stressed the positive influence of Russia on the development of Turkistan. He also wants to dispel the notion spread by (unnamed) foreign radio stations that he has been persecuted; on the contrary, he is living and working freely in his own homeland, among his writer friends. He intends to rework his novel this year and prepare it for publication. It may be worth noting that according to his personal account Mähmudov has been a member of the CPSU for some time.

The effort to ensure orthodoxy in literary work has, apparently, not been confined to the realm of literature proper. Writers' Union chief Särvär Äzimov chaired a meeting on the present situation of songs in Uzbekistan, in which leaders of other creative organizations also took part. According to the published account of the meeting in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, July 30, 1982, p. 6, Äzimov spoke of serious deficiencies, and another speaker warned that the

sharp critical opinions aimed at the improvement of song writing should not be ignored, but it was not clearly explained what the problems with contemporary songs were. Two and a half months later (October 15, 1982, p. 6) the same newspaper published an article by poet, songwriter, and literary scholar Otkir Räshid which spelled out some of the objectionable features of present-day songs. Distinguishing a three-stage process in the production of any song, involving a poet who composes the lyrics, a musician who sets them to music, and a performer, Räshid has critical remarks concerning each of these stages. Perhaps the most interesting is his claim that while the sound of ideologically alien songs is dying out, there are still some fading remnants left, sometimes heard on stage but more often in private gatherings and at wedding celebrations. He contends that even well-known artists perform such songs and that such lyrics continue to be composed because musicians and singers like them. The songs Räshid has in mind are the highly popular songs dealing with the traditional themes of romantic love, passion, and deep despair over unfulfilled desires and containing images common in the verse of Muslim peoples. He also wonders why there are no good songs about the important events in the lives of the people, such as songs about cotton or livestock herders. There exist officially accepted songs, but according to Räshid these are not performed because singers do not like their lyrics or music. Subsequent to this article, several other articles appeared in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti* supporting Räshid's critical point of view.

On August 30, 1982 the Uzbekistan Writers' Union and Cinematographers' Union held a round-table discussion on the films produced by Ozbekfil'm Studio in the last seven or eight years. The report of the discussion published in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, September 3, 1982, p. 6, is characterized by unusually blunt criticism of the particular films under review; in fact, the head of the Cinematographers' Union Mälik Qäyumov admitted that in his 53 years of work in films he had never seen "such an influential and useful round-table discussion." Äzimov condemned the quality of recent films in general terms and claimed that not one film in the last seven or eight years had won popular recognition either in the republic or on the All-Union level or abroad. However, it was left to other members of the Writers' Union to spell out exactly what the flaws in recent films were considered to be. The writer Mirmuhsin, for instance, spoke of his embarrassment when the entire audience walked out at a showing of one Uzbek film in Kislovodsk. He maintained that one reason moviegoers were rejecting the Ozbekfil'm productions was that its film makers had been departing from the "national grounding" in their efforts. That is, it would be impossible without the film credits

to determine where an Ozbekfil'm movie had been produced; in fact, most viewers would assume that they had been made in Hollywood. He condemns "the sock 'em brawls, the shameless embraces and kisses, and the nude scenes" that were featured in some films, stating, "it is impossible to aesthetically educate the spectators by showing naked women and riverside carousing." In addition, he contended that one scriptwriter, Odilsho Agishev, did not understand Uzbek life at all and that the script he wrote was extremely shallow, consisting of lies and falsehoods. Professor Läziz Qäyumov mentioned that some responsible film critics had objected to the course being pursued in contemporary films but their voices had been ignored in the Cinematographers' Union and in Ozbekfil'm. If they had been listened to, certain films would never have come out. He also advocated that the Uzbek national appearance and character be shown in Uzbek films, as is the case in films made by Gruziyafil'm and by Turkmen and Kirghiz film makers. A movie critic told of going personally to the chairman of the State Committee for Cinematography Äbdulähäd Äbdulläev to warn him about the deterioration of Ozbekfil'm movies, or otherwise "the outcome could be bad." But his opinions, as well as those expressed in the press, were ignored. Interestingly, some of the film makers under fire attempted to defend themselves. The published account of the discussion, written by Ä. Ibrahimov, contains the following description of the remarks made by Dmitriy Bulgakov, the chief editor [*redaktor*] of the Ozbekfil'm Studio:

> Because Comrade D. Bulgakov in his talk said things well known to everyone beforehand from beginning to end, his speech did not attract the attention of the listeners. In any case the culprit in the decline of Ozbekfil'm Studio to such a condition in the first place is the script-editorial board and its chief editor. D. Bulgakov, instead of saying what he had to say plainly and openly, tried to shift the responsibility from himself, but you just can't hide the plain truth, and the plain fact that anyone can see is that the ideological-artistic level of the scripts put into production by the script-editorial board in recent years has declined further and further.

Another cinematographer, Ravil' Batirov, attempted to place the blame on others - in particular, on writers, whom he accused of not producing good literature suitable for film adaptation. However, *Shärq yulduzi* chief editor Häfiz Äbdusämätov called this position groundless. Later, the secretariat of the Uzbekistan Writers' Union, acting on proposals made at this meeting, created a new council within the Union, the Dramatic Art and Film Drama Council, with

Olmäs Umärbekov at its head (*Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, September 10, 1982, p. 1).

A reader wrote to *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti* disapproving of the negative assessment given by Äkräm Kättäbekov to a story by Qoldash Mirza about the young life of the classical Central Asian poet Alisher Navaiy. In its October 22, 1982 issue, p. 3, the newspaper printed the letter and an article by Artiqbay Äbdulläev, which reconfirmed the critical attitude of Kättäbekov towards the work in question. At one point in his article Äbdulläev states,

> If the author [that is, Mirza] had correctly reflected the complex historical conditions at that time from a class point of view and had been able to reveal the essence of the contradictions and various relationships between the rulers and the working people, the intellectuals, he would have created a powerful work that would have naturally set the reader's heart pounding. Unfortunately, we see the opposite of that in the story.

In Mirza's version, Navaiy is portrayed as a love-sick young man who pines for a girl named Gulijan, he faces no sharp conflict, and he becomes merely a passive hero. In contrast to another Uzbek writer, Aybek, who also wrote about Navaiy's youth and who dealt with the social life and complex political events of the particular period, "Qoldash Mirza in his story does not achieve precisely that - a clear philosophical-aesthetic conception," according to the article. The editorial staff added a note at the end of the article clearly in support of Äbdulläev's assessment of the work. It also stated,

> The interest in the historical topic among young Uzbek writers is rather strong. In this important matter, along with creative achievements, there are also instances of a superficial approach to historical occurrences, of extracting complex events out of the historical conditions, and of a one-sided description. Bearing in mind how important it is to evaluate fairly the writers who are searching on this path and to set them on the correct path, the editorial staff regarded it necessary to return once more to this issue.

It should perhaps be noted that in each of the attacks on creative works or their authors - that is, in the attacks on Mähmudov's "Immortal Cliffs," some efforts on the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute, certain songs, recent films produced by Ozbekfil'm, etc. - Writers' Union head Särvär Äzimov is never the critic who makes the most damning comments or specifies the particular faults to be found in a criticized work - at least if one can judge by the accounts of his contributions published in the Uzbek press. That is, it appears others

within the Writers' Union have been delegated the responsibility of making direct criticism. Yet, because criticism of this nature was not a regular feature of the Uzbek press in the late 1970's when Kamil Yäshin was the head of the Writers' Union, it seems improbable that Äzimov is not directly involved in the organization of the current campaign to ensure orthodox positions in creative work. (Incidentally, for a recent profile of Äzimov's life and literary work, see *Gulistan*, No. 11, November 1982, p. 12-13).

NOTES

1. Notice of the change is contained in *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, September 12, 1980, p. 1. See also the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 380.
2. See *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* 445/90, "Former Diplomat Becomes Head of Uzbekistan's Writers' Union", November 24, 1980, and *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 4, 1980. That Yäshin has been head of the Writers' Union since 1958 can be seen from the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol, 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 495 and 478. According to *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, January 13, 1981, p. 2, Äzimov also replaced Yäshin as chairman of the Soviet committee for ties with writers of Asian and African countries attached to the USSR Writers' Union secretariat.
3. Some other modifications took place in the newspaper's editorial staff as well; for instance, Mämätqul Häzrätqulov was added as the responsible secretary - a position that does not seem to have been filled since November 1977. The last issue of *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, March 17, 1981, contains a notice of the change in format and title. The journal *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, May 1981, p. 239, mentions that Mukhtar was appointed the newspaper's new chief editor at an April 9th plenum of the Writers' Union. At the 8th Congress of the republic Writers' Union, October 31, 1980, former chief editor Qäyumov was reported to have stated his agreement with discussions on converting the newspaper to a weekly. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 4, 1980, p. 4. Whether he suspected at that time that the change would also involve his removal as chief editor is, of course, unknown.
4. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, May 1981, p. 239.
5. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, December 18, 1981, p. 7.
6. See *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 8, August 1981, p. 239, and *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, January 13, 1981, p. 2.
7. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, December 18, 1981, p. 7.
8. Information obtained from the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 12, Tashkent, 1979, p. 128, and the relevant issues of *Shärq yulduzi*.
9. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 8, August 1981, p. 223.
10. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 10, October 1977, p. 222.
11. *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 6, 1980, p. 71.
12. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 10, October 1980, p. 190.

13. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, May 7, 1982, p. 7, and *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 8, August 1982, p. 206. Käramätov's arrival was accompanied by a bit of fanfare: the April 30, 1982 issue of *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti* contained a front-page May Day article by him and a short notice on page 7 about his works and the recent publication of a book of his in Russian. Some of his work has been commended by the USSR Ministry of Defence.
14. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 30, 1982, p. 8, and August 6, 1982, p. 8. The shift also permitted the new head of the Uzbekistan Composers' Union Sabir Babaev (elected at a plenum following the Composers' Union Congress in June 1982, see *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, June 25, 1982, p. 1) to replace the former head Enmärk Salihov on the editorial staff. The new secretary Käramätov was added to the staff, but Rämz Babajan was not dropped from it.
15. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, October 31, 1980, p. 3. Recent notices on the 70th birthday of Alyadin confirm that he is still the chief editor; see, for instance, *Lenin bayraghi*, September 2, 1982, p. 3; *Pravda Vostoka*, September 3, 1982, p. 4.
16. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, September 5, 1980, p. 2, and *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 23, 1982, p. 5.
17. A list of the secretariat members is contained in *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 4, 1980, p. 1 and in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 12, December 1980, p. 7. These lists are identical except for the inclusion of Hämid Ghulam in the version published in the newspaper but not in the other. It seems reasonable to suppose that the omission of Ghulum from the *Shärq yulduzi* list resulted from a printing error, since he is included on the list of literary figures who signed a recent denunciation of Israel (see below). A list of chairmen of councils, committees, and commissions within the Writers' Union can be found in *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 21, 1980, p. 1, and in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 12, December 1980, p. 239.
18. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, June 1982, p. 10.
19. See the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 516.
20. See *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 5, 1968, No. 1, 1969, p. 2.
21. See the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 495.
22. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, February 5, 1981 and *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 10, 1981, p. 1.
23. His speech is given in *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, January 9, 1981, pp. 1-2.
24. That Tolä spoke on a topic identical to the subject of his article at his meeting was reported in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, June 1982, p. 206.
25. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, March 17, 1981, p. 1.
26. Reprinted in *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 3, 1981; quote on p. 2.
27. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"ati*, January 22, 1982, p. 7.
28. *ibid.*, see *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* 337/82, "Uzbek Novel Found Ideologically Unsound," August 20, 1982.
29. *Sovet Ozbekistani*, February 10, 1982, p. 1.
30. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, February 12, 1982, p. 1. One of the speeches presented at the meeting, made by Äbdughäfur Räsulov, provides more details on the shortcomings of these novels than the page 1 account. His speech is published on p. 7 of this issue. It might be pointed out that all of these writers are members of the Writers' Union secretariat except Mähmudov.
31. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 23, 1982, p. 3.
32. *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*, February 12, 1982, p.1.

33. *Ozbekistan adäbiyati vä sän"äti*, July 23, 1982, p.3.
34. *ibid.*, Ghulam's novel "Mäshräb" is also criticized by Mätyaqub Qoshjanov in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 7, July 1982, p. 201. Mirza's tale was published in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, June 1981, pp. 63-110. Ironically, this tale was introduced and commended by Turab Tolä, who several months later would criticize others for a preoccupation with the past and ideological distortions of it. Tolä states that "Qoldash especially loves our classical literature" and thus he makes use of classical linguistic forms in the dialogues of his tale.
35. See the back cover of *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 12, December 1980, for the announcement.
36. The decree is mentioned in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, June 1982, p. 206; the editorial in *Sovet Ozbekistani* mentions only a discussion of the issue by the city party committee, but not a decree.
37. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, May 1982, p. 164.
38. *ibid.*, pp. 162-3.
39. *ibid.*, p. 163.
40. E. Kärimov has recently had his doctoral dissertation - entitled "The Development of Realism in Uzbek Literature (the second half of the 19th century, the beginning of the 20th century, and the first period of Soviet literature)" - accepted at the Pushkin Language and Literature Institute. B. Näzärov's doctoral dissertation for the same institution was entitled, "The Formation of Uzbek Soviet Literary Criticism and the Methodological and Esthetic Bases of its Development." See *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 6, 1980, p. 71.
41. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5. May 1982, p. 163.
42. One such article is by Azad Shäräfiddinov, a docent at Tashkent State University, in *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 8, August 1980, pp. 224-234, especially pp. 229-232. One notion criticized by Shäräfiddinov is Narbayev's contention that Soviet Uzbek poetry was characterized by poems expressing joy and happiness until the second half of the 1950s, when poetry that criticized deficiences became accepted.
43. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, May 1982, p. 163.
44. *ibid.*, p. 164.
45. But it appears that his criticisms are the most explicit statements yet published on the issue. They are no doubt connected with the decisions made by the Tashkent city party committee.
46. *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, February 1, 1980, p.2.
47. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, February 1, 1980; *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 2, 1980, p. 83, No. 4, 1980, pp. 11-12, No. 6, 1980, p. 56; and *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 4, April 1980, p. 220.
48. *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 2, 1980, p. 83. Accounts of this meeting are presented in *ibid.*, pp. 83-87, *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, December 28, 1979, p. 2, and *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 4, April 1980, pp. 219-229.
49. See *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 119.
50. *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, December 28, 1979, p. 2.
51. See *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 211-219, and *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 4, 1980, pp. 3-6.
52. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 9, September 1981, pp. 211-219.
53. This continued into 1982. *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 1, 1982, for example, published a leading article by one of the literary scholars criticized by name by Tolä, Bäkhtiyar Näzärov, pp. 3-7. In the article, Näzärov finds fault with the lack of studies on Uzbek literature of the 1920s and 1930s in recent years. He maintains that the study of that period should not mean just a continua-

tion of a desire to positively evaluate the works of the time or of a tendency to negatively evaluate them (p. 7). He calls for more work in this area.

54. *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 1, 1969, pp. 88–89.
55. See, for instance, *Akademiya nauk Uzbekskoi SSR 1976* (*spravocknik*), Tashkent, 1976, p. 171.
56. This latter fact is not necessarily damaging to the image of Äbdusämätov as a guardian of orthodoxy. Perhaps the former chief editor of *Shärq yulduzi*, Mirmuhsin, accepted Mähmudov's novel in the first place.
57. *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, February 5, 1981, p. 1.
58. *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 10, October 1980, p. 190, and *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, January 13, 1981, p. 2.
59. See *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 4, 1980, p. 1; the *Uzbek Soviet Encyclopaedia*, vol. 13, Tashkent, 1979, p. 495.

TABLE OF THE SECRETARIAT OF THE UZBEKISTAN WRITERS' UNION

MEMBERS AS OF NOVEMBER 1980

Pen Names	*Chief Editorship or Other Leadership*	*Function within Writers' Union* (Chairman or Secretary) (as of Jan. 1981)
1. Äbdusamätov, Häfiz	(present) *Shärq yulduzi*	1. Council for Propagandizing Belles Lettres
2. Ähmäd, Säid (Husänkhojäev)		2. Satire-Humour Council
*3. Akhunova, E"tibar	Head, a Dept., on *Sovet Ozbekistani*	3.
4. Alyadin, Shamil'	(present) *Yildiz*	4. Tatar Literature Council
5. Aripov, Äbdullä		5. Responsible Secretary of Tashkent Oblast Section
6. Äzimov, Särvär		6. First Secretary of the Board; Chairman of Secretariat Bureau
7. Babajan, Rämz		7. (former) Secretary, Board; member, Secretariat Bureau; Uzbekistan Committee for Ties with Asian and African Countries
8. Fäyziy, Rähmät		8. Commission on Admission to Writers' Union
9. Ghulam, Hämid		9. Essays and Publitsistika Council
10. Mirmuhsin (Mirsäidov)	(former) *Shärq yulduzi* (present) *Gulistan*	10. Poetry Council
11. Mukhtar, Äsqäd	(former) *Gulistan* (former) *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän"äti*	11. Literary Translation Council
*12. Närzullaev, Narmurad		12. (former) Secretary, Board; member, Secretariat Bureau
13. Parmuzin, Boris		13. Secretary, Board; member, Secretariat Bureau
14. Qadirov, Pirimqul		14. Council on Hämid Alimjan Literary Figures' House
15. Qäipbergenov, Tulepbergen	KKASSR Writers' Union Board Chairman	15. Secretary, Board; member, Secretariat Bureau
16. Qariev, Mäqsud	(present) *Sovet Ozbekistani*	16.
*17. Qäyumov, Läziz	(former) *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*	17.
18. Qoshjanov, Mätyaqub	Director, Pushkin Lg. & Lit. Institute	18.
19. Rähim, Ibrahim	(present) *Mushtum* (satire journal)	19. Council of the Uzbekistan Dept. of USSR Writers' Union Lit. Foundation
20. Säfärov, Näzir		20. Military-Patriotic Literature Commission
21. Sheverdin, Mikhail		21. Russian Literature Council
*22. Sultan, Izzät	Head, Lit. Theory & Criticism Dept., Pushkin Inst.	22.
23. Udalov, Aleksandr	(present) *Zvezda Vostoka*	23.
*24. Umärbekov, Olmäs		24. Dramatic Art Council
25. Uyghun (Atäqoziev)		25. Council for Ties with Literature of Fraternal Peoples

26. Vahidov, Erkin	(present) *Yashlik*	26. Council for Work with Young People
*27. Vladimirov, Georgiy	(former) *Zvezda Vostoka*	27.
28. Yaqubov, Adil	(present) *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*	28. Prose Council
29. Yäshin, Kamil (No''manov)	(former) *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*	29. "Hamza Days" Committee
30. Zahidov, Vahid		30. Criticism & Literary Studies Council
31. Zulfiya (Israilova)	(present) *Säadät* (women's journal)	31. "Pushkin Days" Committee
NEW MEMBERS AFTER NOVEMBER 1980		*Function within Writers' Union* (as of Jan. 1981, or presently)
1. Näzir, Häkim		1. Children's and Teenagers' Literature Council
2. Tolä, Turab (Tolakhojäev)		2. Member, Secretariat Bureau; Secretary, Party Organization Bureau; Literary Heritage & Anniversaries Council; Song Council
3. Jäbbarov, Jumäniyaz	Director, Gh. Ghulam Lit. & Art Publishers	3.
4. Usmanov, Oktäm		4. Secretary, Board
5. Käramätov, Sä''dullä		5. Secretary, Board

The asterisk (*) designates the six members of the secretariat *not* among the signatories to a letter denouncing Israeli military activity in Lebanon, *Pravda Vostoka*, July 23, 1982. The list on the letter includes all other members of the secretariat (plus the new members) as well as the following literary figures: Quddus Muhämmädiy, Yoldash Shämshärov, Shuhrät, Shukullä, and Ibrayin Yusupov. Of the chairmen of councils within the union, only Yusuf Sultanov, head of the Folklore Council, and Rozi Qadiriy (real name: Qadir Roziev), head of the Uigur Literature Council, are not members of the secretariat. The new members of the secretariat were elected as follows: Näzir and Tolä as members April 9, 1981 (*Shärq yulduzi*, No. 5, 1981, p. 239), Jäbbarov as member and Usmanov as secretary December 16, 1981 (*Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, December 18, 1981, p. 7), Käramätov as secretary April 29, 1982 (*Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, May 7, 1982, p. 7).

There have been some adjustments in the organization of the councils within the Writers' Union since the chairmen were elected in mid-November 1980. A Song Council with Turab Tolä as its head was created December 29, 1980 (*Shärq yulduzi*, No. 1, 1981, p. 239), and a Satire-Humour Council with Säid Ähmäd as its head January 9, 1981 (*Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, January 13, 1981, p. 2). By March 1982 Ibrahim Rähim had become the chairman of the Council for Propagandizing Belles Lettres (*Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, 1982, p. 205), but it is not clear what other changes have occurred.

Sources: For functions within the Writers' Union as of November 1980, *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 21, 1980, p. 1, and *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 12, 1980, p. 239. For changes, see above. For chief editorships, relevant publications used, plus *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, August 6, 1982, p. 1, August 13, 1982, p. 1, September 3, 1982, p. 1. For other leadership positions, *Ozbekistan mädäniyäti*, November 4, 1980, p. 3 (Akhunova); *Shärq yulduzi*, No. 6, 1982, p. 206 (Qoshjanov); *Ozbek tili vä ädäbiyati*, No. 4, 1980, p. 11 (Sultan); *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, December 18, 1981, p. 7 (Jäbbarov); *Ozbekistan ädäbiyati vä sän''äti*, November 12, 1982, p. 7, (Aripov); confirmed elsewhere.

The Soviets in Afghanistan: The Anatomy of a Takeover

MARIE BROXUP

The official announcement of the change of government in Afghanistan with the aid of Soviet troops in December 1979 took the world by surprise. And yet, the systematic increase of Soviet personnel in the country and the development of relations since 1956 was a clear indication of the consistent interest of the Soviet Union in its southern neighbour.

This article aims to give information on some little known aspects of the history of Soviet influence in Afghanistan, concentrating on the mechanism of control in the Soviet and Afghan government and its apparatus in Kabul. The collected evidence is the result of many discussions with Afghan refugees from Pakistan, India and Western Europe. The presentation will include a chronology of the most significant events of the last 20 years as seen through the eyes of these Afghan intellectuals.

This is not the place however for an exhaustive analysis of Afghanistan's history during this period nor will there be any discussion of the armed resistance.[1]

SOVIET ADVISERS AND TRENDS IN AFGHAN POLITICS BEFORE 1973

After September 1956 when Prime Minister Daoud visited the Soviet Union on the invitation of Krushchev and Bulganin, Soviet advisers began to arrive in Afghanistan, cautiously at first and in small numbers. They came as aids to the military and as civilian advisers. In the military, the Soviets had the monopoly of advice to the Afghan army. Every year since 1956 some 100 young Afghans went to the Soviet Union for military studies where they were trained to use Soviet arms. Some of them were also studying military tactics and strategy at a high level. At this early stage Tajik interpreters helped in their training. From 1960 onwards Soviet instructors began to

arrive in Kabul to teach at the military academy. The same year Afghanistan signed an agreement with Czechoslovakia for cooperation in armaments techniques, maintenance and repairs. Some Afghan cadets went to study in Czechoslovakia and Czech instructors also came to Kabul. Soviet military instructors in Afghanistan were exclusively "Europeans". There were no Central Asians among them - not even as interpreters.

During this period the first projects in Soviet-Afghan cooperation were launched in road building, irrigation, motor repairs (at the Jangaleh factory in Kabul), then later in geological research and agriculture. Soviet advisers and technicians came to Afghanistan on short-term assignments to work on projects such as the Salang highway and Ningrahar irrigation. These missions were composed mainly of Soviet Slavs, but there were a good number of Tajik interpreters among them. Uzbeks, Azerbaijanis, Georgians and Armenians were also seen together with the Russians, Belorussians and Ukrainians.

The members of the Soviet missions specialising in road building, agriculture and geology were able to visit every corner of Afghanistan but their contacts with the Afghan people remained limited in spite of the fact that Afghans were not discriminating in their attitude towards foreign advisers of different nationalities - Western or Soviet. In the 1960's the number of American, West German, British, French and Dutch advisers was still significant (members of the Peace Corps began to arrive in Afghanistan in 1962), and the Afghans were struck by the fact that the Soviets did not have full freedom to mingle with them or accept private invitations while the Westerners could and did.

By the end of the 1960's the number of Soviet projects in Afghanistan had increased to such an extent that there were five times more Soviet advisers in Afghanistan than the total number of Westerners. By then the Soviets were arriving with their families, their own interpreters and commissariats, and were beginning to socialize; some selected young Afghans were invited to vodka parties and were given liqueurs as gifts. A rare case of cooperation was noticed at the end of the 1960's and early 1970's in the Ministry of Planning where Soviet economic advisory missions were working in cooperation with U.S., West German and Indian missions to formulate the Afghan five year plan (1967-1972).

The increasing contact between the Tajiks of the Soviet civilian missions and the Afghan population during this period began to have some notable side-effects. The Soviet Tajiks regained much of their lost cultural patrimony through contacts with the Afghans. They began to study literary Persian, to acquire a new vocabulary and compiled glossaries of technical words. The impact of this new trend on the development of the Tajik language in the Soviet Union became

obvious in the 1970's. During the same period, Afghan students were sent to the Soviet Union to study agriculture, geology, engineering and technical subjects as well as economics and literature. Approximately 100 at first, then 150, Afghan students were sent every year to Moscow or Tashkent. Contrary to the generally accepted opinion, young Afghans who had studied in the Soviet Union were not usually in favour of the Soviet influence in Afghanistan. It was standard knowledge among them that some students were specially selected "favourites" who were recruited by the Soviet intelligence services - such as the KGB. Abdul Qâder, later to become Chief of the Air Force under Mohammad Daoud Khan and Hamid Mohtat, a Panshiri who later participated in Daoud's conspiracy in 1973.

The period from 1963 to 1973 was marked in internal Afghan politics by a growth in left-wing trends and the consequent conflict between fundamentalist and communist factions. Left-wing parties took advantage of the freedom of activity allowed under the Afghan Constitution of 1963 to organize and publicise their views - Khalq was the first party to bring out its own newspaper on 11th May 1966. The extreme freedom given to the left-wing parties to publicise their anti-religious views soon provoked a reaction, initially among the intellectuals of Kabul University who formed a progressive, fundamentalist, anti-communist movement comparable to that of the Muslim Brotherhood.[2] The response of the left was voiced by Babrak Karmal - then a member of Parliament - when he replied to criticism of his anti-religious stand, "Don't use this old sword (*shamshêr-e kohna*) against me".

The conflict between the fundamentalist and communist tendencies took on a new turn in April 1970 when the government took part in the 100th anniversary of Lenin's birth. They adopted the slogan "Lenin's friendship with Afghanistan", Karmal and his Parchamis friends chose the slogan "Lenin - leader of the toiling masses" and a leading article in *Parcham* reproduced a huge photograph of Lenin with the caption "*dorûd* (greetings) to Lenin". The use of the sacred word *dorûd*, used in Afghanistan exclusively in a religious context to praise God, in relation to Lenin further alienated the religious elements in the country. As a result, the mullahs came together to form a movement and convened their own congress in Kabul in March 1970. Faced with two opposing movements, the government of Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi opted to protect the communists and disbanded the mullahs' congress. The mullahs then moved to the Laghman and Shinwar provinces to continue their protest. The government was aware of the influence the mullahs might have on the population. They feared for the safety of a Soviet mission working in the Shinwar province but could not prevent the lynching of

one young Afghan communist in the Laghman province. The Government defused the situation through negotiations with the Shinwaris and the mullahs of Ningrahar. The governments of Dr. Abdul Zaher and Mussa Shafiq from 1970 to 1973 adopted a more favourable attitude towards the religious groups to maintain a balance between the two movements, but the communists continued to enjoy full freedom of action and were strengthening their influence among young intellectuals in the provinces and army officers.

THE GOVERNMENT OF MOHAMMAD DAOUD KHAN, 1973-1978

The Marxist-supported coup of Mohammad Daoud in July 1973 brought an end to Afghanistan's experiment with constitutional monarchy. It became clear that the coup had been planned over the previous two years, since the resignation of Prime Minister Etemadi, with the help of the Marxist elements in the army and some pro-Daoud civilian groups. For the first time, Marxists were to have a share in government - Daoud's cabinet was made up of his own supporters and communists of the Parcham party (the Khalq party was represented by one cabinet member). It was also the first time that Afghanistan experienced an administration using tough police methods. During this period the communists intensified their propaganda among young army officers.

For the first three years of Daoud's government relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union were consolidated and expanded. As soon as he come to power, Daoud asked for high-level Soviet military advisers to work with the Ministry of Defence. Whereas previously the role of the Soviet advisers was confined to teaching, they now worked directly with the Afghan army - from 1973 every battalion had Soviet advisers attached to them. The advisers to the Ministry of Defence and the army were exclusively Russians or Soviet "Europeans" (including Ukrainians and Belorussians) and most of the interpreters were Russians who had learned Persian in military language courses in Moscow with only a small number of Soviet Tajiks among them.

The coup of 1973 initiated changes in the constitution of the Afghan personnel in the army. Leftist officers were given greater responsibility and Khalq and Parcham communist parties were allowed to recruit freely among the young officers, including those who had not been trained in the Soviet Union. The Khalq party had already been recruiting members in the military school of Mahtab-Qala since 1965 and began thus to consolidate its predominance over its rival party. This recruitment was supposed to have been done

secretly, but it was an "open secret" to most of the Afghan population. Daoud's own Pashtun nationalist inclinations and belief in racial superiority helped to promote the Pashtun elements in the army and led them into a close identification with the Khalq party recruits (non-Pashtuns were only accepted on the basis of restricted regional quotas from Kabul, Herat, Badakhshan etc.). Thus the notion of communism became synonymous for many officers with Pashtun nationalism from this time onwards. This identification was as real as it was perceived: the Pashtun military faction, which had helped Daoud come to power, later helped to assassinate him and continued to play a pro-Khalqi role through the rule of Taraki and Amin and after the Soviet invasion.[4]

In general, people realised that communism would come to Afghanistan if the army became communist but nobody had taken account of the extent of communist infiltration, despite the "open secret" of Khalq recruitment.[5]

The growth of leftist elements in the army was paralleled by an increase in the appointment of left-wing candidates to the secret police. These were to be found in the newly-created organization within the Ministry of the Interior together with pro-Daoud supporters. This organization was created to supersede the existing organization for national security, *Masuniyat-e Milli* which had been formed in the last years of the monarchy and was run along Afghan lines with no foreign assistance. (It had inherited the administration of the late Hâshim Khan's *Riâsat-e Zabt Ahwâlât* of the 1930's. After July 1973 *Masuniyat-e Milli* was maintained under the administration of General Ismail.)[6]

Daoud had always maintained an anti-religious attitude and was particularly opposed to the young Muslim fundamentalists and the Mojaddidi and the Gailani families.[7] This attitude appealed to the Parcham communists who took up the slogan "Daoud's friends - our friends; Daoud's enemies - our enemies". In 1975, he arrested all the young Muslim intellectuals in the University of Kabul after the Panshir uprising of July. Some were executed and some received prison sentences of several years in Deh-Mazang prison in Kabul.[8] Many managed to escape to Peshawar where they began to form Muslim resistance movement against Daoud. Their activities were restrained by the Pakistan government in 1976, when Daoud's relations with Pakistan improved.

From 1975 onwards Daoud began to change the direction of his domestic and foreign policy and opened an ambiguous phase in his relations with the Soviet Union. The predominance of the Parcham party was broken as ministers and administrative officials were dismissed. Daoud began to favour nationalist elements which also made

cooperation difficult with the liberals, democrats and technological intelligentsia. Nevertheless, the Parchamis continued to support Daoud, claiming that his rule was only a transitory phase, and the recruitment of new members to the Khalq and Parcham parties went on unaffected by Daoud's new stand. The Minister of Education, Abdul Qayyum Wardak, a man of Pashtun nationalist inclination, continued to appoint Khalqis to important positions in the Ministry of Education and the University of Kabul, provided that their leftist views were not generally known. The *coup* of April 1978 confirmed all of these appointees in their positions.

Daoud's new anti-leftist policy at home was accompanied by an attempt to improve relations with the West. He went to Iran in 1976 where he had been promised an important loan for building Mashad - Herat - Kabul - Peshawar railways.[9] He also went to visit Anwar Sadat in Egypt in 1977, General Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan and to Saudi Arabia. All along, he saw no contradiction in his policy of rapprochement with pro-Western states and good relations with the Soviet Union.

However this new phase of Daoud's regime was impeded by lack of resolution. Daoud had lost the capacity to make decisions. A few of his ministers offered their resignations but were persuaded to carry on with their tasks under the promise that reforms would be undertaken.

The Soviet attitude in response to Daoud's new ventures was cautious, but in July 1977 the Soviet Communist Party secretly instructed the Khalq and Parcham parties to reunite.[10] Both were pro-Soviet but previously opposed to each other. The reunion was not a genuine change of heart but proposed for practical reasons. This marked the beginning of preparations for the coup of April 1978 although officially the Khalq and Parcham parties continued to support Daoud. Meanwhile, the number of Soviet advisers in the country was constantly increasing.

Daoud's new policy was to be put to the test at the conference of ministers from non-aligned countries scheduled for May 1978 in Kabul, prior to the meeting of the non-aligned heads of state in September 1979 in Havana. It was common knowledge in government circles in Kabul that the ministerial meeting would be used by Afghanistan to initiate a movement against Cuba. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wahid Abdullah, visited Jakarta in April and made statements to foreign diplomats, including those from pro-Soviet countries, that the role of Cuba among non-aligned countries had to be checked. He repeated these views on a later visit to New Delhi. When Cuba sent a mission to Kabul in the middle of April 1978 to prepare for the Havana meeting, it got the worst possible

reception. Junior officers were sent to receive the Cuban delegates and they were unable to meet anyone at government level. It is thought that this was the point when the Soviets began to see cause for alarm in developments in Afghanistan. Ironically, the Minister of Defence, General Rassûli, his acting Foreign Minister, Wahid Abdullah and the Minister of Interior, Abdul Qâder Nuristanî, were all of the opinion that the Soviet Union remained friendly towards Daoud's government.

At this stage it must be remembered that every regiment in the Afghan army and airforce had Soviet advisers among them who were fully informed of all developments within the armed forces. The infiltration of the Afghan army was perfect - nothing was done without the knowledge of the Soviet advisers who knew in detail the day-to-day movements of the army. In spite of his new right-wing inclinations, Daoud had done nothing to prevent the spread of influence of the Soviet military advisers, as he was convinced that the Soviet Union would never let him down and that his anti-Cuban stand would be tolerated.

The prelude to the coup came on 17th April 1978 when the communists officially launched their opposition to Daoud in response to the murder of Mir-Ali Akbar Kheybar - a Parcham theoretician.[11] Nearly 11,000 people attended the funeral - Khalqis, Parchamis, other communist sympathisers and also many who were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with Daoud's rule, which they saw as a brand of fascism and immovability. On 24th April, Daoud reacted and imprisoned some Khalq and Parcham leaders, among them Babrak Karmal and Nur-Mohammad Taraki. Hafizullah Amin escaped until the next day which gave him time to alert the armed forces. On 26th April, Watan-jâr moved a column of tanks into Kabul and Abdul Qâder brought in the airforce to strike against Daoud's palace and to immobilise the regiments which could have helped Daoud. Most regiments backed the coup however, not always aware that this was a communist *coup d'état* and not merely a move against Daoud's personal rule. Daoud and his family were executed on the morning of 27th April.

The truth behind the organisation of the coup has remained a major topic of discussion among Afghan intellectuals to this day. There are two theories: firstly, that the April coup was organized by the Afghan communist officers Abdul Qâder, Aslam Watan-jâr, Lt.-Colonel Rafi, and others, with the support and approval of the Soviet advisers who were present in Aslam Watan-jâr's No. 4 Regiment, in other garrisons and in the military airports of Khwâja-Rawâsh and Bagram and secondly, that everything was engineered by the Soviets who instructed their agents (Abdul Qâder *et al.*) to launch the coup. Whatever the truth may be, the Soviet Union welcomed the coup and

responded immediately. A few days later, Afghan officers at the military airport in Bagram were surprised to see large Soviet military transport planes unloading all kinds of armaments under the pretext that they might be needed in case of possible uprisings. This seems to indicate that the coup had the backing of the Soviet Union from the outset.[12]

APRIL 1978 TO DECEMBER 1979

After their release, the new leaders Nur-Mohammad Taraki, Hafizullah Amin and Babrak Karmal, met to organize the new government. Their first public declaration was made in Pashto (read by Taraki) and then read in Dari by Karmal. The speech emphasized that religious traditions would be respected under the new regime and that the new era would bring an end to injustice, fascism and the remnants of monarchistic elements of Daoud's rule. May 1978 passed in an atmosphere of reassurance and there were relatively few executions. Among them were the Minister of Defence, General Ghulam Haidar Rassûli; the Minister of Justice, Wafiollah Sami'i, a Muslim of discreet fundamentalist tendencies; General Rokay Solayman, a cousin of Daoud; General Khaliq who had studied in the USA; the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wahid Abdullah; the former chamberlain to King Zaher Shah, Mohammad Rahim; the former Prime Minister, Mussa Shafiq and army officers who had resisted the coup. About 3000 soldiers were killed during the armed confrontations of 26th and 27th April.[13] By the end of the month the government was beginning to tighten up on all religious elements: some religious leaders were arrested in Logar and Ghazni. Young fundamentalists who had been imprisoned by Daoud and were due to be released, were transferred from Deh-Mazang prison in Kabul to Pul-e Charkhi. They were to be kept there under very tough conditions until their sudden execution in June 1979. Protest meetings in Kunar were savagely crushed.

The coming to power of the communists in April 1978 changed the number, role and position of Soviet advisers in Afghanistan. The new government asked for Soviet specialists in all possible fields, including religion. One week after the coup, Soviet advisers - usually ethnic Russians - began to arrive in Kabul. The number of Soviet military advisers increased greatly, particularly after the beginning of the resistance in Kunar (late April) and Badakhshan provinces (August 1978).

After the coup, Kabul witnessed the arrival of Soviet advisers in two new fields of security: into the Afghan police force, which had been trained previously by West Germans and into the intelligence

services, which was the first time any foreigners had been involved in this area of security. The Soviets reorganized the intelligence services: the former police of the Ministry of the Interior - *Masuniyat-e Milli* - and the Prime Minister's secret police were amalgamated into a central organisation, *Afghanistan de Gatô Sazmân* or AGSa (in Pashto "Organization for the Interests of Afghanistan"), which in turn was divided into three departments for internal, foreign and military intelligence. This organisation was headed by Colonel Assadullah Sarwarî in 1978 and 1979 and played an important role in the arrest, imprisonment and execution of all those suspected of opposing the government. Torture became the rule and from January 1979, when the government was confident it did not require any more "public" confessions, torture was applied as a form of punishment.

Lists of people to be killed were often not prepared or sometimes "disappeared" in the case of summary executions. Many Afghans think that the Soviets engineered these summary executions although nothing conclusive is known about their involvement apart from one clear fact - their presence in the AGSa enabled them to know everything that went on. The Soviet government was fully informed about the executions. When the US ambassador, Adolph Dubs, was taken hostage in February 1979 the role of Soviet advisers was well observed by US diplomats at the time. After the Soviet invasion however, his murder was blamed on Amin and his chief of police, Colonel Sayyid-Daoud Taroon. On 4th September 1979 Taroon was killed in a shoot-out and therefore unable to provide any further evidence in the matter.

After the death of Taraki there was an attempt at a clean sweep in the intelligence services. Colonel Sarwarî disappeared (it was known he was hiding in the Soviet Embassy) and was replaced by Amin's nephew and son-in-law, Assadullah Amin. Amin declared that Sarwarî had been responsible for all the tortures and executions despite the fact that everyone in the administration knew that he had acted with the full knowledge and support of Taraki and Amin. Amin changed the name of AGSa to KAM, *Kargarâno Ettelâ'âto Moa'ssessa* (Workers' Information Organisation, in Pashto) and under this new title the organization continued to carry out torture and killings.

Party organization was one of the spheres of activity opened up to Soviet advisers after the coup. Numerous advisers were sent immediately to help organize the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan* ("Democratic Peoples' Party of Afghanistan"). The Soviet advisers became active in the political bureau of the Party's Central Committee and in organizing provincial and district branches. They also took charge of organizing *sazmâns* which were modelled on the Soviet communist youth, pioneer and women's organizations,

workers' unions (there were no more than 20,000 industrial workers in Afghanistan) and agricultural cooperatives etc.

When Taraki and Amin first came to power they declared their government to be democratic and pro-religious and encouraged the mullahs to continue in their jobs. While maintaining this stand throughout their rule, measures were taken against religion which followed the pattern of the Soviet Union's anti-religious campaigns in Central Asia. Children were encouraged to disobey their parents if they were reactionary; women's liberation was encouraged and plays were shown on television with schoolgirls in suggestive situations. Young people were sent to the countryside to promote the literacy programme and land reform. Individual mullahs were then accused of resisting the establishment of the *kolkhoz* and liquidated. But it also worked the other way round – many of these young people were killed on the spot by the local population. Most importantly, the wholesale slaughter of religious families, Shia clergy and young Muslim fundamentalists began. The Mojaddidi family, for example, were accused of being CIA agents and supporters of the Shah of Iran.[14]

A chronology of the internal politics in Afghanistan shows that the forces which had united to accomplish the coup gradually became more unstable. At the beginning of July 1978, friction between the Khalq and Parcham parties became so strong that co-operation was no longer possible. The Soviet Union decided to back the Khalqis because of their predominance in the army and accepted Babrak Karmal's exclusion from the government.[15] Karmal was sent to Prague as ambassador and his close friends received diplomatic posts elsewhere. The campaign against the Parcham party was stepped up at the end of July when the government declared that it had discovered a plot by Major-General Abdul Qâder to overthrow the regime. Abdul Qâder, Mohammed Rafi', Sultan-Ali Keshtmand and many other Parchamis were arrested and imprisoned. Liberals, university professors, Muslim fundamentalists and nationalists were also arrested. It became obvious that the Qâder plot was a pretext to imprison anybody of influence by accusing them of being a Parcham supporter. Many of the imprisoned were later tortured to extract confessions. In September 1978, Karmal and his Parcham colleagues were accused by Amin of being allies of the Western imperialists, CIA agents and servants of the deposed king. They were summarily expelled from the Revolutionary Committee of the Party, according to a well-tried earlier Soviet pattern. There was no reaction from the Soviet Union other than to provide them secretly with help in the form of money and visas.

Having been accused by the Parchamis of betraying the revolution, Taraki and Amin adopted the red flag as the national emblem. On

7th November Amin welcomed the anniversary of the October Revolution with a speech proclaiming "Our revolution follows the great Soviet Revolution". The change of the national flag together with this declaration provoked a reaction from the Muslims, who began to organize themselves into an anti-Soviet movement. The Tajiks and Uzbeks of Badakhshan and Nuristan were among the first to become active. Resistance was also being organized in Peshawar by, among others, Gulbuddin Hekmat-yâr (*Hezb-e Islami*), Professor Burhanuddin Rabbâni (*Jamiat-e Islami*)[16] and Sebghat-ul-lâh Mojaddidi, who had fled at the time of Daoud's anti-religious campaign. The reaction by the government to the news of resistance was immediate. People were brought to Kabul to be executed: in January 1979, all the men of the Mojaddidi clan were secretly assassinated in one night on the order of Taraki and Amin and all the women and children rounded up and sent to Pul-e Charkhi prison.[17]

The fall of the Shah and the rise of Khomeini in Iran contributed to the general unrest in Afghanistan. Troubles began in Herat (14th March 1979), which is 60 per cent Shia Muslim: 25,000 people were reported killed. From then on the Hazaras and other Shias living in Kabul were brought under suspicion. Later in the month there was a general drive against all the religious groups in the country and once more against the Parchamis. Sunnis, Shias, both fundamentalists and intellectuals, were rounded up until on 21st March, the Muslim New Year, Taraki and Amin felt confident that they had the country under control.

Amin was nominated Prime Minister and Watan-jâr, a Khalqi, Minister of Defence. Amidst the systematic killings which began at that time, the government celebrated the first anniversary of the revolution in April with a Moscow-type parade, distinguished only by stringent security measures. In the dawn of 4th June 1979, the young Muslim fundamentalists previously imprisoned by Daoud were transferred from block No. 2 to No. 1 in Pul-e Charkhi prison and executed *en masse*. These executions and the reputed invocations of Allah and curses against communism by the young men in their last moments had a tremendous impact on public opinion in Afghanistan. Uprisings began in protest against the land reform and communist propaganda and the first organized Mujahideen groups started their operations in Afghanistan. It appeared that the government was losing ground. Before passing to the events of the summer of 1979 it is worth noting a curious phenomenon which occurred during this period in the distribution of power among the tribal federations of Afghanistan. By August 1978, the Dorrânis who had ruled Afghanistan almost without interruption for the previous 150 years were replaced by the Ghilzais.[18]

Afghans consider that the government's lack of control by the summer of 1979 was obvious in its handling of a few incidents. On "Chendawal Day", 23rd June 1979, a demonstration was planned in the Shia district of Chendawal in Kabul which houses many proletarian Hazaras. People were loaded into trucks in this district and executed on the same day as agents of Khomeini. It was assumed that the demonstration was in direct response to Khomeini's request to the Soviet Union to liberate Soviet Muslims. On "Bala-Hissar" Day, 6th August, 1979, M-24 helicopter gunships were used for the first time to quell an uprising in the citadel housing the Kabul military headquarters. Another move worth mentioning is the execution of the former Prime Minister Nur Ahmad Etemadi because it illustrates the effect of foreign broadcasts in such an unstable political situation. In early August, the radio station, Voice of America, broadcast a long analysis of Afghan affairs. Amin and Taraki were accused of blundering and the suggestion was made that only one man could save the situation as a potential leader, namely Etemadi. On the 27th day of Ramadhan, Etemadi was told that he was to be released but was then taken away and executed secretly.[19]

The period between September and December was marked by a high degree of instability. Discipline in the army had collapsed by the end of July and only Khalqi officers could be relied upon to carry out orders. But even the Khalqis stopped obeying orders by September as a direct result of the rift between the Taraki and Amin factions. Between September and the Soviet invasion in December discipline was only enforced by pro-Amin Khalqis. At the end of August Taraki went to Havana for the meeting of the non-aligned heads of state. He returned through Moscow where he met Brezhnev. It is possible that he was advised to get rid of Amin and recall Karmal to reunite the Party. It is likely that there were agents in his entourage who informed Amin of these discussions. A few days after his return to Kabul, Taraki was arrested and secretly killed. The only posthumous comment about him came from the Minister of Justice, Abdul Hakim Shar'i Jozjani (a Khalqi Uzbek) who accused him of being "supported by an uncultured band".[20]

By September 1979, Amin alone was left in power. Despite assurances of Soviet understanding, he was afraid nevertheless, and made pro-Soviet gestures in praising the red flag and in his declarations every day ("Friendship with the Soviet Union is an integral part of our nationalism", "Our revolution is the revolution of Lenin", etc). His lack of confidence was shown further in the execution of 52 formerly influential people after a special celebration for the flag day anniversary. The victims included intellectuals and religious leaders, as well as some Marxists of Maoist inclinations including

Tahir Badakhshi.[21] No Parchamis were executed at any stage of Taraki–Amin leadership. It was the only protection afforded them by the Soviet Union.[22]

Many reasons for the Soviet invasion on 24th December 1979 have been put forward. The Afghan intellectuals have narrowed them to the five outlined here. Firstly, the fact that the government was unable to stop widespread guerilla resistance movements; that it was inconceivable for the Soviets to admit that a communist regime was failing; Soviet retribution for Amin's disobedience in splitting the Party and ordering the assassination of Taraki; because of rumours in Kabul about proposed US intervention in Iran after the diplomats were taken hostage on 4th November 1979; and finally, to establish a new strategic position in South Asia while the United States were strengthening the Diego Garcia aero-naval base.

FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO THE PRESENT DAY

After the Soviet invasion and assassination of Amin by a Soviet KGB commando, Babrak Karmal returned and took up the position of Prime Minister, President of the Revolutionary Council, Secretary of the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan* and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.[23] Many others returned including Major-General Qâder, Lt-Colonel Rafi', Sultan-Ali Keshtmand (a Hazara Shia) and Colonel Sarwarî who was now considered a patriot and promoted to Deputy Prime Minister. Amin was accused of having been a CIA agent and was blamed for all the previous killings, especially of the former Prime Ministers, Shafiq and Etemadi.[24] Most of the prisoners were released and *Jabha-ye Melli-e Padar-Watan* ("National Front of the Fatherland") was created for people without specific political affiliations and for those of a religious persuasion.[25] The freedom and protection of religion were promised and Karmal's first move upon his return was to send a message of praise to Ayatollah Khomeini ("flattering him in words of servile respect"); he received no reply.[26]

After the invasion the number of Soviet advisers in the Kabul administration increased once more. Excluding the Soviet troops, there are now approximately 3000 Soviet advisers in Afghanistan divided equally between military and civilian affairs. They are to be found in the office of the Prime Minister, in all ministries, in the Party and its front organizations, in the judiciary, in trade and in many other fields. Only the geological and agricultural missions which operated in the countryside have been withdrawn because of the lack of security in the provinces. Each Afghan institution is supervised by the corresponding Soviet institution, for example, the Afghan Foreign

Office is supervised by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Afghan army is controlled by the Soviet army, the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan* is supervised by the Communist Party of the USSR and the *Bakhtyar* News Agency is supervised by Tass. The Soviet institutions do not coordinate in Kabul as everything is centrally controlled from Moscow.[27]

A corps of Soviet military advisers controls and decides every move of the Afghan army. Every morning they study all the reports on clashes with the guerillas which are sent to the Ministry of Defence. Afghan leftist officers, who have usually studied in Moscow, are active in every department of the Ministry. The Ministry of Defence has a 24-hour communication link with Moscow. All the communications are in Russian.

After the invasion the intelligence service was to be renamed once again: it is now called "KHAD" (*"Khedamât-e Ettelâ'at-e Dawlati"* - "State Information Service"). It is administered by Dr Najîb - a young Parcham friend of Karmal. The three main departments remain: internal, foreign and military. It is understood that the military department is headed by a Khalqi and the other two by Parchamis. The role of the Soviet advisers in the intelligence service is extremely important. They look after the major affairs of KHAD and train young Afghans for spying, investigations and torture, as well as recruiting candidates for special training in the Soviet Union - usually in Tashkent. KHAD's communications with Moscow and Tashkent are in Russian. Since January 1980 KHAD has continually expanded. It now controls hundreds of corporations such as for example the Kabul taxis (many young Kabuli contacts of the Mujahideen have been arrested thanks to them and have been either jailed in Pul-e Charkhi or executed). KHAD is generally hated and its expansion has created animosity in the ranks of the few remaining civil servants. The majority of KHAD's officers are former police officers and militant communists. New members include young people fresh from the Kabul lycée. KHAD also trains communist girls specially for questioning, searching and torturing women. From time to time, KHAD introduces people to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be sent as attachés - under diplomatic status - to the Afghan embassies in Tehran, Islamabad, New Delhi, Baghdad, Kuwait and the Afghan consulates in Mashhad, Bombay and Peshawar. These people who have received secret training in the USSR are completely unknown to the personnel department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They liaise directly with KGB representatives in Soviet embassies and consulates and their role is to work on their host countries where, as Afghans, they can pass unnoticed.

The new Soviet ambassador, Fikret Ahmedzhanovich Tabiev, a

russified Kazan Tartar, probably a Mishar, rarely meets the Afghan Foreign Minister. Turkish diplomats in Kabul report that he understands a little Turkish. Diplomatic parties given by the Soviet Embassy have become rare under his ministry when compared with the days of the monarchy.[28] Tabiev is only the second high-ranking Muslim diplomat to be posted to Afghanistan.[29]

The most prominent Soviet adviser in Kabul is most certainly Safranchuk, a Ukrainian and former ambassador in Africa. He speaks fluent English and French and is described as being "suave". His daily duties begin with a drive in an ordinary car (without diplomatic plates) to the Soviet Embassy where he receives his instructions directly from the Soviet government through a telegraphic link which operates 24 hours a day. From there he goes on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he has the freedom to enter the office of Shah-Mohammad Dost, the Minister, at any time. He hands him texts of the telegraphs from Moscow in English which are to be announced later in the evening as the official declarations of the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His other duties include accompanying the Minister during his visits to the United Nations, where he also gives him the text of his speeches. In the middle of 1982 Safranchuk was replaced by Gavrillov, a diplomat, who has spent many years attached to the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. Soviet advisers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs deal with international economic relations and agreements. They come also as professors and lecturers to the Diplomatic Studies Institute where only young communists are now trained as diplomats. No decision of any importance is taken in Kabul however, not even by Safranchuk or now Gavrillov. He sends his advice to his government and in turn receives instructions.

The Soviet advisers to the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan* belong to the International Department of the Communist Party and are all Soviet "Europeans". All communications between the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan* and Moscow are in Russian and include Karmal's statements and official speeches. The statements are translated into Tajik by Tajiks from Soviet Central Asia, then "reworked" into Dari by Afghans. The Afghan leaders may be allowed to add a few words to provide some "local colour", but even these are sometimes telegraphed from Moscow.

Two Soviet advisers from TASS, both English speakers, work permanently with the *Bakhtyar* news Agency. There is a special telegraphic link between TASS and *Bakhtyar* which is used to telex all TASS communiqués immediately to Kabul. *Bakhtyar* then drafts its own commentaries with the help of the two advisers from TASS. In the evening, the mass media bases its reports on material taken from *Bakhtyar*. All newspapers are owned and controlled by the govern-

ment. They are financed by the state and all editors are appointed by the government. Features and editorials are taken from *Bakhtyar*, often with the addition of a few curses against the "reactionary bandits" by way of "local colour". Young journalists are sometimes sent to interview peasant workers in factories who express their pleasure at having their sons drafted into the army to fight the enemies of the state. There is little difference in content between the newspapers of Kabul and Düshanbe apart from the different alphabet. Until the last days of Amin's rule lists of obituaries were published in newspapers. This practice has now been stopped as it would reveal the number of communists killed by the Mujahideen. By the same token, the mass media does not announce the losses of the Soviet and Afghan armies.

There are a few Soviet advisers in the Ministry of Agriculture but as mentioned earlier all agriculture and mining missions in the provinces have been withdrawn. There is no more planned agriculture or mining because of the war. Soviet advisers in the Ministry of Agriculture are not in a position to ask for Soviet tanks not to destroy crops, or to ask Soviet soldiers not to shoot cattle (Soviet soldiers have a habit of shooting mules and donkeys in particular because they are used for transporting arms and ammunition to the Mujahideen).

Most of the Central Asians who work as advisers or technicians in Afghanistan are Tajiks, although in the past there have been a few Uzbeks, Turkmen and Azeris. Many of these Tajiks are former students of languages and literature and are able to read and write Dari and Persian in the Arabic alphabet. One can find young Tajiks in the Ministry of Agriculture who have studied Saadi, for example, but not agriculture. Up to now, no Central Asian is known to have worked in any important position; their function is limited to translation (or subaltern roles). They have no power to make decisions and never work in offices where they can come into direct contact with high level Afghan officials (Afghan communists welcome the instructions of the Soviets *only* if they are "Europeans"). The Tajiks are to be found in the various offices of the *Hezb-e Demokratik Khalq-e Afghanistan*, in the offices of the Prime Minister and in less important ministries such as agriculture or mining. There are a few Tajik translators attached to the Soviet army but their number is less than is generally thought. There is not a single Tajik in KHAD or the Ministry of Defence. In the Soviet Embassy they work only in the commercial and consular departments, never in the political section. All translation work in KHAD, the Ministry of Defence and in the political department of the embassy is done by Russians, Ukrainians, Belorussians or other "Europeans" who have learned the language in Moscow or Leningrad. It is obvious that the Soviet

authorities consider their own Muslim Central Asians to be totally unreliable, a fact which Afghan communists are fully aware of. In this respect, the present Soviet leadership is even less confident than Stalin, who for all his belief in Russian superiority was able to use Central Asians for intelligence work.[30]

Before the invasion, there were some attempts to introduce Soviet elements into secondary education. Under Taraki and Amin, lectures on politics were standardized in all secondary schools; Russian text books were translated into Dari for this purpose. The Ministry of Education began to publish text books for Uzbek and Turkmen children similar to those in the Soviet Union in 1978. But progress was so slow that by the time they were published, Amin ordered them to be hidden as they carried photographs of Taraki. Most of the professors were communists – former primary school teachers.

Since the invasion the role of the Soviets in education as a whole has been surprisingly small. Religious books used in schools at the time of the monarchy and during Daoud's rule are still in circulation.[31] Political science courses in secondary schools are now considered unproductive because of the general animosity of the students to the subject. They have been suspended in many schools. The government has been discouraged from pursuing revolutionary propaganda in schools since the schoolgirls' demonstration in February - March 1980 when many girls shouting "down with the Soviet Union" were killed. When Russian and other Soviet "European" professors and doctors arrived in Kabul after the invasion, they asked to see the university curricula. They were shown the syllabuses by the Afghan professors, most of whom had studied in the West, and it was found that in most cases the Afghan curricula were far more advanced than those of Soviet universities. The Soviet Union holds no prestige among Afghans in academic and scientific fields. There is a general disenchantment among Afghan professors who are gradually leaving the country. The latest reports tell us that Soviet professors are unable to teach anywhere other than in their own polytechnic in Kabul "having become victims of their own ignorance and baiting by the students". It appears there is little confidence in the ability of Soviet professors, doctors or technicians.[32]

Afghan students have been sent to the Soviet Union in larger numbers in the last three years. In 1980 there were approximately 600 Afghan students in Tashkent. About half were Communist Party students and the other half were recruited by KHAD. Since then the number of students in Tashkent alone has increased to 5000. Throughout 1982 there have been 25,000 Afghan students in the Soviet Union.[33] Most are happy to go as a way of avoiding military service. Three political trends are predominant among Afghan students

in the Soviet Union: the nationalist Muslims, forming the majority, who do not publicize their anti-Soviet feelings, the Khalqis, and the Parchamis. The majority of students sent by KHAD to train in intelligence work are chosen from families who have close links with Parcham leaders. These form the majority of KHAD recruits and consist of few Pashtuns. Pashtuns are normally to be found among the military recruits from KHAD, dominated by Khalq families. (Under Taraki and Amin most students in the Soviet Union and Bulgaria were Pashtuns who had been chosen by the Khalq party). As a rule when a ministry is controlled by Khalq, students selected for study will belong to families close to the Khalq tendency. As a result there are frequent clashes between the two factions - Khalq and Parcham. Many casualties were reported in 1981 from such fights in Tashkent.[34] The students sent by KHAD to Tashkent are isolated from their compatriots, they are taught exclusively by Soviet "Europeans" and have their free day on Monday rather than Sunday so that they may not meet with their fellow Afghans around the town.[35] There are also about a hundred Afghan students in Düshanbe studying agriculture, economics and literature.

The presence of 5000 Afghan students in Tashkent has had significant repercussions on the native population. Some Afghans are Uzbek speakers which has permitted many contacts between them and the local Uzbeks. Although the majority of the students are communist recruits there are also Muslim fundamentalists among them posing as communists. The Afghans have given information to the Uzbeks about the real situation in their country and have explained the activities of the Mujahideen. The Soviet authorities have tried to stop these contacts but with little success. An attempt has been made to transfer all Afghan students to Moscow and Leningrad but has met with strong opposition from the Uzbek Premier, Rashidov, who insists that Tashkent is the natural place to train Afghans.[36] He also proposed the reopening of the Afghan consulate in Tashkent which existed under King Aminullah but was later closed in 1938 by Stalin. These moves show an interesting feature in the balance of power in Tashkent. That Rashidov should feel confident enough to insist on the privilege of training fellow Muslims testifies to the growth of the political strength of this strategic borderland region.

Since the invasion the Kabul government has continually reassured the public that freedom of religion is allowed and even guaranteed that no mosques will be closed. Anti-religious declarations are restricted to internal communist meetings. Nevertheless, Karmal has followed the Soviet line on Islam - he differentiates between "good" and "bad" Muslims. Afghanistan should try to follow the example of Libya, South Yemen and Syria (see appendix for

extracts from Karmal's speech to the Party Congress in April 1982), while the Mujahideen's brand of Islam is considered to be a reactionary movement of bandits subsidized by the CIA and China. The government created the Council of Islamic Affairs in 1981 but found only a few unknown mullahs to be members. The president is Said Afghani, a former student of the prestigious Al-Azhar University in Cairo, who is considered to be of mediocre abilities.[37] This organisation has done very little since its creation and is used mainly for contact with Soviet Islamic organizations. Mufti Ziautdin Babakhanov was invited to Afghanistan and Afghan mullahs visit Tashkent and Bukhara regularly.[38] The Council of Islamic Affairs is also in charge of Haj affairs. The Saudi government gives Haj visas to Afghans but does not recognise the official missions sent by Karmal to Jeddah and Mekke. In September 1981 the Soviet government asked the PLO to assist the official Afghan Haj mission in Saudi Arabia but seeing Saudi displeasure at this proposal the PLO declined. The Kabul Government knows that many *hajis* choose not to return, but because it needs to show readiness in assisting religious rituals it cannot prevent people going to Haj. (In October 1982 one third of the *hajis* refused to return to Afghanistan. Officials of the Council of Islamic Affairs were among those refugees who sought asylum in Saudi Arabia and later in Pakistan.)

All the efforts of the Kabul government to make themselves appear as protectors of Islam have gone in vain. The Afghan population knows that Karmal and his associates, from both Khalq and Parcham tendencies, have been campaigning against Islam for years. Although the leaders, Taraki and Amin for example, have followed the tradition of the Afghan kings by participating in the prayers of the Ids (*Id-e Ramadhan* and *Id-e Qorban*) they have been considered hypocrites and renegades even by their own families.[39] Karmal is considered no better as he continues in the same tradition. His gestures are considered counter-productive at best, as it is considered a blasphemy if an "unclean" person enters a mosque and pretends to pray. The government's present efforts to find some kind of compromise with Islam come too late as most of the religious activists who have survived the persecutions of the Taraki-Amin period are now redoubling their efforts from Pakistan or from the ranks of the resistance.[40]

CONCLUSIONS

What does the Soviet Union plan to do with Afghanistan? According to Afghan intellectuals implementation of any of the possible solutions - annexation, Mongolization or Finlandization - is becoming increasingly difficult.

To annex Afghanistan and turn it into the 16th republic of the USSR was considered unwise by the Soviet leadership. The addition of 15 million Muslims to the fast growing 45 million strong Soviet Muslim population made this solution an unlikely choice in the early stages. This option has become purely academic since it is clear that the Soviet Union could not control the country militarily.[41]

Some Afghans think that Mongolization was Moscow's original choice. But there are two major differences between Mongolia and Afghanistan: religion did not play such an important role in Mongolia and secondly, the Soviets were seen as a genuine protection against China, whereas Pakistan has never posed a threat to Afghanistan. Also the Soviet Union is militarily unable to seal the border with Pakistan and Iran.

Finlandization might allow Afghanistan's status to revert to what it was under King Zaher Shah - that of a friendly unaligned country with no Western military bases. But the volume of anti-Soviet feeling in the country makes an "honourable" settlement unlikely. In Kabul the BBC, Voice of America, Deutsche Welle and radios Iran and Pakistan can be heard. The Afghan people have been able to make their own assessments of what is happening in their country. For Afghan intellectuals and the population as a whole, everything that has happened since July 1973 - the atrocities and the invasion - is due to the Soviets. They alone are deemed responsible for the destruction of the country.

Since Andropov has succeeded Brezhnev, there have been no basic changes in the Soviet attitude. Any change would require that the Soviet Union recognize that the April 1978 *coup d'état* was not a revolution and that Karmal is no more an Afghan leader than Taraki and Amin were; admit that the Afghans have the right to have a non-communist regime; and finally admit that the resistance is not a tool in the hands of Pakistan but a genuine Afghan movement. The Soviet Union really has no other solution but to talk with those who are fighting.

This article does not represent a complete spectrum of Afghan refugee opinion. The interviewees represent the moderate, nationalist and religious intellectual elements. The more radical religious followers of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and the left-wing anti-Soviet communists of *Sho'le-ye Javid*, *Sama* etc. are not represented here, neither are the guerilla leaders. The people interviewed were high-ranking diplomats and former government officials who emigrated recently.

APPENDIX

Extracts from a report of the Central Committee, presented by Babrak Karmal at the General Conference of the DPPA. The full text appeared in the Kabul newspapers on 21st April 1982.

. . . Thanks to the glorious Saur Revolution, our beloved, ancient and proud fatherland follows the great path of democratic development . . . Since then, the prevailing influence of the great feudal landlords and money lenders has been abolished. Agrarian reforms have been passed in favour of the farmers and the nomads. The state sector is developing industry and transport. The Party and the Government continue to promote an atmosphere of legality and respect for the rights and liberties of the citizens. The basis necessary for a free practice, without obstacles, of religious rites by the believers (*mo'menan*), exists. . . .

The revolutionary departure in Afghanistan, from an outdated situation, towards general progress, has provoked the savage anger and resistance of the imperialists and the reactionaries. They have mounted a massive intervention in our internal affairs and induced terror, killings and war among brothers. This is why the social and economic evolution is less rapid than expected and there are serious difficulties in the field of industry, agriculture, transport, energy . . .

Our duties are as follows: to suppress the survivals from feudal and pre-feudal times, to limit large land estates, to distribute land to those farmers with little or no land, to improve the national economy and the level of living, to sponsor the cultural development of the nationalities, peoples and tribes of Afghanistan and to democratize deeply and continuously our social and political life.

At the same time, our Revolution has a national character. The national particularities reflect the deep religious feelings and the spiritual values (*ma'navi*) of the people living in our united country - Afghanistan. We respect these traditions and values and simply preserve and promote everything created by the past generations when these creations are good (*khûb*) and progressive (*motaraqqi*).

Our Revolution has inherited the long struggle of the patriots of Afghanistan for a better and happier future. These struggles had intensified because of the radical changes which had taken place almost 65 years ago thanks to the success (*ba barakat-e*) of the great October Revolution and the changes that it brought about in the balance of power in the world in favour of peace and progress in all fields. . . . The problems facing Afghanistan are greater than in other countries. As well as economic, social and cultural difficulties, national, religious and tribal problems must also be solved. This demands a moderate and flexible approach on the part of the Party and the Revolutionary Government. . . . Following its success (in April 1978), the evolutionary course of the national and democratic Revolution has not been continuous (*ham-wâr*) and even (*yak-nawâhkt*). The Revolution . . . had to fight off deviations (*enherâfât*), errors (*eshtebâhât*) and interventions and aggressions from abroad, in the beginning. This is why many of our goals have not yet been reached and the evolutionary course which had been started has not been followed . . .

The Revolution is going on in a country where the majority of the people are adepts of the sacred (*moqaddas*) Islamic religion. The reaction inside and outside the country has always made, and continues to make, efforts to fire hatred towards the Revolution and the Democratic Peoples Party of Afghanistan among Muslims who are attached to the religion (*motadayyen*). Therefore the Revolution must be made to be understood (*tafhîm*) by those Muslims attached to religion. . . .

The other particularity of our Revolution is that it is going on in a country which has a complex (*moghlaq*) national and tribal structure (*tarkîb*) . . . A just national solution must therefore be found to this complicated problem that we have inherited from the past.

Our problems cannot be resolved at once . . . they can only be resolved step by step . . . The enemies of our country and our Revolution try to twist the nature of our policy towards Islam and the Muslims . . . They resort to lying. Does Islam reject progress? Is Islam against justice? Doesn't Islam condemn that one should spill the blood of Muslims? Our Revolution reflects (*mon'akes*) . . . the revendications of the Muslim masses of Afghanistan for the establishment of social justice and real equality. This tendency (*tamâyol*) is one of the great values (*arzesh*) and one of the most important traditions (*sonan*) of the sacred religion of Islam.

The experience of Islamic countries such as . . . Algeria, Libya and the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Yemen and finally our own experience, shows that revolutionary developments are not in contradiction with the social tenets of Islam and its historical appeal (*da'wat*) to justice, equality and opposition to exploitation (*estethmâr*) of man by man. On the contrary Islam provides the right background for the establishment of these principles (*ahkâm*) according to the historical wishes of the vast Muslim populations for a better understanding (*dark*) and a just use (*estefâda*) of Islam.

Our Party will not compromise (*sâzesh*) with the efforts of the enemies of our Peoples' Revolution who want to use the sacred religion of Islam to divert Afghanistan from the path (*râh*) that it has chosen. In practical terms, we are going to prove that social progress is not in contradiction with Islam, but that it is, on the contrary, the criminal activity of those elements who do not want, or cannot understand (*dark*) Islam, which is opposed to Islam . . . It is necessary to have a united front for the defence of the Revolution and of the people, composed of the army, police, of the groups of the "defenders of the Revolution", of the tribal militias, the local resistance contingents (*qeta'ât*) etc. . . . We must be more firm and audacious when forming or strengthening the groups of patriots who could be active in each province and district . . . so that the earth should turn into fire (*zamin ba atâsh mobaddal garbar*) under the feet of the bandits, the employees (*mozdûr*) and the allies of international reaction and of all those who disrupt the peaceful and tranquil life of our beloved Fatherland!"

NOTES

1. For an appraisal of Afghan resistance see Edward Girardet's excellent articles in the *Christian Science Monitor*, June 22, 28, July 2, 7, 9, 19, 26, August 11, 1982. For events since 1978 see: Kuldip Nayar, *Report of Afghanistan*, New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1981, 212p.
2. Muslim intellectuals were the first to notice these communist trends because some young communist activists in the Kabul lycée were outspoken in their anti-religious views and used to ask embarrassing questions about religion to their teachers. The Muslim intellectuals then alerted the Sunni clergy.
3. Since 1947 Afghan leftists have used the vocabulary of the Iranian Tudeh Party. The word *dorûd* ("greetings") has been desacralised in Iran but not in Afghanistan where it means "praise".

4. Khalq officers insisted in January 1980 on hanging Taraki's portrait in the military headquarters even after the leadership of the army was given to a Parchami, General Gul Agha, a Tajik from Kabul. Reports say that Khalq officers have obtained the removal of General Gul Agha in the summer 1982 and that the Soviets have agreed to it.
5. It is worthwhile here to give a brief biography of two men who were to play an important role in the coup of April 1978:

   Abdul Qâder, a Sunni, Persian speaker from Herat province, accepted in the Military Academy on the basis of the quota from Herat. He went to study in Moscow where he already expressed his leftist ideas. He was recruited by the KGB (whose primary objective in recruiting people is not always, incidentally, to make good communists out of them). Because of his academic success in the Soviet Union, and because as a Persian speaker he was more sophisticated in his grasp of politics and administration than his Pashtun colleagues, he was proposed for the post of Chief of the Air Force in 1976. There was some resistance at the time to his nomination from conservative elements within the army.

   Mohammad-Aslam Watan-jâr, a Pashtun of the Andar branch of the Ghilzai tribe, from Zormat in Paktya province. Watan-jâr finished the Military Academy of Balâ-Hissâr but did not go to the Soviet Union to further his military education. He was appointed Chief of Staff of Kabul Regiment No 4 (tanks) in 1975. General Ghulam Haidar Rassûli, a MohammadZai Pashtun - the Minister of Defence under Daoud - considered him as a son and gave him free access to his house.
6. The regular police under the king had become active thanks to West German technical assistance with a number of officers trained in West Germany.
7. The main religious authority in Afghanistan belongs to religious families, as a rule descending from the Prophet or the first Caliphs and whose heads are also often the heads of Sufi brotherhoods such as the Naqshbandiya and the Qadiriya. The Soviets ignored the importance of these families and never tried to co-opt them as they did in the Caucasus and Central Asia in the 1920's. They allowed (or maybe advised) Taraki and Amin to destroy them later on. Ordinary mullahs have no nationwide authority in Afghanistan.
8. Pul-e Charkhi jail was still under construction.
9. Daoud's official visit to Iran where he met the Shahanshâh was considered by Afghans to mark an important stage. On his return he expressed his opposition to "imported" ideologies.
10. That the order for Khalq and Parcham to reunite was given by Moscow was confirmed in private conversations by Parcham leaders jailed by Amin in 1979, who confided in non-communist fellow prisoners known to the author.
11. It is not known to this date who was responsible for his murder.
12. Afghans also consider the fact that the Soviets ordered Khalq and Parcham to reunite in 1977 to be a proof of their involvement, if not initiative, in the preparation of the coup.
13. Louis Dupr*ée* mentions less than 1000 people killed, see Louis Dupr*ée*, *Afghanistan*, Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 771.
14. In the last days of his rule Amin organized a congress of Muslim clergy in the hope of obtaining a confirmation of his dictatorship.
15. The Soviets had several options in Afghanistan: they could have chosen to co-opt the Pashtuns as well as the non-Pashtuns; they chose the Pashtuns. They had the option of choosing between the communists and non-communists who were also ready to cooperate. Among the communists they chose Khalq not Parcham. The only factor which can explain why the Soviets decided

to limit their own possibilities and room for manoeuvring was their conviction that in Afghanistan decision making was in the hands of the military. However, in this they were proved to be wrong.

16. According to Edward Giradet, *Christian Science Monitor*, 26 July 1982, *Jamiat-e Islami* has the support of 2500 card-carrying members over the Soviet border in Tajikistan.
17. Meanwhile the Afghan government was welcoming the unrest in Iran, being convinced that the left-wing elements and the Tudeh would succeed.
18.



19. Etemadi, personally, had good relations with the Soviet Union. As Foreign Minister under the King, he negotiated with Gromyko cooperation agreements between Afghanistan and the USSR. The Soviets, however, did not forbid his execution which was carried out under Taraki.
20. Taraki was never really "rehabilitated" by the Soviet Union. Brezhnev did not mention his name during the Communist Party 26th Congress of February 1981 when giving the list of those revolutionaries lost since the 25th Congress.
21. *Sho'le-ye Javîd*, "The Eternal Flame" - Maoist with a mainly urban (Kabul) membership of students, some intellectuals and many Hazaras.
22. Aziz Akbari, the new head of the secret police (called K.A.M. by Amin) came into Pul-e Charkhi and told Parchami prisoners that they would be kept in jail.
23. Vladimir Kuzichkin, a former KGB major, gives a detailed account of the KGB commando killing of Amin in the presidential palace of Tapu-e Taj-Beg, *Time*, 12 November 1982.
24. In tolerating two factions in the Communist Party, the Soviets are following a strategy used successfully in Central Asia in the 1920's, of terror followed by "liberalism". In the case of Afghanistan, Khalq represents the terror and Parcham liberalism. According to the Soviet pattern the executioners are then liquidated themselves: Iagod-a, Iezhov, Beria in the Soviet Union and Amin in Afghanistan.
25. *Jabha-ye Melli-e Padar-Watan* held a general conference in 1980 but despite this the front remains essentially theoretical and has no concrete activity.
26. Not unlike the Iranian Tudeh Party which, from the time of the U.S. diplomats being taken hostages, has been very intent on praising the Ayatollah.
27. Things have not changed: at the time of the Caucasian wars (Shamil's *Ghazawat*) all the decisions were taken by Nicholas I in St Petersburg and not by his representative Vorontzov in the Caucasus.
28. Contrary to reports by European journalists Tabiev's role in Kabul is very modest. He is not the "Kabul dictator" and seldom meets the Afghan Foreign Minister, except occasionally at diplomatic parties and protocol occasions.
29. Kuliev, a Turkmen, was the No. 2 in the Soviet Embassy in 1957.
30. Stalin had trained a corps of Central Asians during World War II to spy on possible German moves in Afghanistan. Twelve of them were arrested during the War and received long prison sentences in Deh-Mazang jail. There were

secret negotiations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan in 1970 to free them.

31. The communist government has never been powerful enough to forbid religious teaching in government schools.
32. Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan are equally despised. They are often drunk or drugged, and appear to the Afghans like something from outer space. Their cupidity in collecting Japanese watches, transistor radios, etc, and admiration for Western gadgets, suggest to the Afghans that the Soviet Union is a backward country.
33. Afghan students in the USSR often pretend to be Syrians or Indians to avoid insults from Russians such as: "You cowards, why can't you defend yourselves against the imperialists?", "Why should our young boys die to defend you?"
34. Fights between communist and non-communist students were also reported in Düshanbe in the summer of 1982. Some were apparently killed.
35. According to Afghan students, this also provides some protection for KHAD students against being knifed by their compatriots.
36. The "contamination" of Central Asian students does not only happen through contacts with Afghan students in Tashkent or Düshanbe. It also happens when Central Asians go to study in Moscow where they meet many students from Muslim countries who are not communists and whose influence is just as important as that of the Afghans. Thus "contamination" by ideas and ideologies from the Middle East can also filter to Central Asia through Moscow.
37. Said Afghani's deputy Tawakkoli is a Shia Hazara.
38. An intense effort is being made by the Soviets to attract the mullahs. Hundreds of them were constantly touring Central Asia in 1980-1981. They are usually from modest rural backgrounds and of low intellectual ability. When travelling to Central Asia they bring in large numbers of Qorans which are printed specially in Pakistan by "Tadj Publishing House". Their price is about U.S. $2 in Kabul but reaches 200 rubles in Central Asia. In October 1980, the Turkmen government offered to buy all the stock of Qorans from the Afghan mullahs visiting Ashkhabad at black market price. On their return to Afghanistan, the mullahs stated they had the impression that Turkmen officials had the intention of "re-using" the Qorans rather than destroying them.
39. *Munâfiq* - hypocrisy is a major sin by Muslim standards.
40. Among the many psychological errors made by the Soviets, we can mention the use of the expression "Elder Brother" (*baradar-e qalan*). The expression "Muslims are brothers" appears in the Qoran and the Hadith. For Afghans *baradar-e qalan* (in Persian) or *agha bey* (in Turkic) has a religious connotation. The elder brother is the guardian of the family honour and of the sacred. The expression therefore, cannot apply to a Russian *kafir*. It would be an insult to Islam. The expression "Our Soviet Brothers" (*baradaran-e Shuraviye-ma*) began to be used under Karmal. In 1980 a mullah criticized the governor of Kunduz for using this expression, saying: "the Muslims are our brothers". In government circles the expression has now been replaced by "Our Soviet Friends" (*dustan-e Shuraviye-ma*).
41. In the summer 1982 in Düshanbe, a Tajik speaking to Afghan students referred to Afghanistan as the 16th republic of the Soviet Union. He was found stabbed to death the next day.
42. Further information based on Afghan witness accounts can be found in: *Afghanistan en Lutte, Documents et Sentence, Iére Session du Tribunal*

Permanent des Peuples, Stockholm, May 1981, published by Freyss, 20 rue Pierre Brossolette, 93139 Noisy-le-Sec, France, and *Sentence du Tribunal Permanent des Peuples, 16-20 December 1982, Paris - Sorbonne*. This last publication can be obtained at the above address or from 5 Via della Dogana Vecchia, 00186 Roma, Italy.

Abdul Kayum Al-Nasyri: A Tatar Reformer of the 19th Century

CHANTAL LEMERCIER—QUELQUEJAY

(This article marks the beginning of a series devoted to important Muslim modernist thinkers of the Russian Empire, or *jadids*. We intend to present articles about other *jadids* in subsequent issues. - Editor)

The present article is a modified and enlarged version of the one published in French, several years ago, in the *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, Vol. IV, 1-2, pp. 117-142, under the title: "Un reformateur tatar au XIXe siècle -Abdul Qajjum al-Nasyri". Since then, several Soviet books and articles have been devoted to the Tatar *jadid* movement, in particular the excellent book of Yahya Gabdullovich Abdullin, *Tatarskaia Prosvetitel'naia Mysl'* (Kazan, 1976; 320 pages, 3000 copies) of which we made use to bring our analysis up to date; also a less scholarly work by Z.A. Ishmuhametov, *Sotsial'naia Rol'i Evolutsiia Islama v Tatarii* (Kazan, 1979) - (*Author*).

By the middle of the 19th century, Kazan, the former rival of Moscow, had definitely lost its Tatar flavour and become a large *Russian* city, proud of its university, founded in 1805, and of its brilliant intellectual life, which had reached an astonishing level of development for a provincial town. The population of Kazan was for the most part Russian, whilst Muslims lived mainly in the outlying districts and in the suburbs, where their presence nevertheless gave a slightly "oriental" character to the city as a whole.

These two communities had lived side by side for centuries without mingling or even becoming acquainted with each other. As far as Russians were concerned, a "Tatar" was a being that belonged to a strange and little known species, often ridiculed and given various more or less insulting nicknames: *poganyi* (impure, unclean), *busurmanin* (disparaging reference to Islam), *khalatnik* ("long-clothes"). At best, he was viewed with a mixture of condescending pity and curiosity. On the other hand, that Tatars, whose *Weltanschauung* was dominated by the opposition between the *Dar ul-Islam*, their own world, and the *Dar ul-Harb* (the World of War), the arena of an endless

fight between the Faithful and the "others", saw in the Russians, first and foremost, *kafirs*, the hated awesome descendants of their conquerors and despoilers. Under the circumstances, only a few and very limited contacts between members of these two communities were possible, mostly in the countryside, where Christian and Muslims peasants alike shared a similar way of life, or else in factories where the lot of a few Tatar workers was not very different from that of Russian proletarians.

It was but rarely that certain exceptional individuals belonging to the one or the other of these camps made an effort to cross the no-man's-land of indifference that separated them and to penetrate beyond the entrenchments into the other's domain. On the Russian side, at the beginning of the last century, some members of the academic world, such as Karl Fuks (1776-1846), Professor of Medicine at the University of Kazan, who spoke the Tatar language, had observed the life of the Tatars with eager interest. However, the work of these scholars was studied and appreciated only within a very limited circle of specialists. Indeed it was only the orthodox missionaries belonging to the Theological Seminary of Kazan or to the St. Gurii Fraternity (entrusted with the task of converting the Tatars to Christianity) who were in a position to learn the true facts about the Muslims, so near to the Russians and yet so far from them. It must be noted, however, that the activity of these religious bodies, instead of bridging the deep gap between the two communities, inspired Muslims with an even greater suspicion and animosity towards the Russians.

On the Tatar side, even fewer intellectuals took the risk of infringing the traditional rules of the Muslim way of life, strictly defined by the Koranic law, and of breaking away from their own in order to study Russian ways and culture. In the first half of the 19th century, the one and only Muslim scholar to achieve a real academic career in the Russian University of Kazan was Ibrahim Halfin (1778-1828).[1]

In the meantime, unknown to the Russians, the Tatar community was undergoing a deep and radical transformation. The old structures of Muslim society, modelled by centuries of cultural and religious domination exercised by Bukhara - the spiritual guide of all Eastern and Northern Turks - were crumbling under the action of internal and external influences. Russian pressure was brought to bear everywhere: in the commercial sector, where the competition of the Russian bourgeoisie threatened to deprive its Tatar rivals of outlets to the Turkestani market; in the cultural domain, as consequence of Il'minski's russification policy, inaugurated in 1870; and in spiritual life, because of the return in the 1860's to the religious conversions policy. Tatar society at all levels was deeply aware of the Russian

threat, which nurtured an oppressive climate of mutual mistrust between the two communities and provoked a vigorous reaction among the Tatar bourgeoisie. To face a more powerful and "advanced" foe, it was necessary for Tatars to break away from the antiquated past. This perception was at the origin of what is rightly called the "Tatar Renaissance", a phenomenon that went practically unnoticed by Russian contemporaries. Nevertheless, it was of great historical importance, because of its reverberations in the years to come not only within the Empire but also beyond its frontiers. It presented certain analogies with the Italian Renaissance and also with the Russian revival of the 18th century: faith in the virtues of the "enlightenment", a perception of similar obstacles and enemies to overcome, and dynamic leadership endowed with universal education and fanatically devoted to their own people.

Abdul Kayum al-Nasyri ranks among the most prominent of these Tatar *Kulturträger*. Nasyri was a curious individual: ugly and deformed, a misanthrope, scorned by his own people and ignored by the Russians. He remained poor, practically destitute, all his life. He left the Russian-Tatar educational training college of Kazan, where he was teaching the Tatar language, and founded a primary school, situated in a sordid back street, with premises jammed between a pub and a brothel. No one could imagine that this poor, sickly man would provide Tatar reformism with the foundations that it lacked – a national language and contacts with the Russian and European culture – nor that his posthumous renown would raise him above most of his contemporaries.

Until the advent of al-Nasyri, the Tatar cultural movement was developing rapidly but in isolation, in a purely Muslim milieu. This cultural movement was the product of the efforts made at the beginning of the 18th century to introduce reforms into the ancient Bukharian system that ruled the spiritual life of Tatar Islam. The credit for this goes to Abu Nasr al-Kursavi,[2] a young Tatar theologian, *mudarris* at a *medresseh* of Bukhara who proclaimed the priority of reason over dogma. Charged with heresy by the Orenburg mufti, Kursavi was forced to take refuge in Turkey, but his memory was taken up by a famous theologian, Shihabeddin Marjani,[3] who inspired respect even amongst conservatives. Marjani endeavoured to free Islam from the narrow dogmatism which, at the time, was characteristic of Central Asian theology. He tried, successfully, to prove that the Muslim religion was fully compatible with modern science. He thus cleared the way for the modernist movement, obstructed till then by fears of impiety. Though Marjani could not speak Russian, he was the first (after Halfin, whom he surpassed) to deserve to be called a modern scholar: he applied strictly scientific methods to historical research. He dared to introduce secular disciplines into the programme of the

medresseh that he directed ("Marjaniyeh" of Kazan). Though overlooked by present-day Tatar historians, Marjani's activity was at the time of primary importance for the evolution of the Tatar bourgeoisie's revival, insofar as he made it possible for Tatar bourgeoisie to approach the Russian "World of the Unfaithful" and to gain access to the cultural patrimony of the West.[4] Some of Marjani's disciples opted resolutely for this new way. One of them, the historian Husein Feizkhanov[5], lectured at the Oriental Faculty of St. Petersburg University and became a member of the Imperial Society of Archaeology. It must be stressed, however, that these westernized Tatars, whom Russian scientists admitted freely into their ranks, were supposed to sever ties with their own community, which in any case rejected them. Consequently, they could play no major part in reform in spite of their long and strenuous efforts in that direction.

In Marjani's time, the Tatars as a people were - as one contemporary has written - "a nation deprived of its soul". They wrote not in their own language but in Chagatay, the literary tongue of Central Asia: unintelligible for those who did not know Arabic and Persian. The archaic educational system borrowed from Bukhara was intended for the training of "clerics" and in no way responded to the needs and problems of modern life. Literature and, especially, poetry attached themselves slavishly to Persian and Arabian romantic topics and forms foreign to the positive spirit of the Turks. Neither the people nor the intelligentsia were conscious of belonging to a Tatar nation.

The main problem therefore was to rediscover, under the old strata of Arab and Persian deposits, national culture. Those who led the Tatar people on the road to progress and to the discovery of their origins remained deeply rooted in their national milieu, refusing to become "Russians". Nasyri was one of them.

Abdul Kayum al-Nasyri was born on the 15th March 1825 in the village of Yukary Shirdany (Vernie Shirdany in Russian), in the district of Sviazhsk, west of Kazan - in territory that had been conquered and colonized by the Russians in the 16th century (the Russian fortress of Sviazhsk had been built in 1551). The population of this district was a mixed one, comprising a large proportion of Russians, Christian Chuvashes and animist or Christian Mariis. Nasyri's father was a "non-official" mullah, director of a village school (*mekteb*), a pious and learned man whose ancestors had been theologians of repute (*fikhi*) for six generations.

Little Kayum first studied in his father's *mekteb* where he learned Persian, Arabic and even some Russian. He then continued his studies (from 1841 on) in the Kazan *medresseh* and not in that of Bukhara, like his contemporaries. This was a deviation from the tradition according to which advanced studies were to be made in one of the famous

schools of Turkestan. In the Kazan *medresseh*, Nasyri improved his knowledge of Arabic, Persian and Chagatay (*Türki*). Russian was not taught in religious schools, and Nasyri had to learn it on his own. In 1855, at the age of thirty, he came to the end of his studies. He had an excellent Islamic background, a perfect knowledge of the Koran, of the *Hadiths* and of *Shari'yat* law, as well as of Arabic and Persian classical literature. His career seemed outlined for him. Like any other young *shakird*, he should become first a *halfa*, then a *muallim* in a village primary school and hope to wind up as a *muddaris* (teacher in a *medresseh*). Such was the path followed by most of his fellow students. But as soon as he had graduated from the *medresseh*, instead of complying with this tradition, Nasyri dared to commit a most surprising act for his time: he was accepted to teach the Tatar language in a Russian school directed by Orthodox missionaries, and he later held the same job in the Kazan Theological Seminary. This was a blatent scandal, treason to Islam.

Thenceforth, without being completely rejected by his people, Nasyri was surrounded by constant hostility: the "blind Kayum", "the traitor", "Russian agent", "the missionaries' hireling", such were the insults hurled at him by conservatives. But the opinion of his fellow-countrymen counted for nothing in the eyes of this non-conformist, who was driven by his passion for learning and by his certainty that he was right.

At the beginning of the 1860s, Nasyri attended lectures at the University of Kazan as a "free" Tatar student. There he met some Russian scholars, in particular Katanov, Gothwald, Lebedev, V.V. Grigor'ev and Radloff. They were the representatives of the best Russian intellectual and liberal elite. They did not expect him to renounce his religion and culture and did not ask for his adherence to their own world view. Nasyri's acquaintance with this venerable and brilliant place of learning was to be a decisive factor for his future; it deeply marked the attitude of the young Muslim towards Russia and Russians.

In 1871, Nasyri left the Theological Seminary and embarked upon the next stage of his career. He obtained from Radloff, who acted as inspector of Muslim schools, a permit to open a model establishment for Tatar children where he was both director and sole teacher.

To appreciate the measure of pluck needed for such an enterprise, one must consider the Muslim educational system in the middle of the 19th century. Gasprinski's reform began to bear fruit only toward the end of the century, and in Nasyri's time the traditional model inspired by Bukhara dominated everywhere. Arabic, Persian and Türki were taught by the syllabic method; the Tatar language was not taught at all. Other subjects were purely religious sciences, presented in so

forbidding a way that pupils learned their lessons by heart without trying to penetrate the meaning. Secular disciplines were excluded and considered as dangerous innovations (*bid'a*) or even as impieties (*kufr*). *Mektebs* as well as *medressehs* were with some rare exceptions real hotbeds of archaic and narrow minded dogmatism.

Nasyri's hopes were not fulfilled. His school did not meet the approval of his co-religionists and attracted only a few young boys belonging to the most destitute classes of society. The teacher had to feed and to clothe them out of his own meagre resources. The school survived for five years, and it is with despair that Nasyri describes this bitter experience:

> The school was lodged in a sordid flat above a *traktir* (pub) full of noisy drunkards. There was a distillery in the yard and a brothel nearby.[6]

Yet it was during this period that Nasyri worked out his boldest pedagogical ideas, which compared favourably with those of his Russian contemporaries, for instance with Ushinsky's. Like the latter, Nasyri thought that the aim of education was to "open up all the faculties of the child", so that he introduced without hesitation into the programme of his school not only the studies of the Russian language and of secular subjects such as arithmetic, geography, history and even book-keeping but also aesthetic studies such as music and drawing; in the opinion of conservative Muslims this bordered on heresy.

During the five years of the school's existence, Nasyri composed and published for his few pupils his best pedagogical works. His first book, the *Nehu Kitaby* (*The Book of Syntax*), had appeared in 1860, and was a comparative syntax designed for Tatars learning Russian and Russians learning Tatar. The themes illustrating the book were lessons in natural science, in geography and arithmetic. The same year he produced a text book of natural science for children: *Bush Vaqyt* ("Free Time") in popular modern Tatar. In spite of the controversy surrounding its author, the book was a great success and was re-edited eight times.

For his own school, Nasyri published in 1872 a *Short History of Russia* (*Mukhtasar Tarikhi Russiye*) and in 1873 a handbook of arithmetic, *Hisablyk*, a small book of a European type for which Nasyri had been forced to invent suitable Tatar terminology. It was also for his pupils that he compiled and published in 1878 a Tatar-Russian dictionary, *Tatarcha-Uruscha Lugat Kitaby*, which was a first text of the Tatar spoken language.

Nasyri's school was closed by the authorities in 1876. During the remaining 26 years of his life (he died on the 2nd of September 1902),

Nasyri lived on the scant income from private lessons, a few translations and the copyrights of his books. With the exception of a few short trips to Moscow, Orenburg, Ufa, to the Nizhni-Novgorod fair and to some Tatar villages, he rarely left Kazan and the only major event in this last stage of his life was his election in 1885 to the University of Kazan Association of History, Archaeology and Ethnography.

Present day Soviet historians tend to represent Nasyri as "the chief of progressive and democratic circles", "the leader of the reformist movement". But this over-optimistic image is contradicted by certain details of his life, in particular by the complete isolation in which he lived. The truth is that like almost all reformers ahead of their time, Nasyri was misunderstood and rejected by his contemporaries, the conservative *qadymists*, and also (toward the end of his life) by the young intellectual modernists, suuporters of Ismail bey Gasprinski, whose Pan-Turkic nationalism (*Türklük*) was opposed to the "Tatarism" (*Tatarlyk*) of Nasyri.

Of all the Tatar reformists, Nasyri was the one whose heart and spirit were the nearest to the West. Yet he shared the life of the poorest classes of his people. In a letter to his brother Abdul Hay, he describes his life with a sort of bitter humour:

> If your roof has holes and lets in rain, take refuge in a corner; what matters if your pockets are torn, since you have nothing to put in them? Do not complain if you lack food, rather give thanks for it to Heaven since fasting will preserve you from stomach ulcers. If you find it difficult to bring buckets of water upstairs to your room, Allah will send you heavenly water through your roof. What is the importance of your toothache, since you never eat meat . . .[7]

Nasyri suffered terribly from loneliness, much more than from his destitution. His character altered and he turned into a secretive, depressed, nervous hypochondriac and misanthropist. He describes in the following terms to his brother his voyage to Orenburg:

> I met no one, I did not have forty thousand roubles in my pocket that would have allowed me to approach the rich, nor a grand turban that would have permitted me to get acquainted with the mullahs . . .[8]

Nasyri's great admirer, the Tatar *jadid* historian[9] Hadi Maksudi, relates his visit to the reformer from whom he had hoped to obtain a photograph and some biographic material. He met with a poor reception in Nasyri's frozen attic. Nasyri, dressed in a sheepskin coat with stocking-feet, refused categorically to give the least biographical information "to the people who starve their intellectuals" or to lend his

photograph since "no one would wish to look at so ugly a face".[10]

After 1876, however embittered, Nasyri continued his work, inspired by one idea: to educate this people that he so passionately loved, to endow them with practical knowledge, with some elements of science, which they so badly needed for survival in the competitive modern world, in which Muslim society was likened by the Tatar historian Aziz Gubaydullin to "an old cart of the Middle Ages facing a Russian engine ready to squash".

The literary and scientific publications of Nasyri amount to nearly 50 works bearing on numerous branches of learning. Nasyri did not specialize in any discipline. He was an encyclopaedist of the traditional European type, but comparable to the men of the West European "Age of Enlightenment". However there are three distinguishable domains in which his ideas were especially fertile and his influence particularly lasting.

POPULARIZATION OF EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC DISCIPLINES

Nasyri should be credited with an enormous achievement: he managed to arouse the interest of the Tatars in secular science and thus deserves the title of the "Tatar Lomonosov" and comparison with the Turkish reformer Ahmed Midhat. Aziz Gubaydullin called him "the first swallow that brought us science".[12] For nearly 25 years he systematically explained his scientific ideas in an annual Calendar (*Qazan Kalindary*) that he published between 1871 and 1897, with interruptions in 1886, 1887 and 1895.

Nasyri was also the first Tatar geographer of the "European type". We are indebted to him for the first Tatar map of the world (the two hemispheres), several maps that appeared in his Calendar and two books: *Estelahat-i-Jografiya* (*Geographical Terminology*) and *Usul-i Jografiya-i Kebir* (*Fundamental Principles of Geography*), in three volumes.

With an even more practical objective, Nasyri published several books on agronomics and hygiene: *Zira'at-i Ilmi* (*Agricultural Science*), explaining the techniques of sowing and giving advice on the utilization of fertilizers, the picking of berries, etc.; *Khwas-i Nebatat* (*Characteristics of Plants*) describing 313 useful plants and giving their names in Russian, in Tatar and in Latin and *Menaqi'-i A'za ve Qanun-i Sahat* (*The Use of Limbs of the Body and the Preservation of Health*), a work on public hygiene.

In his desire to enlighten the people, Nasyri translated into Tatar a Russian booklet published by the temperance socity of Kazan, *Ahval-i Sekeran* (*The Drunkard's Fate*), in which he denounces the dangers of alcoholism not only from the dogmatic but also from the

medical point of view. Numerous scholarly text-books may be included in the same list of popularized science. For certain subjects, such as arithmetic and geometry, Nasyri had to invent his own terminology in Tatar.

HISTORICAL RESEARCH

Even more praiseworthy was Nasyri's desire to continue Marjani's work in the domain of historical research, into which he introduced methodological criticism worthy of the best Russian and Western historians. Nasyri was a historian, and archaeologist, an ethnographer and, above all, a folklorist; he considered that auxiliary sciences were intimately linked to history. But only a part of his immense work was to be made available to the world. He was always on the look-out for various documents - songs, legends, epigraphic sources and so forth - which appeared regularly in his *Calendar*. Other material was published in an addendum to *Fevakih ul-Julesa* (*Fruits of the Table Companions*), an important collection of stories drawn from the Koran and the *Haditha*. These stories are about science, trade, industry, women, and law. The book was published in 1884 by the University of Kazan.

Nasyri's works on folklore have been translated into Russian. To name one of them: *Poveriia i obriady Kazanskikh Tatar obrazovavshiesia pomimo vlianiia na nikh Sunnitskogo Magometanstva* (*Beliefs and Rites of Kazan Tatars the Origin of Which was not Influenced by Sunnite Islam*).[13] In this work Nasyri disclosed for the first time the part played by the old pre-Islamic animist and shamanist beliefs in those of Muslim Tatars.

He is also the author of numerous works on historical songs and Tatar legends, which he collected in remote places of the countryside. Nasyri published them either on his own or with the assistance of Russian scholars in the *Izvestiia* of the Society of History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the University of Kazan. Some of them are:

1. *Tatarskiie skazki o staroi Kazani* (*Tatar tales of ancient Kazan*), in collaboration with Professor N.F. Katanov;
2. *Obraztsi narodnoi literaturi Kazanskikh Tatar* (*Examples of the popular literature of Kazan Tatars*), in collaboration with A. Poljakov;
3. *Skazki Kazanskikh Tatar i sovopostavlenie ikh so skazkami drugikh narodov* (*Tales of Kazan Tatars and their comparison with tales of other peoples*).

Nasyri also helped Katanov collect historical Tatar songs and legends connected with the conquest of Kazan and the Russian campaign in France in 1814. His principal historical works have not been

published. We have in this respect only his short history of Russia, which appeared in 1872, and a booklet, *Zubdet min Tavarih al-Rus* (*Summary of Russian history*) published in 1890, containing biographies of Russian rulers from 862 to 1880.

After his death, three versions of Tatar chronicles which Nasyri compiled were published by Aziz Gubaydullin in his journal *Ma'arif* in Kazan (1923), but his great studies have not yet been published and remain in the manuscript form. These are: *Tavarih-i Bulghariye* (*History of Bulgaria of the Volga*); *Dastan-i Chingiz Khan ve Aqsaq Timur* (*The legend of Chingiz Khan and of Timur*); Tatar legends concerning the revolt of Pugatchev, and narratives about the Bishop Lucas Konashevich, who had persecuted Muslims in the 18th century.

THE CREATION OF THE WRITTEN TATAR LANGUAGE

Nasyri's greatest claim to fame is the creation of the literary Tatar language. In his opinion, the cultural backwardness of his people was mainly due to their ignorance of their own tongue, the "course language of cart-drivers (*lomovoy*)", shunned by Tatar writers and poets who preferred the *türk tele*, a learned language, close to the Chagatay which the masses could not understand. Fanatically, passionately attached to his tongue, "the most beautiful and the purest of Turkish languages", Nasyri endeavoured, and succeeded, to purge it of Arabic and Persian contributions and to endow it with literary constructions, using his own works as an example and fixing once for all the orthography and grammatical rules.

Nasyri's linguistic reforms can be compared to those of several other reformers who were to follow him, the greatest among whom was Ismail bey Gasprinski, but Nasyri was the pioneer who had cleared the ground and his effort should not be underestimated.

Three works of scientific philology have contributed to Nasyri's fame:

1. The Tatar dictionary, *Lehche-i Tatary*, a work of great scientific value, in which all the examples are drawn from the modern language;
2. *Enmuzej* (*The Model*), Etymology and Tatar syntax, published in 1895;
3. *Qava'id Kitaby* (*Book of Stylistics*) published in 1892.

But Nasyri did more than lay the foundations of scientific philology. All his work goes to prove the extraordinary wealth, beauty and pungency of the Tatar language, creating an easy, simple and attractive style.

Nasyri cannot be considered a professional writer, and his original

contributions consist only of a few tales drawn from national folklore or oriental legends. They are:

1. *Golzar ve Cheminzar*
2. *Gülrukh ve Qamrjan* – The story of the Princess Gülrukh, daughter of the Emperor of China and of Qamrjan, son of the Shah of Khwarezm.
3. *Qyrq Bagche* (*The Forty Gardens*) – A collection of tales in which Nasyri sets forth his own advanced ideas on philosophy, nature, pedagogy and religion.

Nasyri's numerous and varied translations acquainted the public with Arab, Persian and Turkish classics.

He translated from Arabic the tales concerning Abu Ali Sina: *Abu Ali Sina Qysasy* and *Ra'is al-Hokma Abu Ali Sina* (this last book was edited six times between 1889 and 1905). From Persian he translated the famous book of moral precepts, *Qabus Nameh*.

Finally Nasyri selected from the Turkish Ottoman literature and published, in 1881, the popular *Tales of Forty Vizirs* of Sheyhzade (*Qyrq Vazir Qysasy*), which was also edited several times.

Nasyri, the father of the Tatar language was not understood by his contemporaries, either conservatives or modernists, who feared that the Tatar tongue would become an obstacle to a common pan-Turkic language. Well aware of this he complained bitterly in his preface to the Tatar dictionary:

> I worked for thirty-five years to develop our language but without much result. I laboured day and night without stopping. I suffered for my Tatar nation and I was not loved. I was hated because I claimed as my own the Tatar language.

Nasyri led a lonely life to the end and his activity was completely overshadowed by the fame of Marjani and Gasprinski. He has been in the limelight since the Revolution of 1917, whilst his rivals are deliberately forgotten. But the posthumous fame, which he certainly deserved, is not without danger: the excessive qualities with which he is credited somewhat falsify his profile. Today, Nasyri is honoured as the "great ancestor" of the Tatar people, the one who can be safely lodged against his contemporaries, both conservatives or *jadids* who are accused by Soviet historians of "clericalism" and "nationalism". By comparison, Nasyri is made to appear as a true "Soviet patriot", champion of the Tatar national idea, adverse to "cosmopolitan Pan-Turkism". He is deemed to be an unconditional supporter of Russia, as opposed to those who favoured pro-Turkish trends. He is frequently represented as an anti-clerical thinker, or even an atheist. Thus described, Nasyri personifies the essential qualities

of every good Soviet patriot. In this respect, we note the typical opinion of a Tatar historian, D.G. Gumerov, as expressed in an article of the *Voprosy Filosofii*. He considers Nasyri as the representative of the "progressive-democratic" tendency, as opposed to "bourgeois" trends:

> His (Nasyri's) *mirovozzrenie* (conception of the world) was developing in a direction absolutely opposed to religion. He did not go to the mosque, neither did he observe religious rites. In short, he was believed to be an infidel.[14]

This anachronistic judgement tends to project on a man of the 19th century the qualities that its author desires to find in his descendants of the 20th century. The real Nasyri is more complex that that.

Concerning Russia and the Russians, Nasyri, an ardent champion of intellectual and material progress, professed a point of view that would eventually be adopted by people like the Kazakh Chokan Valikhanov or the Azeri Feth Ali Akhundov, who considered that it was necessary to learn from the Russians. He did everything in his power to render the Russian language and culture available to his fellow-countrymen, in the hope that eventually this would lead them to European and not only to Russian culture *stricto sensu*. His works devoted to the Russian language demonstrate his will to break through the barriers separating the two communities.

In 1889 and 1892, Nasyri published a spelling-book, *Qyra'-i Rusiye*, a grammar, *Nemune Yani Enmuzej*, and a dictionary, *Polnyi Russko-Tatarskii Slovar'* (*Complete Russian-Tatar Dictionary*), which was re-edited several times. The latter two books still preserve their scientific value in our day.

Nasyri spoke Russian well and was versed in Russian literature. He was the most russophile of the Muslim thinkers of his time. During his lifetime the russification campaign had not yet developed; hence, he believed quite sincerely that cooperation between the two communities was possible. He did not have the same reasons as Gasprinski and his followers to beware of the tsarist administration.

On the other hand it is hardly possible to admit that Nasyri was anti-clerical, let alone an atheist. All the innovators of Islam had to fight the opposition of the conservatives, their formalism and dogmatism, and innovators were often accused of impiety and heresy. But in Islam - a religion without clergy - modernists, progressives and even revolutionaries were but seldom free thinkers in the Western sense of the term. On the contrary - and especially in the Tatar country - the boldest reformers were the mullahs, such as Musa Jarullah Bigi, Rizaeddin Fahreddin, Ubaydullah Bobi and many others. They struggled not for the destruction of the faith but to

sweep away the centuries-old scholastic philosophy and to return to the pure religion of the first four Caliphs, to the dynamism of early Islam, to the "Golden Age" (*Asr-i Sa'adet*) when the Faithful of the Prophet were also the champions of progress.

Though hostile towards the conservative mullahs, Nasyri was a believing Muslim, but not a practising one. Such a situation is possible and even frequent in Islam. Furthermore, his desire to adhere to the faith of his ancestors is proved by the many books he wrote on the subject of religion, some of them dealing with the history of Islam:

1. *Shejare-i Mubarak-i Peighamber* (*The Noble Genealogy of the Prophet*)
2. *Mukhtasar Tavarikh-i Anbiye* (*Brief History of the Prophets*), published for the first time in 1884 and re-edited many times; half of the book is devoted to the history of Mohammed according to Muslim and Christian sources.
3. *Magmu a ul- Akhbar* (*Collection of Novels*). Work in prose and in verse, published in 1895, relating the life of the Prophet, of his companions and disciples, of the holy sheikhs and founders of the Sufi orders.

Furthermore, Nasyri composed in 1888, for the imams of the mosques, a collection of sermons in Arabic: *Otuz v'az* (*The Thirty Sermons*), based on the pronouncements of great Muslim saints: Anas ibn Malik, Jabir ibn Abdallah, Ibn Abbas, Abu Horeira and even Jesus Christ).

Nasyri's most significant religious publication is the Tatar translation of the *Anis al Jalis* (*The Pleasant Interlocutor*) of the great Egyptian mystic Jelaleddin al-Suyuti (15th century). It appeared in Kazan in 1884 under the title of *Jawakhir-al-Hikayat* (*Treasure of Tales*) and was re-edited six times before 1900.

Soviet Tatar historians are at a loss to explain the publication of this classical work of Sufi literature. Some explanations attain the level of sheer absurdity. For instance Zinnat Alimovich Ishmuhametov, forced to admit the religious character of this work, writes:

> Why did Nasyri translate this book? Is it because of a pious wish to serve religion? This is doubtful. Such a wish does not correspond to his general line. We believe the contrary: Nasyri thought that the legends contained in this book, when seriously analysed, would not promote the reinforcement of faith, but on the contrary prove the absurdity of the myths of Islam.[15]

Nasyri is also the author of several scholarly text-books of religious inspiration, for instance the *Treatise on Dogma* (*Aqa'id Risalesi*), re-edited several times in Kazan between 1880 and 1900 and the book

of Arab texts *Essays* (*Ijek*), published in 1895. In this last work, all the texts chosen by Nasyri are of a religious character. Among them are the first chapter of the Koran, the Five Prayers and the *Shahada*, the Muslim Credo, and the call to prayer (*Ezzan*). All these publications prove beyond doubt that Nasyri was no atheist.

In fact, Nasyri was a typical representative of the pleiad of Muslim reformers who, from the middle of the 19th century and to its end endeavoured to arouse *Dar ul-Islam* from its long slumber so that it might face the challenge of the West. The Turkish thinkers of the *Tanzimat* also belonged to this group as well as the forerunners of the Constitutional Movement in Iran, the modernist reformers of Aligarh and, while this might seem unlikely, the Senousis of Tripoli and the Wahhabites of Nedjd, who participated indirectly in the movement through their desire to purify Islam.

The activity of Russia's Muslims and the part that they played in this movement are little known in the West because of their closer contact with Russian culture; in fact the Tatar, Azeri and Kazakh reformers of the 19th century ranked among the boldest and the most original. All of them - Chokan Valikhanov, Ibray Altynsaryn, Abay Kunanbaev in the Kazakh steppes; Feth Ali Akhundov and Hasan beg Melikov Zerdabi in Transcaucasia; Abu Nasr Kursavi, Shihabeddin Marjani and Abdul Kayum Nasyri in the Volga region and, especially, Ismail bey Gasprinski in Crimea - were pursuing in different ways the same remote aims. They were united by the same devotion to progress and love for their own peoples. All belonged to the same religion and were sons of the great Turkic race.

Soviet historiography refuses to acknowledge the spiritual community of these formers. It condemns as "anti-national" the doctrine of the "unique current" (*edinnyi potok*) and endeavours to discover in it conflicting trends, both "progressive" and "reactionary". Of course there were divergences in the 19th century, but the split of the national movement into two camps - limited exclusively to the Tatars (*Tatarchlar*) on the one hand and to the supporters of the pan-Turkic ideal (*Türkychüler*) on the other - occurred only on the eve of the First World War.

Nasyri was spared the political problems that befell his followers after his death. His work was beneficial for everybody. The constellation of Tatar writers who were to grace the beginning of our century - Abdullah Tukay, Majid Ghafuri, Sheyhulzade Babich, Ayaz Iskhaki, Galimjan Ibragimov - would likely not have acquired such brilliance without the preliminary work of Nasyri. Neither would the pan-Turkic theories of Gasprinski's disciples have reached such an audience had not Nasyri prepared the way by making the literary language intelligible to the masses. Pro-Tatars and pan-Turkists who,

after October, joined either the ranks of the Communist Party or became enemies of the Soviet regime, were all indebted to this exceptional individual.

NOTES

1. Halfin was from 1812 associate professor of the Tatar language and literature at the University of Kazan. He published a number of historical surveys, including *Ahval-i Jingiz Khan ve Aqsaq Timur* (Kazan, 1822) and the seminal work of Abdulghazi Babadur Khan on the genealogy of the Turks.
2. Abu Nasr Kursavi (1783-1814) was condemned to death by the Emir of Bukhara for "infidelity". He escaped to Kazan and founded his own *medresseh* in his native village of Kursa. Accused of heresy by the Mufti of Orenburg, he escaped to Istanbul where he died. His main work is *Irshal al-Ibad*, published in Kazan in 1900. Kursavi was an adept of the Naqshbandiya *tariqa*.
3. Shihabeddin Marjani (1815-1889), son of a *mudarris* of the village of Yabynchy near Kazan, graduated from Bukhara and Samarkand *medressehs*. Back in Kazan in 1849, he founded his own *medresseh*. Marjani was a universal scholar: a historian and theologian. His main works are: *Nazzara, Haqq ul-Ma'rifat* - works on theology; *Irfat ul-Hawwakin* (*History of Central Asia*), Kazan, 1864 (in Arabic), *Jelalat ul-Zemin*, Kazan, 1878. This work is a short history of the Kingdom of Bulghar and of the Khanate of Kazan. Most important of all is the *Mustafadh ul-Akhbar fil Ahwāl Qazan ve Bulghar*, a history of the Tatars in two volumes, the first published in Kazan in 1885 and the second in the same city in 1900. We must also mention the *Wefayāt al-Aslāf* - a biography of the great scholars (Kazan, 1883).
4. In Stalin's time, Marjani was officially classified among the "conservatives and clerical reactionaries" and was contrasted with Nasyri, a "progressive and popular scholar". Marjani's rehabilitation began after the downfall of Nikita Khruschev. At present he is recognized almost officially as the "father of the Tatar reformist movement".
5. Feizkhanov (Feizkhani) (1826-1866), born in the village of Sabachay, in the Simbirsk district; graduated from the *medresseh* "Marjanyeh" of Kazan, assistant professor of oriental languages at the University of Kazan.
6. Quoted by M.K. Bakeev, "Zhizn' i pedagogicheskaya deiatel'nost' Kayyuma Nasyri", *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, Moscow, 1952, No. 12, p. 87.
7. *ibid.*, p. 88.
8. *ibid.*, p. 89.
9. Hadi Maksudi was the brother of the Duma deputy Sadri Maksudi. He collaborated with Ismail Gasprinski and published his articles in the *Terjüman*. In 1906, he launched his own newspaper *Yoldiz* of Kazan, in which he defended his reformist and pan-Turkic ideas.
10. Article published in *Yoldiz*, quoted by Jemaleddin Validov, *Ocherki obrazovannosti i literatury Tatar (do Revolutsii 1917 g.)*, (Moscow-Leningrad, 1923), p. 43.
11. Aziz Gubaydullin (Ubaydullin), "K voprosu ob ideologii Gasprinskogo", *Izvestia Vostochnogo Fakul'teta*, Baku, t. IV, 1929, p. 189.
12. In *Kayyum Nasyrining Mejmu'asy* (Kazan, 1922), p. 90 (in Tatar).
13. Published in the *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obshchestva*, t. VI, 1880, p. 243-270.

14. D.G. Gumerov, "Kayyum Nasyri Peredovoi myslitel' Tatarskogo Naroda XIX veka" (Kayyum Nasyri – a progressive thinker of the Tatar people of the XIXth century), *Voprosy Filosofii*, 1950, 1, p. 193.
15. Z.A. Ishmuhametov, *Sotsial'naia Rol' i Evolutsiia Islama v Tatarii* (Social role and Evolution of Islam in Tatarstan) (Kazan, 1979), p. 104.

THE WORKS OF NASYRI

We have found the titles of 51 works of Nasyri, of which 44 are in Tatar and in Arabic and 7 in Russian.

Abbreviations

Br. M = British Museum (London)
H. = National and University Library of Helsinki
H.L. = Hoover Library, Stanford University (California)
H.T.U. = Hakki Tarik Üs Library (Istanbul)
L.O. = Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales (Paris)
N.Y.P.L. = New York Public Library
S.O.A.S. = School of Oriental and African Studies (Univ. of London)
T.E. = Türkiyat Enstitüsü Library (Istanbul)
T.T.K. = Türk Tarih Kurumu Library (Ankara)
W.L. = Widener Library, Harvard University, Cambridge (Mass.)

WORKS IN TATAR AND ARABIC

1. *ABU ALI SINA QISASY*
(*Tale of Abu Ali Sina*), translated from Ottoman Turkish by K. Nasyri.
Kazan, University Press, 1881, first edition, 116 p. The book has been re-edited four times (H., T.E. 2945, L.O. U.IV.63). (Review of Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'* of Kazan Nos. 8-9, 1898, p. 431).

2. *AHVAL-i SEKERAN*
(*The drunkard's fate*), Tatar translation of a Russian booklet *Vino-Yad* (*The wine is poison*) published in Kazan by the Temperance Association. Kazan, University Press, 1888, 3-column page.

3. *AKHLAQ RISALESI*
(*Treatise on [good] behaviour*)
Kazan, University Press, First edition, 1890, 24 pages. The work has been re-edited by Kazan University Press in 1893 (H.), 1898 (H. and T.E. 1064) 1904 (H.).

4. *AKHLAQ RISALESI (KEBIR)*
(*Great treatise on [good] behaviour*)
Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1890, 39 pages (T.E. 1490); 2nd edition, 1901, 44 pages (T.E. 1170); (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'* No. 5, 1898).

5. *AQA ID RISALESI*
(*Small treatise of religious precepts*)
Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1807; Vincislav Press, 2nd edition, 1882, 24

pages (H.); Kazan University Press, 3rd edition, 1896, 24 pages (T.E. 1490, H.); (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'* of Kazan, No. 12, 1897, p. 692).

6. *BUSH VAQYT*

(*Free time*) Natural science explained to children. The work has been edited several times: 1st edition, Kazan, 1860, 12 pages; Another edition, Chirkov Press Kazan, Maarif Kütüphanesi, 1909, 32 pages (H.).

7. *EFSANE -i GULRUH VE QAMERJAN*

(*The tale about Gülruh, daughter of the Emperor of China and Qamerjan, son of the Shah of Khwarezm*). Novel. Kazan, University Press, 1896, 54 pages (H., T.E. 3961); (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'*, No. 4, 1897).

8. *ENMUZEJ*

(*The model*). Etymology and syntax of the Tatar language. Kazan, University Press, 1895, 32 pages. (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'*, No. 4, 1898, p. 204).

9. *ESTELAHAT-i JOGRAFIYA*

(*Geographical terminology*)

Kazan, University Press, 1890, 74 pages.

10. *FEVAKIH ul- JULESA*

(*Fruits of the Table Companions*) Collection of pronouncements taken from the Koran and the *Hadiths*, concerning religion, sciences, trade, and craftmanship. Rich Tatar folkloric material in addendum.

Kazan, University Press, 1884, 615 pages (L.O. Tur. 11.34, B.B. II.10, A.A. III-36, T.E. 2596, T.T.K. A.3965).

11. *JAVAHIR al- HIKAYAT ve al-ASAILET ve LATA'IF al-RIVAYAT ve al-MESAIL TERJUME MIN KITAB ANIS al–JALIS al-IMAN AL SUYUTI*

(*Treasure of tales and questions, beauty of traditions and examples*). Translation of the book *Anis al-Jalis* (*Agreeable interlocutor*) of Imam Al-Suyuti); Tatar translation by K. Nasyri of the work of the Arab historian, Imam Jelaleddin Abdurrahman ibn Abu-Bakr al-Suyuti (died in 1505).

Kazan, University Press, 1884, 139 pages, first edition (H.); 1894, 138 pages, fourth edition (H. and T.E. 2916); 1898, 136 pages, fifth edition (H.); 1900, 123 pages, sixth edition (H. and T.E. 2916); 1905, 123 pages, seventh edition (H. and Br. M. 13369 23).

12. *GOLZAR ve JEMINZAR*

(*A short story*)

Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1873, 52 pages. 2nd edition, 1893, 85 pages.

13. *HESAPLIK*

(*Handbook of arithmetic*)

Kazan, University typography, 1st edition, 1873, 52 pages; 2nd edition, 1893, 85 pages.

14. *IJEK*

(*Essays*), first reader. Examples in Arabic are taken from prayers and the Koran. Kazan, University typography, 1895, 20 pages (H.).

15. *ILM-i HENDESE*

(*Geometry*)

Kazan, University typography, 1895, 24 pages, tables, ill. (H.).

16. *IRSHAD al-ATBIKHE*

(*Initiation into the preparation of food*)

Kazan (?), 1893, 30 pages (First part; the rest remains in the form of a manuscript) (T.E. 1490).

17. *KHAVAS-i NEBATAT*
(*Characteristics of plants*)
Kazan, University typography, 1893, 112 pages.
18. *LEHCHE-i TATARY*
(*Tatar encyclopaedic dictionary*)
2 volumes: Kazan, University typography, Vol. 1, 1895, 226 pages; Vol. 2, 1896, 156 pages.
19. *KAYUM NASYRI SAYLANMA ESERLER*
(*Kayum Nasyri, selected works*)
Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1st edition, 1953; 2nd edition, 1956.
20. *MAZHAKE YAKHUD AQVAL-i GHARIBE*
(*Jokes of strange sayings*)
Kazan, Haritonov, 1904, 31 pages.
21. *MEJMU'A al-AKHBAR*
(*Collection of novels*). Stories about the life of Mohammed, about his companions and great sheikhs.
Kazan, University typography, 1895, 175 pages. (This work was composed in 1859 but published only in 1895. According to Professor Çagatay, it has been re-edited three times).
22. *MENAQI'-i A'ZA ve QANUN-i SAHAT*
(*The use of limbs of the body and the preservation of health*). Book of hygiene.
Kazan, University typography, 1893, 71 pages.
23. *MUKHTASAR TARIKH-i RUSIYE*
(*Short history of Russia*)
Kazan (?), 1872.
24. *MUKHTASAR TAVARIKH-i ANBIYA*
(*Short histories of the prophets*)
Kazan, University typography, 1884, 77 pages (1st edition); 1899, 79 pages (2nd edition) (H.).
25. *NEHU KITABI*
(*Book of syntax*). For the Tatars learning Russian and the Russians learning Tatar.
Kazan, 1860, III + 79 pages (T.E. 3235).
26. *NEMUNE YANI ENMUZEJ*
(*Similarity or example*). Explanation in Tatar of Russian Grammar.
Kazan, University typography, 1892, 184 pages (T.E. 2910); 1897, 172 pages (H.).
27. *OTUZ V'AZ*
(*Thirty sermons*). For the Night of Ramadhan and other holidays. Texts in Arabic collected by Nasyri.
Kazan, University typography, 1888, 180 pages (T.E. 68).
28. *QABUS NAMEH TERJUMESI*
Tatar translation of the Persian work *Qabus Nameh*.
Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1882, 140 pages; 2nd edition, 1898, 140 pages (H., L.O. X. Y. I. 16) (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'*, No. 5, 1898, p. 264). This work was translated into Russian by O.S. Lebedeva in 1886.
29. *QAVAID KITABY*
(*Book of stylistics*)
Kazan, University Press, 1892, 32 pages (H.).
30. *QAVAID-i LISAN-i ARAB*
(*The rules of the Arab language*)
Kazan (?), 1896, 74 pages. (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'* of Kazan, No. 2, 1897).

31. *KAZAN QALINDARY*
(*Kazan calendar*), annual publication edited by Nasyri between 1871 and 1897 - with the exception of the years 1886, 1887 and 1895 - for the University Press. It gives valuable information on geography, history, folklore, etc.
3rd year, 1873, 66 pages (Br. M. 14496 d 1/3)
4th year, 1875, 52 pages (Br. M. 14496 d 1/4)
7th year, 1874, 52 pages (L.O. Mel. No. 98)
12th year, 1881, 80 pages (H.)
16th year, 1885, 38 pages (L.O. Mel. No. 80)
26th year, 1897, 40 pages (H.)
32. *QYRA'AT -i RUSIYE*
(*Russian ABC spelling book*)
Kazan, University Press, 1889, 24 pages.
33. *QYRQ BAGHCHE*
(*The forty gardens*). Collection of Oriental tales.
Several editions, the first being in 1880, in Kazan. Edition of 1881, Kazan, Kerimov, 58 pages (L.O. c.c. VI. 106); edition of 1902, Kazan, Kerimov, 80 pages (H.)
34. *QYRQ VAZIR QYSASY*
(*Tales of Forty Vizirs*). Tatar translation of the Ottoman Turkish work of Sheyhzade.
Several editions, the first in 1881. Kazan, University Press, 3rd edition, 1888, 160 pages (L.O. UU.V.83, L.O. V.IV.58); 4th edition, 1891, 160 pages (T.E. 2944); 5th edition, 1896, 160 pages (H., Br.M., Tur.90).
St. Petersburg, Baraginski, 1902, 160 pages (H.). Kazan, University Press, 1907, 160 pages (T.E. 4882); 1908, 160 pages (H.). Kazan, Dombrovski Press, 1910, 160 pages (H.). (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'*, No. 10, 1897, p. 582.
35. *RA'IS al-HOKMA ABU ALI SINA*
(*The chief of Scholars Abu Ali Sina*). Translation in Tatar of a Turkish novel of Yahya Ziauddin, dedicated to Ibn Sina (Avicenne).
Several editions, Kazan, University Press, 1889, 112 pages (H.); 1894, 114 pages (H.); 1898, 112 pages (H. and S.O.A.S. 29484); 1905, 100 pages (H. and Br. M. 14468 d.19).
36. *SAYLANMA ESERLER*
(*Selected works*)
Kazan, Tatknigoizdat, 1945, 180 pages.
37. *SANAI' ULFANIYE*
(*Treatise on the crafts of carpentry and jewellery*)
Kazan (?), 1890.
38. *SHEJERE*
(*Genealogy*). Nasyri's ancestors. On his father's and mother's sides.
Kazan (?) 1880.
39. *SHEJERE-i MUBARAK-i PEIGHAMBER*
(*The mobile genealogy of the Prophet*)
Kazan, University Press, 1860.
40. *TATARCHA- URUSCHA LUGAT KITABEVI*
(*Tatar-Russian dictionary*)
Kazan, University Press, 1878, 120 pages. Edited by Fathfullah Hamidullin Amashev (T.E. 3481, 182; L.O. FF VIII, 33; L.O. cc II 91).
41. *TERBIY A KITABI*
(*Book on morals*)
Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1891, 32 pages; 2nd edition, 1898, 24 pages

(H.). (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov in *Deiatel'*, Nos. 6-7, 1898, p. 346).
42. *USUL-i JOGRAFIYA-i KEBIR*
(*Fundamental principles of geography*)
Kazan, University Press, first volume, 1894, 206 pages; second and third volumes, 1898-1899, 138 and 200 pages (H.). (Review by Professor N.F. Katanov, in *Deiatel'*, No. 12, 1899, p. 561).
43. *ZIRA'AT-i ILMI*
(*The science of agriculture*). Advice on how to sow wheat and to cultivate gardens.
Kazan, University Press, 1892, 24 pages (T.E. 1490, H.)
44. *ZUBDET MIN TAVARIH AL-RUS*
(*Summary of Russian history*). Short biographies of Russian sovereigns from 802 to 1880.
Kazan, University Press, 1890, 27 pages (T.E. 1490).

WORKS IN RUSSIAN

1. *ISBRANNYE SOCHINENIIA*
(*Selected works*). Translated into Russian.
Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1953.
2. *KRATKAIA TATARSKAIA GRAMMATIKA*
(*Short Tatar grammar*)
Kazan, University Press, 1860.
3. *OBRAZTZY NARODOI LITERATURY KAZANSKIKH TATAR*
(*Examples of popular literature of Kazan Tatars*)
Article in cooperation with N.F. Katanov in *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii*, Kazan, vol. XIII, 1896, fasc. 5, pp. 374-427. With an introduction by Professor Katanov.
4. *POVERIIA i OBRAIADY KAZANSKIKH TATAR OBRAZOVAVSHIESIA POMIMO VLIANIIA NA NIKH SUNITSKOGO MAGOMETANSTVA*
(*Beliefs and rites of Kazan Tatars not influenced by Sunnite Islam*)
In *Zapiski Imperatorskogo Russkogo Geograficheskogo Obschchestva*, Moscow, Vol. VI, 1880, pp. 243-270. With an introduction by Professor V. Grigor'ev.
5. *POLNYI RUSSKO-TATARSKII SLOVAR'*
(*Complete Russian-Tatar dictionary*)
Kazan, University Press, 1st edition, 1892, 263 pages (L.O. LK III, 25, T.E. 3416); 2nd edition, 1905-1906, 263 pages (T.E. 60, W.L.).
6. *SKAZKI KAZANSKIKH TATAR I SOPOSTAVLENIE IKH SO SKAZKAMI DRUGIKH NARODOV*
(*Tales of Kazan Tatars and their comparison with tales of other peoples*)
Article in collaboration with P.A. Poliakov. In *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii*, Kazan, vol. XVI, 1900, fasc. 2,3,4. Tatar text, transcription and translation.
7. *TATARSKIE SKAZKI OB STAROI KAZANI*
(*Tatar Tales concerning ancient Kazan*). Collected by Nasyri and published by Professor N.F. Katanov. In *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii*, Kazan, vol. XXI, fasc. 3.

Several texts by Nasyri had been translated into Russian by Professor N.F. Katanov in his *Materialy k izucheniiu Kazansko-Tatarskogo narechiia*, Kazan, 1898 and in his "Istoricheskie pesni Kazanskikh tatar" (Historical songs of

Tatars), *Izvestiia Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii* of the University of Kazan, vol. XV, fasc. 3, 1889 which contains 14 tales drawn from *Fevakih ul-Julesha, Mejmu'a ul-Akhbar, Qabus Nameh* and *Qyrq Vezir Qysasy*.

Extracts from the *Calendar* of 1882 has been translated by Katanov and published in the journal *Deiatel'* of Kazan (1897-1898).

PRINCIPAL BIOGRAPHICAL WORKS ON NASYRI

WORKS IN RUSSIAN

1. ABDRAHIMOV (Rahim Ali), "Kayum Nasyrov", in *Vestnik Nauchnogo Obshchestva Tatarovedeniia*, Kazan, Nos. 1-2.

2. ARSHARUNI and GABIDULLIN, *Otcherki Panislamizma i Panturkizma v Rossii* (Description of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism in Russia), Moscow, Bezbozhnik, 1931, pp. 11-12.

3. ASADULLIN (A.), "Kayum Nasyri ob izuchenii russkogo iazyka tatarami" (Qayyum Nasyri, on the subject of Russian studied by Tatars), in *Russkii iazyk v Natzional'noi Shkole*, Moscow, 1958, No. 6.

4. ASHMARIN (N.I.), *Otcherk literaturnoi deiatel'nosti Kazanskikh Tatar Muhammedan za 1880-1895 gg.* (Essay on the literary activity of Kazan Tatar Muslims between 1880 and 1895). *Trudy po Vostokovedeniiu Lazarevskogo Instituta Vostotchnyh Iazykov*, vol. IV, 1901, 58 pages (concerning Nasyri, pp. 48-52).

5. BAKEEV (M.K.), "Zhizn' i pedagogicheskaia deiatel'nost' Kayuma Nasyri" (The life and pedagogical activity of Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, No. 12, 1952, pp. 85-100.

6. BAKEEV (M.K.), "Kayum Nasyri - K 120-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia" (Kayum Nasyri - On the occasion of the 120th anniversary of his birth). In *Utchitel'saia Gazeta*, Moscow, No. 12, 1945.

7. EFIROV (A.F.), "Nauchnaia sessiia, posviashchennaia Kayumu Nasyrovu" (Scientific session devoted to Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, Moscow, Nos. 5-6, 1945.

8. FASEEV (K.F.), *Iz Istorii Tatarskoi peredovoi obshchestvenno i mysli vtoraiia polovina XIX - nachalo XX-ogo veka*) (Extracts from the history of progressive social Tatar thought - second half of the XIXth - beginning of XXth century), Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1955, 279 pages (concerning Nasyri, pp. 41-57).

9. GAYNULLIN (M.Kh.), *Kayum Nasyrov i prosvetitel'noe dvizhenie sredi Tatar* (Kayum Nasyrov and the enlightenment movement among the Tatars), Kazan, 1955.

10. GAYNULLIN (M.Kh.), "Kayum Nasyrov". In *Literaturnaia Gazeta*, Moscow, No. 8, 1945; *Kayum Nasyri - Ocherk nauchnoi, literaturnoi i prosvetitel' noi deiatel'nosti. K 120-letiiu so dnia ego rozhdeniia* (Kayum Nasyri - essay on his scientific, literary and educative activity. On the occasion of the 120th anniversary of his birth), Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1946, 84 p; "Vydaiushchiiia tatarskii uchenyi i pisatel' - Kayum Nasyrov" (Remarkable Tatar scientist and writer - Kayum Nasyri). In *Krasnaia Tatariia*, No. 5, 1946; *Kayum Nasyri (Nasyrov) - K 50 letiiu so dnia smerti* (Kayum Nasyri - at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of his death), Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962.

11. GOROHOV (V.M.), "Kayum Nasyri kak pedagog (1825-1902)" (Kayum Nasyri - the educationalist (1825-1902). In *Sovetskaia Pedagogika*, Moscow, 1947, No. 2, pp. 66-78; "Vydaiushchiisia tatarskii uchenyi, prosvetitel' i pedagog

Kayum Nasyrov" (Kayum Nasyri, Tatar scientist, teacher and educationalist). In *Krasnïa Tatariia*, No. 5, 1945.
12. GUMEROV (D.M.), "Kayum Nasyri - peredovoi myslitel' tatarskogo naroda XIX-ogo veka" (Kayum Nasyri, the XIXth century progressive thinker of the Tatar people). In *Voprosy Filosofii*, Moscow, 1950, No. 1, pp. 180-199.
13. HARLAMPOVICH (K.V.), "Moslovskii i ego perepiska s N.I. Il'minskim" (Moslovskii and his correspondence with N.I. Il'minskii). In *Izvestïa Obshchestva Arkheologii, Istorii i Etnografii*, Kazan, vol. XXIII, 1907.
14. *Istoriia Tatarskoi A.S.S.R.* (History of the Tatar A.S.S.R.), Kazan branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, vol. 1, 1960, Tatknigoizdat (concerning Nasyri, pp. 363-365).
15. *Kayum Nasyri (1825-1945). Materialy nauchnoi sessii posviashchennoi 120-letiu so dnia rozhdeniia* (Kayum Nasyri (1825-1945). Material of the scientific session devoted to the 120th anniversary of his birth), Kazan branch of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1948, 136 pages, ill. (The same publication also appeared in Tatar).
16. VALIDOV (Jemaleddin), *Ocherki istorii obrazovannosti i literatury Tatar (do revolutsii 1917 goda)* (Essay on the history of education and literature among the Tatars before the 1917 revolution), Moscow-Leningrad, 1923, 106 pages (concerning Nasyri, pp. 41-43).

Notes on Nasyri appear in the *Bol'schia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia* (Great Soviet encyclopaedia), second edition, Vol. XXIX, p. 224; in the *Literary Encyclopaedia*, vol. VII, p. 612; and in *Malaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopedia* (Small Soviet encyclopaedia), 2nd edition, vol. VI, p. 457.

There is a bibliography of Soviet works devoted to Nasyri in the *Istoriia Tatarskoi A.S.S.R. - Ukazatel' Sovetskoi Literatury, 1917-1959*, pp. 91 and 92, Kazan, University, 1960.

WORKS IN TATAR

1. AMIRHAN (Fatyh), "Adäbiyätgä-i aid" (Culture celebration). In *Al-Islah*, Kazan, Nos. 44 and 47, 1908.
2. CHOKRYJ ('Aufullah), "Kayum Nasyri". In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 5, 1913.
3. FAHREDDIN (Rizaeddin), "Meshhur Kesheler vä böek Vaqy'alar" (Famous men and great events). In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 21, 1912.
4. FAYZULLIN (S), "Onytylgan häzinä" (The forgotten treasure). In *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, No. 36, 1945.
5. GAYNULLIN (M.H.), "Atakly galim häm yazuchy" (A great scientist and writer). In *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, No. 28, 1945; "Atakly galim häm yazuchy Kayum Nasyri". In *Soviet Adäbiiaty*, No. 7, 1940; "Böek mäg'rifätche häm patriot (K. Nasyri)". (A great educationist and patriot: K. Nasyri). In *Sovet Adäbiiaty*, Kazan, 1950, No. 2, pp. 67-73; *Kayum Nasyri*, Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1945, 84 pages; "Kayum Nasyri dokumantlarda" (Among the documents of Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovet Adäbiiaty*, Kazan, No. 2, 1945; "Kayum Nasyri tuuynda 120 el tuluunda belan (Kayum Nasyri - the occasion of the 120th anniversary of his birthday), Kazan, Tatknigoizdat, 1945; "Mägrifätche, pedagog Kayum Nasyrinyñ ülüena 50 el" (The fiftieth anniversary of the death of the enlightenment teacher Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovet Mäktäbe*, Kazan, No. 4, pp. 5-9.
6. GALI (M.), "Kayum Nasyri ülüena 40 el tutlu uñae belän" (Kayum Nasyri - on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of his death). In *Sovet Adäbiiaty*, Kazan, Nos. 9-10, 1942. *Kayumnyñ balachagy* (Kayum's youth), Kazan, Tatknigoizdat, 1958, 70 pages.

7. GOROHOV (V.M.), "Böek tatar galime" (The great Tatar scientist). In *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, No. 5, 1945; "Kayum Nasyrinyñ pedagogik karashlary" (Miscellaneous pedagogic works of Kayum Nasyri). In *Halyk Mägarife*, Kazan, No. 1, 1945.
8. HABIBULLINA (Z.S.), *Tatar halkynyñ galime, mägrifatchese hame yaszuchysy Kayum Nasyri (1825-1902)* (Kayum Nasyri, scientist, educationalist and writer of the Tatar people). Kazan, "Lenin Library", 1952.
9. HANGILDIN (V.), "Kayum Nasyri gramatikalarynda Tatar tele sintaksisy nigezläre" (Syntax of the Tatar language in the grammars of Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, No. 2, 1942.
10. HALIT (C.), "Tatar halkynyñ kürenekle mägrifätchese häm gälime". In *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, Kazan, No. 36, 1945.
11. HANEFI (Muzafar), "Istälektär". In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 6, 1913.
12. HASANOV (Ahmed), "Kayum Nasyri turynda kaiber istäleklär". In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, Kazan, No. 7, 1940.
13. HUGASHI (Nasreddin), "Möhtäräm Abdelkayum Nasyri" (The venerable Kayum Nasyri). In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 24, 1912.
14. ISAEV (Nasreddin), "Kayum Nasyri turynda hatirälär (Recollections about Kayum Nasyri). In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 22, 1912.
15. KURBANGALIEV (Prof. Muhiddin), "Kayum Nasyri turynda istäleklär". In *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, Kazan, 15 February 1925.
16. *Kayum Nasyrinin Mejmu'asy* (Collection of Nasyri's works), edited by Galimjan Ibragimov, Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1922, 160 pages (Scientific Centre of the Commissariat of Public Instruction of the Tatar Republic). (T.E. 5571, H.L. not classified).
17. *Kayum Nasyrinin munarja basylmagan eserleri häm yüz bayram materiïallarymejmua* (The unpublished works of Kayum Nasyri and material for the centenary of his birth). Collected by Ali Rahim. Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1920, 133 pages (T.E. 5720, H.T.U., N.Y.P.L., T.T.K.: A/5887).
18. SAADI (Abdurrahman), *Tatar Ädäbiïaty Tarikhi* (History of Tatar literature), Kazan, Tatgosizdat, 1926 (concerning Nasyri, pp. 42-50) (T.E., T.T.K.).
19. SAADI (A.), "Tatar khalqynyñ üseshendä Kayum Nasyri role" (The role of Kayum Nasyri in the revival of the Tatar people). In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, Kazan, 1944, No. 10.
20. SHAHIDULLIN (Sh.), "Abdelkayum efendiniñ vefaty" (The death of Abdulkayum Efendi). In *Zaman Kalindary* (The calendar), Kazan, 1904.
21. TAHIRI (Hadi), "Kayum Efendi Nasyri haqynda hatiraler", (About the recollections concerning Kayum Nasyri). In *Shura*, Orenburg, No. 23, 1912.
22. UKMASY (M.), "Kayum abzy Nasyri". In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, Kazan, No. 2, 1945.
23. VASEEVA (G.), "Kayum Nasyri - terbiache" (Kayum Nasyri - educationalist). In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, Kazan, No. 2, 1945.
24. ZHALI (L.), *Tatarlarga mägrifätchelek häräkätä häm Kayum Nasyri* (The cultural movement among the Tatars and Kayum Nasyri). In *Sovet Ädäbiïaty*, Kazan, 1945, No. 2, pp. 37-44.

WORKS IN TURKISH

1. BATTAL-TAYMAS (A.), *Kazan Türkleri*, İstanbul, 1925, (concerning Nasyri, pp. 184-190).
2. CHAGATAY (Saadet), "Abdül Kayum Nasyri". In *Ankara Universitesi Dil ve Tarih-Çografya Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. X, fasc. 3-4, eylül-aralık 1952, pp. 148-160, Ankara, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1952.

3. TOGAY (Feyzi), "Kayum Nasyri". In *Türk Amacı*, Istanbul, No. 4, 1942, pp. 165-170.

Dr. Saadet Chagatay quotes (*op. cit.*, p. 157) several bio-bibliographic articles concerning Nasyri which appeared in Turkey. The first ones were published shortly after his death in the newspapers of Istanbul: *Ikdam* and *Terjüman-i Haqioat*. The Tatar writer Aiaz Ishaki devoted several articles to Nasyri in *Türk Yurdu* (No. 11 of 1925), *Yeni Türk Yurdu* (No. 4 of 1942) and in the Tatar émigré review *Milli Yul* (Nos. 10 and 11 of 1937 and No. 1 of 1938).

We must also mention a work in Kazakh by Zh. Syzdykov, "The great teacher of the Tatar people," which appeared in the literary review *Ädäbüet Zhene Iskustvo* (Literature and Art), Alma-Ata, No. 9, September 1952, pp. 99-102.

A Valley Against an Empire

JÉROME BONY & CHRISTOPHE DE PONFILLY

("A Valley Against an Empire" is the film-script from the film of the same name by the French makers **Jérome Bony** and **Christophe de Ponfilly**. We believe that even without visual support the film-script is an interesting and poignant document. "A Valley Against An Empire" has been bought by the BBC and will be released in the near future. We would be pleased to forward inquiries about the film to the film-makers. - Editor)

AFGHANISTAN 1981

The Koran is our law
The Holy War is our life
Martyrdom in the name of God is our wish
Death to the Soviets!
Death to Stalin!
Death to Brezhnev!
Long live Islam
Long live the warriors

Interview with Homayoum, an Afghan student in Paris, 1981.

I learned of the invasion of Afghanistan from the Soviet soldiers. Obviously the invasion of one's country and people by a foreign power provokes a reaction. And I think the French people understand this . . . quite well, because they were invaded and occupied by Hilter's army. Therefore they can easily imagine the problems this invasion and occupation present to the conscience. It is true that Afghanistan was a country and I think the only one in the world which needed a revolution because the social gaps among the classes were so enormous.

But you, before the Soviet intervention in 1979, weren't you communist?

Communist . . . the term needs to be defined. Rather I had so-called progressive ideas but they are ideas like others, probably.

Anyway when I say ideas like any others I say this today because I have realized that when one speaks of progress or communism or socialism, these are words totally deprived of any meaning in any case as far as Afghanistan is concerned right now.

Will you be able to go home someday?

I will go home and into the ranks of the resistance against the Soviet army.

In the foothills of the Hindu Kush, which extend the Himalayas into Afghanistan, the roads of contraband have become the paths of resistance.

We entered Afghanistan clandestinely with a caravan led by Aragoul. Since his liberation after two years of imprisonment and torture at the Pauli-Charki prison in the suburbs of Kabul, Aragoul has become a specialist in clandestine convoys.

He is responsible for the caravan, consisting of 50 horses and 60 people: the *mujahidin*, that is the soldiers of the faith, a blacksmith, a baker, precious-stone merchants and also a team of doctors belonging to the French association International Medical Aid, carrying 300 kg (600 pounds) of medicine from private donations.

Compared to the tremendous airlift operation which brought the 100,000 soldiers of the Red Army and their equipment to Kabul these expeditions are ridiculous. Yet, thanks to these expeditions, an umbilical cord links the Afghan resistance of the interior with the 2 million refugees in exile.

Besides the medicine, the caravan conveys weapons - Simenov rifles given by Egypt, one Zigouyak anti-aircraft cannon from Somalia - munitions, news and . . . Hope.

Jérome Bony

We crossed the Afghan border only five hours ago and already in these somewhat idyllic surroundings we are plunged in total ignominy. Char Mansour, one of the *mujahidin* in the group, is the victim of an anti-personnel mine; the anti-personnel mines are dropped by helicopter throughout the countryside, they are camouflaged to look like the surroundings. People walk on them and are crippled by the explosion. Worse, some of the mines are made up to look like watches and bracelets or boxes of matches. People who pick up these objects, women or children in the villages, are also left crippled by the explosion.

Interview with Frédérique H., International Medical Aid.

What exactly happened, Frédérique, you were there?

Yes. We had just arrived, we were resting waiting for tea when

we heard a shot or a bomb, I don't know what it was. All the *mujahidin* as well as we hid behind the boulders waiting till it was over. Afterwards, we looked around, there was a group of men on the other side of the river. We were wondering what had happened. We thought there might be some wounded. And then we saw a man crawling across the stream waving to us to come over, they needed a doctor, we would see that the man's foot had been blown off.

What can you do?

We will have to amputate, there is nothing else to do.

Interview with Bertrand N., International Medical Aid during the operation.

How is the operation going? You waited quite a while for the medication.

We waited a long time for the drugs because they were transported by the horses which were . . . this material was divided up, part of it was way up front and part far behind, to such an extent that we had to wait more than an hour for the *palfuim*.

Dialogue between the doctors during the operation.

Look at those kids running around, there are mines all over the place!

Had it not been for the medicine, gangrene would have taken over and Char Mansour would have lost his right leg.

Anguish has now joined the caravan. The anguish of stepping on the right spot along a trail only 15 inches wide.

The limited destructive capacity of anti-personnel mines, similar to those used by the American army in Vietnam, seems to have been calculated by some Machiavellian mind: they wound but they don't kill . . . . Someone who dies in the Holy War becomes a martyr, but someone who is only wounded becomes a danger, slowing down the caravan, so vulnerable to attack from the air. Later, the victim will recall the terrifying situation in which he was wounded.

What methods of dissuasion for the Afghan people, who at all costs must keep their faith intact!

Our destination: the Panshir valley, 50 km (35 miles) north-east of Kabul. In order to get there by the north trail, these men must walk 15 hours a day for 10 days, a total of 400 km (300 miles), crossing three mountain passes at an altitude of 5,000 m (15,000 ft). Seemingly never-ending climbs over the precipice, across rock-strewn paths which make progress difficult. Crossing violent streams, the

plains under stifling heat, mountain passes where oxygen is rare and blizzards threaten. Sleeping at night behind stone walls. Drinking tea, eating bread and scarce pieces of fat, cold meat, poorly dressed with bad shoes, the Panshiris never complain: they are trekking to the Holy War . . . in song!

The horses, over-burdened, don't always arrive at the end of the trip. Many carcasses are strewn along the trail.

Except for the mines, there is no sign of Soviet presence: the mountain passes are too high and cannot be controlled by helicopter.

THE PANSHIR VALLEY

The Soviet army and what is left of the regular Afghan army after massive desertions control only 10 percent of Afghanistan. The majority of the regions (districts) are resisting and many valleys have kept or gained their liberty.

The Panshir valley is a thorn in the foot for the Soviets: it leads to the strategic route linking the USSR to Kabul near the Saleng pass where guerillas ambush the military convoys. The valley is also a symbol. Its organization is becoming a model for the other Afghan provinces.

Surrounded by mountains on the East, the North and the South, under pressure in the West by Soviet-Afghan troups, 100,000 men, women and children have chosen to stay in the valley, to go on living as if nothing had changed, as if there were no war.

Kabul is 50 km (35 miles) away. This proximity has not prevented the Panshiris, since the arrival of the pro-Soviets in the government and therefore well before the invasion of December 1979, from refusing interference on the part of the central government in their economic, cultural and religious life.

In July 1979, the governor of the valley, a teacher and several policemen were killed. The central administration did not force itself upon the valley and recalled all its representatives. Since then, the Panshir has always been autonomous. But the valley lives a vicious circle of guerilla warfare and reprisals. After two years of this war, the valley pays the price and it's heavy . . .

Bombed by Migs and Soviet helicoptors the valley could inscribe a long list of victims on its war memorial were there such a monument. Most of the houses have been destroyed and all of the mosques. Why the mosques? Because everything religious has become the number one target of the Kabul government.

During the morning prayer the terrifying sound of the cannons is heard. When we arrived home the helicopters began dumping bombs and rockets, they destroyed the whole village.

(Was there any reason for this?)

No. My house was destroyed because I have a religious role, I am against the laws of the Soviets, and against their politics. Many other houses were also destroyed.

(How many dead?)

There were three, plus the wounded.

The peasant's song

My joy will be immense
when I will return to Panshir
my native land
What a joy to find
the one I have always loved
I will have
so much to tell her
All night long / I will reveal to her
my love / I will tell her / all my
thoughts and feelings
while singing, yes, while singing.

Oh God!

Since the beginning of the conflict, the peasants of the Panshir sow and reap their harvests under the threat of aerial attacks whose intensity strengthens when harvest season begins. An efficient agricultural system ensures this valley, cut off from the world, the most necessary food products. The whole population works in the fields.

In the Panshir, every single day of peace is a victory won by the *mujahidin* who hold the mountains and passes and the access to the valley over there, near Kabul. Their leader, the commander Ahmad Chah Massoud, was chosen by the population who appreciate his courage and intelligence. This leader has assumed full military and civilian responsibilities, at the age of 28.

For security reasons, Massoud never sleeps two consecutive nights in the same place. With a sense of organization, will and discipline, he has set up, in the valley, political institutions, founded on respect for democracy and faith in Islam. The responsibility is divided among five committees. Elected representatives of these committees live in each village in the valley.

First of all, a military committee, which takes care of recruiting and dividing up the weapons, clothes and food; this committee manages transportation consisting of a dozen trucks, which up to now have escaped the aerial attacks, which criss-cross the valley. Priority is given to transporting troops and food.

An economic committee, supervising supplies and levying taxes on

transportation and commerce, manages the practical aspect of life for the whole valley. Only one type of currency is used here: the Afghani of before 1978. The Panshiri naturally reject the new notes printed by the communists, a paper money system which will last as long as the worn-out bills.

The third committee deals with culture and propaganda. It distributes posters of the Jamiat Islami, one of the Islamic movements exiled in Pakistan. The leader of the group is Professor Rabani, Massoud's companion.

The job of the secret service committee is to collect all information useful to the resistance, in particular the dates of the forthcoming aerial attacks. Agents are everywhere, even in the General Staff at Kabul.

Finally, the judicial committee is particularly remarkable. Justice is not hasty. Prisoners of war are not immediately executed. If they are Afghan nationals they are incarcerated in this prison.

PANSHIR PRISON

A prison which is a rather exceptional institution in the Afghan resistance movement, which demonstrates the degree of organization and justice reached by the people of the Panshir. There are actually 80 prisoners who have been sentenced or who are waiting to be sentenced. Among them are 20 officers of the government army: the ordinary soldiers are released after seizure of their weapons and uniforms. Certain of them join the ranks of the resistance.

We saw no Soviet prisoners.

The other prisoners are militants of all ages from the Khalq or Parcham, the two Afghan communist parties. They are often teachers condemned, not because they represent knowledge, but rather, because they represent the central power and Kabul's doctrine.

Some were taken after an ambush on the route to Saleng, for example, two communist Afghans arrested in their car while on their way to the cement factory which they manage.

In spite of this apparent tranquillity the war is everywhere. Every day brings casualties (wounded) from the front. An 18-year-old man (shown in the film) had his arm blown off by shell fragments. He died the next day in spite of the care given to him at the hospital, organized and supplied as well as possible by two French doctors, Laurence and Philippe. They were the first to arrive during the spring of 1981. We filmed them as they turned the hospital over to Frédérique and Bertrand, who travelled with us.

Frédérique, International Medical Aid.

> Well, as for us, when we get there, we'll be a little lost. What did you find when you arrived for the first time three months ago, what has been happening?

Laurence, International Medical Aid.

Well, what happened . . . we were warmly greeted. They weren't expecting us and we told them we had come here to work for three months and that later more doctors would come and that we wanted to work for everyone, the civilian population as well as the *mujahidin*.

Frédérique.

What kind of pathology have you encountered, surgical or medical injuries?

Laurence.

As far as war injuries are concerned the first victim came eight days after our arrival. A grenade had exploed in the hands of a *mujahid*. So we did major surgery immediately. Later a *mujahid* commander who had been burned by napalm, burned 100 per cent, he died 24 hours later. We had mostly bullet wounds.

Philippe M., International Medical Aid.

Special bullets, high speed, which means they provoke serious injuries when they penetrate the tissues and particularly bone fractures which are practically impossible to repair satisfactorily. Or the other hand, there is a specific wartime pathology, extremely important, a psychiatric pathology with serious personnality problems. And of course . . . .

Laurence.

Philippe takes care of the *mujahidin*, I take care of the women.

Bertrand.

Were there other things?

Philippe.

Yes, there was wartime medicine and general medicine.

Laurence.

There was a whooping cough epidemic. I saw a lot of children with whooping cough. For three days I interviewed the women, asking them how many children they had and how many had died. From a group of 200 children 66 had died of fever, whooping cough, measles, stupid things, really simple ones. After that the women of the village asked me to teach them lessons; very simple ones, lessons in hygiene. Everything went quite well. We must keep that up. That's what they want the most.

Inside the hospital, the new team is warmly welcomed by the Panshiris. During the French doctors' absence the hospital continues to

functions thanks to seven Afghan nurses who were trained by Laurence and Philippe.

Their intervention is obviously limited by their lack of experience and training but they continued to ensure emergency care which has even included amputations!

The day after our arrival the patients flood in. For the whole Panshir valley population of 100,000 there are three Afghan doctors of whom two are Khalqis. Because they are communists, they don't necessarily have the patient's confidence. As Bertrand puts it:

> For the last two days we can see that the patients have heard of the arrival of the new team, the consultations take place at a rather rapid pace. I think that quite soon we will reach the same pace as our predecessors, that is about 60 to 70 people per day.

In the hospital two of the nurses are also interpreters, absolutely necessary for talking to the patients. It is important to note that these people have not seen a doctor in two years, that is since the beginning of the war. Some need only to be reassured, that they are in good health, but many others need care. There are various diseases: tuberculosis, parasitic diseases of the digestive system, pulmonary infections or diseases of the eye. The diseases are all the more serious in that there has been no medical care for so long, the level of hygiene is insufficient and there is of course, malnutrition, especially so in the case of the children.

The doctors have adapted themselves to Islamic custom, a curtain separates the women, they are treated by Evelyn, the nurse, and Frédérique.

Interview with Frédérique H., International Medical Aid.

> What kind of medical schooling do you have?
>
> I am a general practitioner, I don't have any other background, I'm not a specialist.
>
> A question which comes immediately to mind: why did you come to the Panshir? Why do you take these risks?
>
> That is kind of hard to answer just like that. I think that by instinct I'm attracted to a people who have a hard time in life and also a hard time gaining their freedom themselves and in Afghanistan, the *mujahidin* are fighting alone, for an ideal which I share and I knew they needed doctors, these people need us, so I came. But let's be honest, I came for myself as well for the adventure, at least for a limited amount of time and with limited risks, also.

Emotionally, it must be quite hard too. When the accident of the *mujahid* stepping on the mine occurred, we looked at you, you were quite shaken.

Yes, I was. And as a doctor I am more directly concerned. We have to react immediately, we are responsible for what we do, we don't have time to wait or to weaken, we have to act immediately, but I was indeed quite affected.

MILITARY TRAINING

In the Panshir each and every civilian is a potential soldier. The metamorphosis nonetheless entails serious training. Massoud teaches guerilla tactics. His reputation has been made well beyond the confines of the valley. The Panshir is a leader in this field as well.

Interview with Walid, a resistance fighter.

Walid, why did you come here to Panshir?

Personally, I am a resistance fighter from the Kunar Valley. I came here to see Mr. Massoud to see if it is possible to send our groups here, and also for training, because in our province of Kunar from the technical point of view the *mujahidin* don't know how to wage war. Here in the Panshir there are real commandos.

How long does it take to get here from Kunar?

From Kunar to here it takes six days.

And Massoud's training is worth that?

Yes, it is worth more than that.

Training lasts at least two months for eight hours a day. New recruits learn their first lessons there. But warfare is not their job, for they are craftsmen, peasants, farmers, former students. They are simply fighting for the respect of their life style and their freedom. The resistance is not the work of a handful of *mujahidin* but of the whole population.

For these men, their participation in military operations lasts for periods of two weeks, between which they return to their families.

Interview with Ahmad Chah Massoud.

Commander Massoud, Western television spectators must be wondering how a small valley like yours, with five thousand men and only seven hundred weapons, manages to resist against an army reputed to be the most powerful in the world, the Red Army?

I think there are four reasons. The first reason is that my combat troops like to wage war against an enemy in order to attain *Jannad*; if we die we attain or reach *Jannad*.

Jehad?

Jannad.

You mean the Holy War?

Jannad, Jannad, the Garden of God . . . Yes, you know what I am talking about?

You mean that the *mujahidin* who die reach the Garden of God?

They reach *Jannad* and because of that they are not afraid to die. The first thing is the help of God. The second thing is that the *mujahidin* are all very courageous and now for the war they are complete, how do you say it, complete?

They are prepared.

They are prepared to begin the war, to continue the war. The third thing is the structure of the valley, the mountains and the rivers; for us it is an advantage, but not for the enemy. The fourth thing is that the enemy doesn't know us, he doesn't know the way and doesn't know the mountains and other things.

At the opening of the valley, the front is stabilized, a rather exceptional situation in this rather mobile war. The bottle-neck of the opening leading to the valley is under constant pressure from the Soviet tanks.

Two days ago, the Soviet aircraft bombarded this village, the village of Shotal.

This village, attacked by Migs and helicopters, under constant mortar fire, is a heap of rubble. The Soviet Afghan troops are one or two miles away. As for the civilian population, they have found refuge in caves carved out of the mountains.

There thirty *mujahidin*, thirty solders, were sleeping in the mosque, but only one was wounded.

There, a rocket came through the wall?

Through the wall. Look, the wall fell down.

Yes.

WEAPONS

A Dachaka, heavy Soviet machine gun, a rocket launcher retrieved from the carcass of a heliopter. We arrived unexpectedly at the Pan-

shir weapon stock and repair shop. We didn't see any American or Chinese weapons.

Commander Aoued, responsible for weapons.

We didn't see anything but Soviet weapons.

Throughout this war in the whole Panshir Valley weapons were taken only from the Soviets.

Had he had a ground-air missile he would proudly have shown it to us.

In the Panshir an estimated 80 percent of the weapons and ammunition are recovered from the enemy while the remaining 20 percent come by caravan. Before the arrival of Arogoul's caravan the *mujahidin* were practically out of ammunition. The adversaries use very powerful weapons. These (shown in the film) fragmentation bombs for example. The idea behind these weapons is simple. A pre-cut metal ribbon surrounds a heavy load. The explosion sends off thousands of fragments which rip up everything they hit in a radius of hundreds of feet.

What do the Panshiris do with them when they recover them from the grounded helicopters? They take them apart in order to analyse the mechanism, they reconstitute them and use an electric wire hooked up to two 1.5 volt batteries and re-establish the firing mechanism. Looks like tinkering but they do the best they can with what they've got. And it's this Afghan ingenuity which causes the Soviets so much trouble. And courage takes care of the rest. As for mines, they are hooked up to a detonator set at a certain distance and designed to attack the mine-clearance squad.

This lightweight cannon (shown in the film) with explosive bullets is the latest invention in Soviet weaponry. Only the firing pin is missing.

Troops at attention.
Disciplined, properly clothed, good shoes, these men have spent the last two weeks on the front. The encounters take place mostly at night. During the day they must hold out at all costs in spite of helicoptor attacks, a shower of mortar.

Massoud under the trees talking to a mujahid.

What happened?

They came from the other side.

Did they spot the Dachaka?

No, they are setting up communications but they haven't spotted our positions.

(In French) It's a retreat, then? It's the *mujahidin*'s retreat?

Yes.

The helicoptors came to bomb Shotal, but luckily because of the fire from the Dachaka and the Zigouyak which was taken from the Soviet tank, the helicoptors were downed. One fell next to a large fabric factory and the other on the plateau of Shamoli.

The one flying around now is over which position?

It is flying above the troops. Allamondine is a great hunter of helicopters.

How many has he shot down?

Up to now he has shot down five helicoptors.

What did he shoot them down with?

With a Dachaka.

The one over there?

Yes.

And now are you going to move it?

Yes, now they are coming down from the mountain to move the Dachaka.

At one point on the front near Choteul Massoud's men have been overtaken by the Soviet Afghan troops who have gained a position on a ridge. With mortars they pound at the Panshiris' positions. Informed by messenger (the resistance fighters do not have a radio) Massoud organizes the counter-attack. The assault to regain the lost position is planned for the night. In groups of 33 men, the Panshiris head in the direction of the next skirmish.

During the night mortar fire is considerably closer. No sooner had we left the house where we were spending the night than it was blown to bits. Total: three dead among the Panshiris including one of Massoud's lieutenants.

Also victims of this war, the soldiers of the regular Afghan army and the young Soviets of the annual call-up coming from the Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia; they are totally unmotivated, unadapted, so vulnerable.

In spite of its power, the Red Army doesn't always have trustworthy equipment. Vehicles break down, bombs don't explode. As in all the battlefields of the superpowers Afghanistan is a testing ground for special weapons. Nerve gas, as well as incendiary bombs

composed of napalm or phosphorus, such as this one.

Interview with Massoud, examining a piece of the bomb.

What kind of bomb is it?

It is a piece of burning bomb.

We have brought back from Choteul a piece of this bomb and have turned it over to a specialized laboratory in France: emission spectography and other analyses have shown the presence in high doses of phosphorus and magnesium. It is in fact an incendiary bomb.

An old man, talking to Christophe de Ponfilly.

Did the Soviets bombard here?

They destroyed all the houses.
It's the Soviets who burnt and destroyed their houses.
We can't do anything. There is no ammunition. There are no rifles. The people of the Panshir are poor; if they had rifles, if they had munitions, you would have seen how we would have cut off their heads.

Other victims of the war, the children, shown here with weapons. Obsessed by the Soviet invasion, traumatized by the bombing, even then they participate the best they can in the resistance.

Along the only road of the valley: the remains of the last four Soviet interventions (April and August 1980, January and September 1981). Four times since the invasion in December 1979, the Soviet-Afghan troops from Kabul have blown up the resistance's hold on the front and have managed to cover 60 km (40 miles) by land in the direction of the end of the valley. Harassed by Massoud's commandos, hidden in the mountains, the Soviets have never been able to hold the Panshir valley for more than three weeks. Each time they have retreated, leaving behind them hundreds of casualties and a considerable amount of equipment.

Once the soldiers have left the scene of the ambush, the dealers arrive. Everything is recovered. Everything which can be transported disappears. Taking apart the remains he (a scrap-metal merchant) chooses the pieces of metal which can be used in fixing the vehicles which still work.

In the villages, some houses have been destroyed as many as three and four times. Nonetheless reconstruction continues and all the neighbours lend a hand. The incredible spirit of the Panshiris who, in spite of repeated bombing, unendingly rebuild the image of peace, is extraordinary.

In spite of its natural resources, grain, fruit, trees, herds of goats,

cattle, sheep, the valley is not self-sufficient. At night, men and women and even children cross the fighting zone in order to reach the Big Bazaar of Kabul and bring back products which cannot be found in the Panshir. Rice, for example, whose price has tripled in three years.

Paradoxically, some goods come from the USSR. One-litre cans of oil, for example, or matches. Supply is not regular. If bags of fertilizer can be carried across the mountains with not too much trouble, the 20 litre (5 gallon) jerrycans of gasoline are hard to carry and do pose a problem.

Before 1979, at the time of the pro-Soviet government, the inhabitants of the valley had destroyed the schools which had become the symbols of atheist propaganda. The children are back at school today. Religious instruction with translations of chapters from the Koran, but also general education in geography, mathematics, history and science, etc . . . Teaching these children that life is not only earned with weapons is difficult.

Interview with a child.

Where did you go?

Behind the village.

What did you do there?
What did you touch?
Did you catch something?

A rock.

What was it?

A grenade . . .
It made noise.

What this seven-year-old child thought was a toy was in fact an anti-personnel mine which blew off his hand. The doctors were not there when the explosion occurred. His father covered the boy's hand with mud to stop the bleeding.

God is great
Mohammed is our guide
Islam is our faith
The Koran is our law

Oppressed in our own land
We will fight against the
Soviets' vassals
We will
Our force is our faith.

Neither rebels nor outlaws nor wild mountaineers, we discovered in the Panshir Valley an organized people's resistance being developed. It has already won a battle over despair, disorder and fanaticism . . .

As each day goes by, the Panshiris add a new verse to their song. An impossible war between an empire and a valley, between a country which has never been enslaved and a superpower which has never backed down.

Interview with Massoud.

Do you think you are going to win?

Yes, yes of course.

What makes you think so? What makes you think you are going to win.

I believe we are going to win. It is clear.

Eastern Turkistan After 32 Years of Exile

ERKIN ALPTEKIN

My trip to my motherland, Eastern Turkistan, in 1982, after 32 years of exile was entirely satisfactory. I was able to meet all my relatives, most of my childhood friends and at least some of my acquaintances; I was able to move around and to talk to people freely, without so-called "guides"; and I had the opportunity of visiting the homes of my countrymen. I visited not only the capital, Urumchi, but also Kashgar and my parents' home town, Yenisar.

Eastern Turkistan is an extensive territory in the Northwest of China, bordering on the Soviet republics of Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Tajikistan in the northwest, the Peoples Republic of Mongolia to the northeast, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India to the southwest, Tibet to the south and China in the east. Eastern Turkistan was brought under Chinese rule in 1876 after several attempts and was annexed to China proper in 1884 as the province of Xinjiang, which means "New Territory".

According to official figures, Eastern Turkistan has a population of about 12 million; 5,800,000 Uighurs, 870,000 Kazakhs, 90,000 from other Turkic groups, as well as 100,000 Mongols, 70,000 Manchus and 5,000,000 Chinese. According to my countrymen there are far more Chinese inhabitants than admitted in the official figures. They estimate that there are 10 million Chinese in Eastern Turkistan. Before 1949, the Chinese population of Eastern Turkistan was estimated at 200,000 and that of Urumchi at 80,000. Today, it is estimated that 800,000 of Urumchi's inhabitants (80%) are Chinese.

The multiplication of the Chinese population of Eastern Turkistan has led to conflict between the Chinese and the indigenous population. There have been problems in cities like Aksu, Kashgar, Ili and Kargalik. Indeed, while I was in Yenisar, trouble broke out in Kargalik. According to my sources, the story behind this trouble is as follows. An unknown man set fire to the mosque in Kargalik and the local people, in recrimination, rioted and destroyed Party, municipal and

government buildings. The Chinese officials to whom I talked about this incident, however, claimed that Russian spies agitating in Eastern Turkistan were responsible.

It is true that Russian propaganda is very strong in Eastern Turkistan. There are almost 300,000 Uighurs living in the Soviet Union, who are used by the Soviets as tools against China. Apparently, these Uighurs have two radio stations in Alma Ata and Tashkent, which broadcast intensively in the direction of Eastern Turkistan. According to Chinese officials there is also a mobile radio station in the Peoples Republic of Mongolia. I was told that the Russians are smuggling not only spies but also weapons and propaganda into Eastern Turkistan.

The growth of the Chinese population has brought not only racial conflict, but also unemployment, hunger and disaster to Eastern Turkistan. In Urumchi, Kashgar and Yenisar, I met jobless young people with high school diplomas walking the streets, who told me that unemployment was their main cause of discontent.

Eastern Turkistan is potentially a very rich country, with quantities of iron ore, uranium and non-ferrous metals, as well as oil and other possibilities. According to geologists, the coal fields of Eastern Turkistan could supply the entire world for 60 years. In 1980, the value of the livestock population and of agriculture was estimated at about 1.4 billion dollars. In the same year, exports were set at 90 million dollars. There are over 1000 factories.

All this potential wealth has not brought any prosperity to the local people, however, who are getting poorer and poorer, poverty which becomes more evident as one travels to the south of the country. I have seen people going barefoot in the middle of winter.

The new Chinese leaders have made some attempt to improve things. The local people are now allowed to conduct some private business in order to improve their living standards. Only those who have some capital of their own are able to take advantage of this leniency to run a private business, however. As a result, those who are able to benefit from private business are few and far between, since few people have any capital to invest.

The minimum wage has been raised to 80 *yuan* (45 dollars). It is true to say that the cost of living is acceptable for those who are actually in receipt of the minimum wage. For example, a flat with three rooms and a total size of about 25-30 square metres, with water and electricity, will cost about 2.75 dollars. For the last two years there has been an adequate supply of food, people who would once have survived on a diet of barley can now eat a more varied diet. Meat, oil, flour, rice, clothes are all still subject to rationing. The monthly rations per head are as follows; 250 grammes of meat, 250 grammes of oil,

500 grammes of rice. There is a yearly allowance of 8.5 metres of cloth.

Turkistan possesses 1 university, 12 university-level colleges, 800 high schools and 14,000 middle and elementary schools. Urumchi University has 10 faculties, with 3,154 students, of whom only 1,727 are native. Turkish, English and Russian are taught as foreign languages. It is worth noting that in Uighur schools, it is obligatory to teach in Chinese, but in Chinese schools it is not obligatory to teach Uighur at all. There are a number of schools which teach only in Chinese.

Communications have also been considerably improved. There are 24,000 kilometres of road, 5,200 of which have been asphalted. There is a railway from China to Korla via Urumchi (2350 kilometres), which is at present being extended to Kashgar. Furthermore, there is a regular air service from Urumchi to Ili, Korla, Kuchar, Aksu, Kashgar and Hoten.

All of these improvements are comparatively recent. According to the people I talked to, Mao followed a "holocaust" policy of destruction of the culture of Eastern Turkistan and its people. After the death of Mao and the purge of the "Gang of Four" a more pragmatic policy was introduced. Particularly since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese are well-disposed towards the local people. As a result, a little more freedom has been accorded to the Eastern Turkistanis. The new freedoms that Chinese leaders have introduced can be seen particularly in the religious and cultural fields.

The Latin alphabet which had been forced on the Eastern Turkistanis has been abolished, rejected on the grounds that it was a Chinese assimilation tactic, as it was based on Chinese phonetics. The Latin alphabet has been replaced by the Arabic script, which the people of Eastern Turkistan have used for 1000 years.

For the first time since the Chinese acquisition of Eastern Turkistan, the Chinese have officially acknowledged the fact that the people of Eastern Turkistan are of Turkic origin. Until the death of Mao the people of Eastern Turkistan had been officially regarded as being of Han (Chinese) stock. Taiwan has not given up this claim. The people of Eastern Turkistan are now allowed to write about and to study their own history, after not being allowed to even read it for many years. The Uighurs have a history going back for 2000 years and have played a highly significant role in the Central Asian Turkic community.

The process of translating the old Uighur books into modern language has already begun. For instance, Mahmut Kashgari, a famous Uighur scholar, compiled a Uighur dictionary in the 10th century which has now been translated into contemporary language. The Chinese words and expressions which have been forcibly incorporated

into the Uighur language are under examination, a considerable cultural change.

The peoples of Eastern Turkistan, Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars and Tajiks, are all Muslim. They accepted Islam in 934 AD during the reign of Abdulkerim Satuk Bugra Han, the ruler of the Karakhanid state, whose capital was Kashgar. He was, in fact, the first ruler in the Turkic Muslim world to voluntarily accept Islam.

Under the rule of Mao, Muslims were prohibited from reading the Koran, performing Islamic rites, going to mosques and preaching Islamic teachings. Most mosques were shut down and, in many cases, desecrated and even converted into barracks, regional Communist Party headquarters or, in some cases, slaughterhouses. Now almost all of the existing mosques have been re-opened and some have been restored at the government's expense. In many places the people are restoring and building mosques in their own time and at their own expense. In Yenisar I joined some 200 Muslims in a small town mosque.

The Chinese translation of the Koran appeared last year and translation of the Koran into Uighur has already begun in Urumchi. There have also recently been Chinese and Uighur translations of Hadith. In Kashgar, I was told that the government has agreed to open *medressehs* (Islamic schools) in some cities of Eastern Turkistan. Despite all this, religious teaching is still prohibited throughout Eastern Turkistan. Furthermore, there is no available information concerning religious freedom in the new Chinese draft constitution. The constitution adopted in March 1978, almost 18 months after the fall of the "Gang of Four", is still in force. To quote from Article 46 of the constitution;

> Citizens enjoy freedom to believe in religion and freedom not to believe in religion and to preach atheism.

As far as can be understood from this Article, it is only atheism that they are free to preach and not religion.

There is no need to point out that the people of Eastern Turkistan have no political freedom. The Chairman of the Eastern Turkistani Government, Ismail Ahmet, has no real power. Power lies in the hands of the Secretary of the Communist Party of Eastern Turkistan, Wang Enmao. All important positions are occupied by the Chinese and the local people describe their own position as "subservient". The Chinese policy can be summed up as follows: "Even if we give them positions, let us not give them any authority."

It is due to this policy that fighting has broken out repeatedly since late 1979. In April 1980, a Uighur was killed by two Chinese in Aksu. The Uighurs retaliated by beating up several hundred Chinese, destroying Chinese homes and damaging a Chinese-run factory. A few

months later, in Kashgar, a Chinese soldier driving a military truck killed a Uighur pedestrian. The court, which was dominated by Uighurs, convicted the driver of manslaughter and sentenced him to death but the police force, which is dominated by Chinese, refused to execute him and the army threatened to mutiny if the sentence was carried out. Further trouble was averted by commutation of the sentence.

In June 1981, in Kashgar, after a week of rioting, a band of 200 Uighurs tried to storm an army base outside the city. The attack was repulsed and the leaders of the uprising arrested. In August 1981, the situation deteriorated so badly that Deng Xiaoping travelled to Eastern Turkistan from Peking to help mediate in political infighting between Chinese and Uighur members of the provincial ruling committee. As a result of this visit, Wang Feng was replaced by Wang Enmao, who had worked in Eastern Turkistan from 1949–1969.

The real demand of the Uighurs of Eastern Turkistan is for self-rule and an end of Chinese domination. They are glad, nonetheless, for the limited freedoms they have been granted since the death of Mao and are very much afraid of losing them.

Book Reviews

Mehmet Saray. *Rusya'nın Türk İllerinde Yayılması.* Istanbul: Boğaziçi Basım ve Yayınevi, 1975. 230 pp.

Mehmet Saray, who specializes in the history of Central Asia, has attempted in this recent volume the popularization of a subject increasingly drawing international attention: the historical and contemporary relationship between Russia (the USSR) and the Turkic world. Drawing upon his own research in Turkish and British archives and some of the more important secondary sources (mostly in Turkish and English, with a smattering in Russian, but a notable absence of selections from the rich French historiography), Saray seeks to provide his Turkish audience with the basic facts surrounding the history of Russia's expansion into Turkic areas, the long and eventful story of the Russo-Ottoman confrontation, and the unfulfilled promises of closer ties between the USSR and republican Turkey in the twentieth century. Unlike others whose writings on sensitive subjects for a mass audience often evince polemical overtones, Saray has remained remarkably dispassionate in the hope that his volume will help not only to explain but also resolve the tensions and controversies that have plagued relations between Russia and her Turkic-speaking neighbours over the centuries. If he is not polemical, neither is he naive about the prospects of imminent success or about the nature of the Soviet system that stands as the major obstacle to a less volatile relationship in the future.

The book is divided into four parts. The first examines Russo-Turkic relations from the 10th to the late 17th century. More than half of this initial section is devoted to Russia's entanglements with the Golden Horde and its successor states, especially the Khanates of Crimea and Kazan, while the remaining pages concern the earliest contacts with the emerging Ottoman Empire. Two themes figure prominently in Part One: first, the inability of the Turkic peoples (save for the Osmanlis) to organize long-term and stable socio-economic and political orders, and second, the importance of the Crimean Khanate as a link between Russian and Ottoman Empires. Part Two covers the period from the reign of Peter the Great to the demise of the tsarist regime in 1917. Here the emphasis is almost totally on Russo-Ottoman relations, with, as is to be expected, most attention riveted on diplomatic and military matters. In Part Three Saray continues the saga into the post-October 1917 period offering extended discussion of the common interests - anti-tsarism, anti-imperialism, and the threat of Georgian and Armenian separatism - that prompted Atatürk to seek not only closer ties with Turkey's revolutionary northern neighbour but significant military and political alliance as well. Finally, Part Four returns the reader to Russia proper for treatment of the later stages of tsarist expansion into Central Asia and the conditions under which Soviet Turks find themselves living today. Especially important here are the pages devoted to the broad cultural effects of Soviet domination that are creating social and potential political problems for the Kremlin.

The attempt to cover in barely two hundred pages nearly ten centuries of the

history and interrelationship of several different regions has exacted a certain price from the author's effort. Overall the book is episodic and descriptive rather than flowing and analytical, and the need to move from Ottoman matters to those of the Volga or Central Asian Turks and back serves to accentuate this feature. Only in Part Four, it seems to me, does the author move significantly beyond the narrative to weave in argument and interpretation. Even there, however, I thought the discussion would have been greatly enhanced (and the interpretation perhaps modified) by greater attention to Soviet nationality policy and its vagaries over the last sixty years.

A selection of maps and battle plans, as well as illustrations of important political and military figures, grace the pages of *Rusya'nın Türk İllerinde Yayılması*. Unfortunately, no index is appended.

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Selig Harrison. *In Afghanistan's Shadow: Baluch Nationalism and Soviet Temptations.* New York and Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1981. 205 pp., notes and index.

For Baluchistan the ratio of outside ignorance to geo-political significance must be as unfavourable as for any of the crucially placed regions on our globe. In this book Selig Harrison has gone a long way towards rectifying the situtaion. Its greatest shortcoming is probably in its unfortunate title which gives the already neglected Baluch second billing to the Afghans. Otherwise, in looking for flaws the critic is obliged to demand limitless data and perfectly balanced analysis. While it will not be the last word on Baluchistan, anyone seriously concerned with the future of western and southern Asia will find this book to be an indispensable source of fact and interpretation on an issue of great potential importance.

As he has in several previous publications, Harrison once again demonstrates the advantages of combining the skills of the scholar with those of the journalist. He has brought together a wide range of sources - testimonial, archival, literary and observational - including the use of materials in the several languages relevant to Baluchistan. To the material he has collected he has applied the journalist's talents for interviewing, tight organization and clarity. He has made full use of the resources of time, travel, and linguistic assistance provided by Carnegie funding. The personalized perspectives, the feel for changes in expectations, the large network of contacts that are used to great effect here are the results of more than two decades of residence, movement and study of the region.

In this study Harrison concentrates on an assessment of Baluchistan as a factor in the politics of its region following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The bearing of Baluchistan's history, geography and society on its current politics is sketched tersely and cogently. The glaring contrast of few people and vast, empty territory is a principal, recurrent theme. It has meant chronic minority status and an uphill struggle for a meaningful share of political power and some control over their own natural resources for the Baluch of both Pakistan and Iran.

Harrison concludes that this struggle has several portentous implications for the region in light of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. He sees the Baluch nationalistic movement as an Achilles' heel for Pakistan as it confronts the post-invasion pressures from the Soviet Union and India. The evidence convinces Harrison that the Baluch leadership - backed by the Baluch People's Liberation

Front with several thousand guerilla troops - is poised to launch an effort to achieve complete independence from Pakistan. Such a movement would be supported by the more powerful of the tribes and by the small but expanding community of radicalized, recently educated Baluch youth. This conclusion is based on a painstaking study of the issues and events that have separated politically active Baluch from Pakistan's central leadership, especially since Bhutto dissolved the province's only popularly elected government in 1973 and sent in the army.

Paradoxically, it is the limits on the capacity of the Baluch to wage a liberation war that makes its prospects particularly alarming to Harrison. Previous contests with Pakistan's air and ground forces have left Bauch guerillas badly mauled and seeking the haven of safe encampments across the Afghan border. There is little conviction among Baluch leaders that they could win without the collapse of central authority in Pakistan, or without substantial outside help. Thus, the gap between the Baluch desire for independence and their ability to achieve it leaves an opening to the Soviet Union, or perhaps India. The Baluchistan card would enable either or both of them to employ considerable leverage on Islamabad through intervention or even the threat of intervention.

Yet, Harrison makes clear that there are factors that mitigate the danger. Soviet ideology and past political strategy demonstrate a clear preference for the preservation of multi-ethnic nation-states in the region. As a consequence of this line, no support has been given to build a Marxist movement specific to Baluchistan and no organization directly tied to Moscow has developed there. Moreover, even the more radical of the Baluch nationalists have doubts about the benefits of accepting Soviet military assistance and political endorsement after witnessing the consequences of the intervention in Afghanistan.

This uncertainty and the high political stakes involved lead Harrison to prescribe an American policy that attempts to achieve a balance between support of the Afghan resistance and the Zia regime on the one hand, and on the other persuasive pressure on Islamabad to negotiate a package of mutually acceptable political and economic tradeoffs with the Baluch. Otherwise, he argues, Moscow is left with an uncontested initiative to use Baluchistan as a tool for neutralizing of perhaps eventually dismembering Pakistan.

Nationalism among the Iranian Baluch is found to be significantly less developed, despite outside support, most notably from Iraq. Their leaders have given a response to the Khomeini revolution. Those that are groping for greater autonomy or secession look to their stronger counterparts in Pakistan to take the lead in creating a "Greater Baluchistan".

If one is to question Harrison's conclusions, their most vulnerable point is in his assessment of the Baluch commitment to independence. The core of his evidence came from his series of interviews with the three most prominent leaders, Khair Bux Marri, Ataullah Negal, and Ghaus Bux Bizenjo. The former two are leading the World Baluch Organization (for independence) from abroad, while the latter remains a strong advocate for Baluch autonomy including the right to secede. Virtually no attention was paid to politicians, officials and tribal notables who have cooperated with the Pakistan establishment in varying degrees. Divisions, ethnic, tribal and sectarian, within Baluchistan such as Baluch-Brahui rivalry and the doctrinal disputes between the Zikris of the Makran and the Sunni majority are mentioned but not examined with the intensity invested in those factors which have encouraged separatism. And, in fact, some of the data presented can be interpreted to indicate that the demographic and cultural basis for a viable Baluch nationality is eroding. More than 40 percent of the Pakistani Baluch now live outside the province. This emigration has been accompanied by a

flood of Pashtun and Punjabi migrants moving in. It is arguable, therefore, that the pulls of economic opportunity and concomitant desires for social and cultural change work against the tribally based spokesmen for separatism. Despite their own progressive records and their association with the considerable radicalization of the nationalist cause, these leaders may have little time left to take advantage of the problematic benefits of Soviet support.

Richard S. Newell
University of Northern Iowa

Correspondence

Sir,

I was very pleased to receive the first issue of your journal and to learn that you accord Afghanistan a primary position in the Central Asian region; it is, of course, the westernmost country of the Middle East and the northernmost of South Asia: that is, a geographical and historical crossroads.

Richard Newell's article, "The Government of Muhammad Moussa Shafiq: The Last Chapter of Afghan Liberalism" [Volume 1, Number 1], reminded me of the words of an old professor of 20th century history with whom I studied when a young university student: "It is difficult to touch fresh corpses". Professor Newell has made a well-documented and serious attempt to do just this; unfortunately, he had little access to many facts, some of a personal nature, of which I became aware as a result of a period of close association with some of the principals. Please allow me to bring some of these facts to light as a means of supplementing Professor Newell's fine analysis, so that the decade 1963-1973 may be better known and understood. These facts may also assist an understanding of why in 1973 not only Shafiq but also the monarchy disappeared from the Afghan scene, thereby paving the way for the emergence of a Soviet-imposed communist regime.

A very young Muhammad Moussa Shafiq was introduced to King Zaher-Shah in the late 1940s, before the former's departure as a student of the Shari'at to al-Azhar. Thus, at this early stage, the son of Molla Mohammad Ibrahim Kamawi already had the King's blessing. In Cairo, Shafiq remained aloof from the Muslim Brotherhoods; his personal protector there was the late Salah-ud-din Saljuqi, Afghan Ambassador to Egypt. Returning to Kabul in the late 1950s, Moussa Shafiq became a junior civil servant in the Ministry of Justice and a part-time lecturer in the Faculty of Law of Kabul University. About this time, Shafiq became acquainted with a number of important people: Dr. Samad Hamed, a young Mohammad-Zai who had studied constitutional law in Switzerland; the Sayyid family of Kabul, which included Mir Mohammad Siddiq Farhan, Sayyid-Qassem Reshtiya (Farhang's full brother), and their sister Mrs. Rogayya Aboubakr, a highly intelligent and ambitious lady whom Shafiq was later to marry; Ahmad Gilani (alias Affandi Jan), heir to the famous spiritual family and a young Mohammad-Zai with links to the former Seraj Royal Family.

All this is important to understand the rapid ascent of Shafiq of Kama (near Jalal-Abad), a former student of religious science. This is critical, for in the early 1960s, the King, in his attempts to counter the dictatorship of Prime Minister Daoud, had secret connections with this group of the liberal and progressive Kabul "bourgeoisie". Under their influence and in a rare moment of courage, the King in 1963 proposed constitutional and political changes to his Prime Minister (who was also his cousin). Daoud was older than the King and was married to his sister; therefore, Daoud was supposed to be respected as an (oriental) "big brother"

(*Agha-Lala*). The changes sought by the King were along the lines envisaged by Farhang, Samad Hamed, Shafiq and others of their close friends and confidants.

Daoud, who had been in his youth an admirer of Hitler and Mussolini and was the political protégé of the dictator Hashim Khan (Prime Minister 1933-46), was a staunch supporter of Pashtunism against all other peoples of Afghanistan and a real protagonist of the Pashtunistan calamity; he was also a great admirer of the anti-monarchist Nasser of Egypt. Not surprisingly, he was against all of the democratic and liberal changes proposed by the King. Daoud chose to resign, and it was in this way that the King, freed from the immediate control of his *Agha-Lala*, was able to call openly for the liberal and progressive group, of whom Shafiq was one, to draft a democratic constitution. Shafiq and his friends, for whom Daoud had no love whatsoever, laboured to draft a constitution with the legal assistance of Louis Fougere, a provincial French adviser who knew well the case of Morocco.

Shafiq, who was head of a department which was constantly bullied by the Minister, Sayyid Abdulla - a bureaucratic Daoudist - became Deputy Minister of Justice when that ministry was taken over by Sayyed Shams-ud-din Majrooh, a suave and intellectual liberal of an earlier generation, who also happened to come from Ningarhan Province, the same as Shafiq. The famous Article 24 of the Constitution, which was discussed and adopted, prohibited a member of the Royal Family, as Daoud was, from becoming Prime Minister: this only enhanced Daoud's animosity toward Dr. Zaher, Shafiq, Farhang, and Samad Hamed. Clearly, Daoud wanted to stage a comeback, and it is not surprising that the only recorded reservation to Article 24 came from Nour Ahmad Etemadi, a former protégé of Mohammad Naim, Daoud's full brother. Etemadi, a Mohammad-Zai, was a member of the drafting committee and was considered a man of the middle between the King and Daoud.

Dr. Youssof's second "cabinet" in November 1965 lasted only three days. Maiwandwal, a former protégé of Naim who was later to become anti-Daoud because of his inherent liberalism and substantial ambition, received a vote of confidence. The King, under the influence of some of his private advisers, did not support and protect Dr. Youssof. This was the King's first major mistake. Shafiq was too junior to become Prime Minister in 1964. He prepared to bide his time, travelling to the United States for further education, becoming an "adviser" to the Foreign Office, accepting an opportunity to study French in France, and, eventually, becoming simultaneously Afghan Ambassador to Egypt and Lebanon. It was an open secret that Shafiq was to be the King's last card.

It should be mentioned here that Moussa Shafiq, when in 1972 he was Foreign Minister in Dr. Zahir's government, and also in the time of his Prime Ministership, annoyed even his closest associates and well-wishers by continuing to practice and flaunt the "dandy" manners he acquired during his stint as ambassador. His adversaries attacked him as a playboy, and even his strongest supporters were put off by his use of government service architects to plan his villas; one on the bank of the Kargha Dam near Kabul and one for winter in Jalal-Abad. And in 1972, he even requested Aryana Afghan Airlines to transport a *Deesse* from Paris to Kabul!

Maiwandwal, Prime Minister in 1965, former Ambassador to London, Washington, and, more recently, Islamabad, was then a liberal. He had not been in Kabul as a member of the drafting committee of the new Constitution. Shafiq, Farhang, and Samad Hamed considered him a outsider, too "western", and a rival, and they set about turning the House of Representatives into an anti-Maiwandwal body. Farhang, his sister Rogayya Aboubakr, and other friends of Moussa Shafiq in fact

succeeded in turning the House of Representatives into a permanent enemy of the government. This was, of course, in accordance with the wishes of Babrak Karmal and against the spirit of the Constitution. The King, who was under the strong influence of Shafiq and his group, was made to think that a Head of State *must* support the Members of Parliament against the government. The idea of an equilibrium between the legislature and the executive, which was of course the real basis for the Constitution, had never been suggested to the King. Rather, the King favoured a kind of "Gouvernement d'Assemblie"; he refused to protect Maiwandwal (and later Etemadi). This was his second major error, which eventually cost him the throne. Henceforth, it was to the advantage of Members of Parliament such as Aziz-id-lah Wasefi and Is-haq Osman, who were undeclared Daoudists, to cooperate with an even more secret Daoudist: Babrak Karmal. Every few weeks, this group would float rumours through the House which served no other purpose than to raise the King's anxiety level and to fuel his doubts. So it is that a really liberal and progressive monarch became a tool in the hands of those members of Parliament who craftily directed the Daoudist secret lobby. (Nobody should forget that Babrak Karmal was secretly protected in the early 1950s by Daoud against his uncle, Prime Minister Shah-Mahmoud. Babrak Karmal was released from prison in 1955 by then Prime Minister Daoud. At this time, Babrak was already a communist agitator).

Even non-Daoudist politicians, members of the House, discovered how easily it was to influence the King, and many moved to take advantage of this favourable psychological situation. Relations between Farhang, Samad Hamed, and the King became strained; Shafiq, when not living abroad, did little to help the King to free himself from his predicament. Shafiq was, however, the only one to retain complete pyschological and intellectual influence over Zaher-Shah.

The King and Etemadi (and later Dr. Zaher and Shafiq) allowed Marxists complete freedom, failing to notice how vital it was for Afghanistan to have a progressive Islamic political party. On page 57 of his article, Professor Newell writes how "ultraconservative religious groups gained followers on the campuses" about 1969. In fact, there were progressive Muslim fundamentalists including young men like Professor Niyazi (later jailed by Daoud and executed in 1978 by Taraki-Amin), Professor Rabbani, and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who are now fighting against the Soviets for Afghanistan's freedom. Young men like Ahmad-Shah Massoud, who now battle successfully against the battalions of the greatest army in the world, are Islamic products of those years. Neither the King and his Prime Ministers, nor any high officials, did anything to encourage progressive Islamic youth. A great opportunity was thus lost, and the King had committed his third, and perhaps crucial error.

It was only under the Etemadi government that plots to bring back Daoud began. Abdul-Razzaq Ziyayee, an obscure administrative Deputy Foreign Minister and a staunch Daoudist, initiated in 1970 his secret talks with Mir-Akbar Kheybar, a member of Parcham and, therefore, an indirect informant of the KGB and the Soviet Communist Party. Etemadi obeyed the King by sending Razzaq Ziyayee as Ambassador to Prague. Etemadi was himself under the influence of the Daoudists around him, which cost him some weeks of nervous depression. He had great respect for Daoud, who secretly informed him that he, Daoud, had decided to take power, which explains Etemadi's resignation. As usual, the King was not aware of this plot, being tired of the turbulence in Parliament and prepared to content himself with his "own" men, Dr. Abdul Zaher and Moussa Shafiq. Called back from their ambassadorial posts in Rome and Cairo respectively, Dr. Zaher and Shafiq were asked to form a government. This transpired during a period when Afghanistan was facing the worst drought in human memory and when

Daoud, after a secret agreement with communist officers (mainly Fag Mohammad, Pacha-Gul, and Mohtat), had already given a green light to his supporters to prepare a *coup d'état*. Daoud's supporters in Parliament began at this time to attack the King indirectly for allowing an Iranian mission some weeks earlier to pay a visit to the Helmady Valley and the Kajaki dam, where they observed that there was no water in the reservoir. Is-haq Osman and Aziz-ul-lih Wasef were particularly vicious in their statements to the effect that such a visual acknowledgement was a slander on national sovereignty, and they carried their argument to the cabinet of Dr. Zaher, which included Shafiq, in May 1972. With the same team, Daoud launched a debate in support of civil servants being required to know *both* official languages of the country, which had the obvious and intended effect of pitting Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns against one another. (Pashtu has not been mastered by many Turkmen, Tajiks, and Uzbeks). Had the debate continued, it is likely that Afghanistan would have split into two or more ethnic pieces. The King failed to identify Daoud as the culprit in this matter. Meanwhile, the King's own son-in-law, General Abdul Wali, continually warned him of the possibility of a *coup d'état*. However, the communist officers in the armed forces were unable to initiate an anti-monarchist coup without Daoud as leader; thus, the two factions merged for this last act.

The King, who was vacationing in Italy, at first considered the coup as a breach of confidence by his brother-in-law. Later, through messengers, Daoud made the King think that if he, Daoud, had not headed the coup, the communists would have seized power by themselves and the consequences would have been even more dire.

Daoud was happy to put Shafiq in the Deh-mazang jail, thereby eliminating one of the principal authors of the hated Article 24 of the (now abolished) Constitution. Communists, who had assisted in the coup, were also happy to see the young liberal intellectual, who was thoroughly versed in Islamic law and the Shari'at, removed; if he was anything, Shafiq was considered a stooge of the West. However, Daoud could not condemn Shafiq for signing the Helmand Waters Treaty with Hoveyda, for Daoud had signed a similar treaty 14 years earlier; this earlier treaty was later rejected by Teheran. Thus, Shafiq was not executed. The case of another ambitious Afghan politician was still pending, moreover. Mohammad Hashim Maiwandwal had welcomed the fall of Zaher-Shah but insisted on criticizing Daoud in his private conversations. A *coup d'état*, supposedly to be lead by Maiwandwal, was conveniently discovered, and the former Prime Minister was arrested in September 1973. Later, communist police officers, like Azhar Amer-Khel, quietly assassinated Maiwandwal in his cell. Incredibly, the government announced the next day that he had committed suicide by hanging himself with the aid of his necktie and the belt from his robe! Maiwandwal was not to be missed by the new powers. Although he had leftist pretentions, he still was considered "a man of the imperialists". And Daoud was certainly relieved that the only man outside the Mohammad-Zai clan who was a potential rival for power in the future was liquidated.

Former Prime Minister Etemadi was sent as Ambassador to Moscow, where he was welcomed by his old friend Gromyko, with whom he had negotiated many times since 1956. In 1979, his friendship with Gromyko apparently failed him: Taraki and Amin had him assassinated in August of that year.

Prince Abdul-Wali and Moussa Shafiq were released by Daoud, despite the fact that communists served on the martial councils. Abdul-Wali immediately left to join his family in Rome, but Shafiq was held under house arrest in his half-constructed villa at the Kargha Dam. Later he was moved to Kabul and was sometimes seen walking disconsolately in the Wazir-Akvar-Khan quarter. He was

advised to refuse visits, even from his close friends, and he was not permitted to live in his home town, Jalal-Abad. Those who were able to meet him learned that he had had two gloomy audiences with Daoud; yet he remained optimistic for the future. Shafiq was arrested by the communists at the end of April 1978, detained in the basement of the Ministry of Defence (facing the Palace), and, paradoxically was taken along with Wahid Abdullah, General Rokay Solayman, General Abdul-Qadeer Khaleeq, and some others who were active in the Daoud administration and executed in May 1978.

Shafiq never reemerged as a prominent adviser to Daoud, as Richard Newell believes on the basis of a "personal interview with a surviving member of Daoud's final cabinet, October 1980". Professor Newell (and the unnamed surviving member) must not forget that Daoud was by then pathologically unable to make any wise decisions.

Very few Afghanis mourned for Daoud, although his slaughter - along with his brother Naim and his family - by Khalqi officers was an act of pure barbarism. Daoud opened the door to communism in Afghanistan, which brings us to today.

Even for a Western observer "from afar", I have been perhaps too candid. And it is for this reason that I ask you to withold my name.

Contributors

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